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The practice of employing sedation to unconsciousness at the end of life is 
reserved for those patients with intractable suffering. However, whilst the need 
for symptom relief for these patients is recognized, employment of this 
intervention has been subject to significant controversy. In recognition of this, the 
palliative care community upon which care of these patients have been entrusted 
have made great strides to disperse these concerns both through the employment 
of evidence-based measures and standardization of this practice through the 
production of clinical guidelines. 
Clinical data and careful specification of care approaches have appeared to 
assuage some of these concerns but careful study of the ethical and practical 
elements of this treatment of last resort raises yet more questions.  
Practically, once this treatment has been employed, issues such as variances in 
access to care facilities and palliative care, differences in the manner that the 
overall goals of care when addressing care of these patients are determined, and 
how monitoring requirements and support of these patients and their families are 
met remain a cause for concern. Ethical issues such as the decision-making 
processes behind the application of these treatments, the consent process involved 
in applying the treatment, the guiding principles with regards to the oversight of 
this procedure and its wider effects upon the personhood of the patient are also 
frequently overlooked. These issues have increasingly been seen as the new face 
of controversy with regards the employment of these treatments. 
 xiv 
This thesis will scrutinize the prevailing practices of terminal sedation (TS) and 
palliative sedation (PS) from a clinical and ethical perspective, highlighting five 
areas of concern that have and will be a cause for concern for these practices. 
Through careful ethical and clinical study of these areas of concern, this thesis 
will offer a new, clinically relevant, ethically sensitive, culturally appropriate 
practice called “continuous deep palliative sedation” (CDPS) that addresses many 
of the procedural and ethical worries that have plagued its predecessors. 
This thesis will argue for the continued application of clinically assisted nutrition 
and hydration (CANH) as a matter of routine unless medically contraindicated, 
and the proportional and monitored titration of sedatives and opioids that is 
consistent with prevailing clinical guidelines, for this very specific form of 
sedation at the end of life. To further distance this practice from prevailing 
clinical controversies, this thesis will also argue for oversight of a 
multidisciplinary specialist palliative care team on all aspects of care and 
decision-making to ensure that this practice is holistically considered, balanced, 
transparent, accountable and evidenced-based. Additionally, in adopting a 
homogeneous view to suffering, the CDPS framework will extend its boundaries 
of care to include all forms of suffering inclusive of existential suffering in 
keeping with the ethos of palliative care.  
This framework will also argue in favour of the overall goals of care to be firmly 
focused upon the palliation of intractable suffering as determined by a holistic 
review by a multiprofessional team. Where patient involvement in this 
deliberative process is limited by compromises to their cognition and competence 
as well as a result of their susceptibility to the undue influence of their underlying 
clinical condition and/or their prevailing psychosocial context, the CDPS 
 xv 
framework invokes the application of a multidisciplinary-team-determined best 
interest assessments to inform and guide the decision-making process. 
Furthermore, in light of concerns about the effects of CDPS that have shifted 
from potential life abbreviation to the apparent negation of personhood, this thesis 
will proffer an evidence-based approach to viewing personhood that will dispel 
fears that this procedure induces “social death” and is thus not dissimilar to 
euthanasia.  
The prerequisites to applying this intervention of last resort include:   
(1) a diagnosis of intractability where there is an exhaustion of treatment 
options to palliate the distressing symptoms experienced to a tolerable level 
within an acceptable time frame; 
(2) “terminality” of the illness where a prognosis of less than two weeks is 
anticipated; 
(3) a diagnosis of “futility” when it is determined that the cancer progression is 
no longer responsive to disease altering treatments; and 
(4) a determination that application of this procedure is in keeping with the 
holistically determined best interests of the patient. 
In giving an ethical defence of this position, this thesis addresses a number of key 
considerations: the professional obligation to relieve suffering and the ethical 
justification for holistic palliative treatment of intractable suffering including 
existential suffering; the issues surrounding treatment without consent when 
many patients being considered for sedation at the end of life lack the capacity to 
authorize such treatments; justifying best interests decision-making that extends 
beyond the physician-patient dyad; the ethics of appropriateness and 
proportionality of response given its centrality to the employment of this 
treatment, and its related monitoring and safety precautions; and the need for an 
 xvi 
account of personhood to distance this treatment from euthanasia. Clarification of 
these facets will serve to set CDPS as a distinct and acceptable practice of last 
resort within the armamentarium of palliative care.  
 xvii 
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The practice of palliative medicine has evolved a great deal over the last decade. 
The research, education and symptom management in this area of practice have 
expanded rapidly whereas other areas have struggled to match this growth (1,2). 
This can be seen in the stuttering growth of palliative medical services amongst 
non-cancer patients and in end-of-life care for those suffering from poorly 
controlled symptoms (1,2). This uneven development owes much to the struggles 
of palliative medicine in overcoming long held misconceptions about the end of 
life, fears regarding the medications used and particular societal beliefs and 
misconceptions about the role and goals of palliative medicine (1,2). Slow 
progress in expanding end-of-life care is also due to unfortunate associations with 
life attenuating measures, a lack of clarity in its goals of care, a dearth of 
universally accepted clinical approaches and monitoring techniques as well as the 
extent of care that can be afforded these patients (1,2).  
A plethora of issues remain unresolved within end-of-life care for those with 
poorly controlled symptoms (3,4). This thesis focuses on patients whose 
symptoms do not respond to conventional means of treatment and amongst whom 
the perceived risks of hastening death are very great. I will consider the subgroup 
of patients who despite maximal palliative care interventions remain in a state of 
distress at the end of life. 
For these patients, it is the practices of palliative sedation (PS) or terminal 
sedation (TS) that represent the best serviceable means of ensuring that their final 
2 
stages of life are comfortable and indeed free of distress [Appendix 1-6]. 
However such practices continue to be fraught with controversy (3,4). 
 
Controversies surrounding the application of palliative sedation  
and terminal sedation 
Controversy regarding the application of treatments such as PS or TS which entail 
the application of sedatives and sometimes opioids to induce unconsciousness as 
a means of circumnavigating awareness of suffering has raised concerns that this 
medication may potentially hasten death in frail patients (3-8). These forms of 
sedation stand apart from lighter forms of sedation described by Morita that 
include mild sedation where “patients can communicate with caregivers”, and 
intermittent sedation which “ provide some periods when patients are alert”; 
continuous sedation like PS and TS, on the other hand, continue to alter a 
patient’s consciousness until they die (29). For the relatively small subset of 
palliative care patients (estimated to be about 1-3% of cases locally) the type of 
sedation being applied is primarily deep continuous sedation where light, light 
intermittent, deep intermittent sedation have been tried and found to be 
ineffective and there is confirmation of an exhaustion of treatment options, 
continued suffering and a prognosis of two weeks or less. I describe just such a 
case in section 3.3 on page 141 to provide a background of care for these patients 
with increasingly difficult to treat suffering that culminates in the need for 
continuous sedation. 
3 
Prevailing concepts of TS and PS, however, are fraught with inconsistencies, as I 
will highlight in Chapter 1, though a brief summary is enclosed here in the form 
of Table I.1. In the light of these concerns, an alternative to prevailing practices – 
continuous deep palliative sedation (CDPS) – is proposed.  
Facets  CDPS TS (refer to extant 
guidelines in 
Appendix 3)  
PS (refer to 
guidelines in 
Appendices 5 and 6) 
Goals Relief of all 
forms of 
suffering 
Not clear whether the focus is treating symptoms 
or suffering, or whether existential suffering is a 
valid indication – see Appendix 1,2,3,5 and 6. 
Prognosis < 2/52 Not strictly defined for example Morita et al had 
suggested a prognosis of three weeks whilst the 
ACP-ASIM guidelines suggest that it may be used 
in patients with burns. 
Intractable Defined Not clearly defined; various undefined terms used 
– see Appendix 4. 
MDT review Required Not strictly required. Second opinions and 
palliative care inputs not required. 





Some require informed consent; others rely on 














Includes light intermittent, light continuous, deep 




Required Means and frequency of monitoring are not 
specified; requirement of professional oversight is 
not discussed.  
Table I.1 Fundamental differences between TS, PS and CDPS 
It is in these settings where the application of sedatives such as benzodiazepines 
and/or opioids to achieve these goals, that concerns arise over fears precipitating 
respiratory depression (3-8). The situation is made more complicated by the frail 
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state of these patients, which leaves them particularly predisposed to such ill 
effects (3-8).  
This situation is further complicated by the practice of the routine cessation of 
clinically assisted artificial nutrition and hydration (CANH), which has been held 
to predispose patients to yet further side effects as a result of a reduction in the 
excretion of opioid metabolites (6). The issue of CANH provision is also a key 
consideration for some authors who suggest that sedating a patient to 
unconsciousness, leaving them incapable of eating and drinking and not 
providing them with CANH was tantamount to intentionally seeking their demise 
(6). This in turn has led to the term “slow euthanasia” being applied to the 
practice of sedation at the end of life (7,8). 
A further concern regarding the application of these treatments centres on the lack 
of clear practice guidelines and monitoring protocols [Appendix 1-6]. Clear 
inclusion criteria, transparency and justification for attempting these treatments 
and clear objective and reproducible endpoints are needed. Furthermore, 
variances in the types of drugs used, the manner that they are applied, the 
duration of application and the variations in pharmacodynamics and 
pharmacokinetics as a result of genetic differences have meant that there remain 
significant gaps in knowledge (9-13). 
Concerns also arise as to how decisions to employ PS or TS come about and 
whether patients plagued with apparent unremitting symptoms, frail with their 
progressive illness and on maximal treatment doses of various medications could 
participate in a deliberative process (14). The consent process for these treatments 
has thus been under increasing scrutiny (14). 
5 
Monitoring the state of patients under TS and PS has offered some evidence that 
patients do still retain some awareness of suffering and pain (15-17). Questions 
then arise as to whether the monitoring processes that are carried out during the 
applications of sedation at the end of life are appropriate for the tasks for which 
they are applied. Ensuring that an appropriate level of sedation is provided and 
that present monitoring techniques are effective has now become a concern 
(16,17). This is particularly important given that the current practice of applying 
the lowest possible doses of medication to achieve the stated goals of care may be 
benchmarked upon inaccurate information and compromised by ineffective 
monitoring techniques (16,17). This in turn compromises the ethos of 
proportional response. 
The goals of care of TS and PS have also come under scrutiny over their 
approach to managing the needs of terminally ill patients (18-20). Also under the 
spotlight has been the manner that intractable existential suffering is viewed 
under the auspices of these goals of care (18-20).  
The personhood of sedated patients is a further area of concern (21-23). Some 
philosophers and neurobiologists hold that the seat for personhood lies within the 
realms of consciousness, which would be lost in the event of sedation (21-26). 
The importance of this issue becomes clear and returns TS and PS full circle to 
the vexed practices of euthanasia when it is suggested that if personhood replete 
with its social functions and features that endow a patient with their individuality 
can be sacrificed for comfort, could life itself not be sacrificed, when there is only 
a limited prognosis at stake and the potential for further suffering (21,22)? 
6 
Would intractable existential suffering be warranting of such a “drastic” 
intervention? Clearly the response is dependent upon the prevailing sociocultural 
views of suffering and perceptions as to the “severity” and extent of damage and 
distress a patient suffers (19,20,27,28). Whilst studies into the effects of suffering 
upon an individual’s personhood are seen to provide healthcare professionals 
(HCPs) with just such insight, these reviews have yet to bridge the gulf between 
the two dominant and opposing views on the viability of treating intractable 
existential suffering with sedation at the end of life (SEL) (19,20,27,28) 
[Appendix 3,5 and 6].  
  
Figure I.1 Areas of concern of this thesis 
Consideration of this spectrum of concerns reveals significant overlap between 














key areas featured in Figure I.1, which in turn form the focus of this thesis in its 
efforts to address prevailing concerns with regards to the practice of SEL.  
 
Objectives of this thesis 
The CDPS framework begins by addressing the prevailing concerns with respect 
to the practice of SEL that have left it poorly understood and open to conjecture 
with respect to its treatment goals, prerequisites and extent of care [Appendix 1-
6]. Chapter 1 highlights these inconsistencies in the practice of TS and PS and 
reviews the clinical, bio-psychosocial, ethical and practical issues that affect these 
practices [Appendix 1-6]. Clarification of the manner that the practices of TS and 
PS are conceived and utilized will aid in overcoming some of the practical 
concerns with respect to SEL. The proposed alternative to prevailing practices of 
SEL is inspired by Morita et al’s description of continuous deep sedation (CDS) 
and Quill’s description of proportionate palliative sedation (PPS) (29,30). CDPS 
represents an evolution of both these concepts (29,30). Unlike Morita et al’s 
described practice, neither physical nor psychological distress is seen as the only 
indication for CDPS (29). Furthermore vital organ failure is not a primary 
requirement for its application (29). CDPS, like Quill’s PPS formulation, applies 
sedation in progressive titrations to ameliorate suffering but CDPS is clear in the 
manner and route that this sedation is applied (30).  
In CDPS, medications with the primary function of inducing sedation are applied 
to complement the effects of other medications used to alleviate symptoms that 
are resistant to all practical and viable standard treatment modalities. The intent is 
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the induction of deep and continuous sedation until death as a form of 
circumnavigating awareness of the suffering when the cause cannot be reversed 
and the effects of suffering cannot be ameliorated by any other manner. In these 
patients who have short estimated life expectancies and who are expected to 
continue to suffer unabated until death without CDPS, the induction of 
unconsciousness is seen as a treatment of last resort. This controlled and 
monitored application of sedation in combination with increasing data on the 
safety of sedatives and opioids when applied in keeping with increasingly 
available guidelines and care standards lays to rest many of the concerns 
regarding the death hastening effects that have plagued the practices of TS and PS 
[Appendix 1-3, 5 and 6]. 
Implemented under the aegis of palliative care, the practice of CDPS is defined as 
the proportional and monitored induction of deep continuous sedation for the 
amelioration of all forms of intractable physical, psychological and existential 
suffering in a cancer patient with a prognosis of less than two weeks following a 
holistic multiprofessional assessment of the patient’s condition to affirm that 
suffering is in fact intractable and the application of such an intervention is in the 
patient’s best interests. The intent of this procedure is to circumnavigate 
awareness of suffering through the maintenance of deep levels of sedation in a 
manner that is consistent with current guidelines and clinical, professional and 
legal standards after other forms of light and deep intermittent sedation have been 
employed and have failed to reduce the severity of the suffering. This procedure 
is monitored and overseen by a MDT to ensure accountability, transparency and 
justifiability of actions and to make certain that life is not intentionally 
abbreviated. CANH is provided as a matter of routine in the application of CDPS 
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unless clinically contraindicated. The prerequisites for implementing CDPS in 
cancer patients are:  
(1) a diagnosis of intractability where there is an exhaustion of treatment 
options to palliate the distressing symptoms experienced to a tolerable level 
within an acceptable time frame; 
(2) a diagnosis of “terminality” of the illness where a prognosis of less than two 
weeks is anticipated; 
(3) a diagnosis of “futility” when it is determined that the cancer progression is 
no longer responsive to disease altering treatments; and 
(4) a determination that application of this procedure is in keeping with the 
holistically determined best interests of the patient. 
Including CDPS under the aegis of palliative care ensures the provision of 
effective multiprofessional, multidimensional, transparent and accountable care. 
It has been this failure to fully comprehend the ethos of a palliative-care-led 
approach and observe recognized palliative care standards and guidelines that 
have hindered the appropriate use of PS and TS. I submit that when overseen by 
prevailing ethical, social, cultural, spiritual, professional and legal standards, 
many of the practical and sociocultural concerns that have arisen around this 
practice of sedation at the end of life can be allayed.  
Concerns, however, remain with regard to the determinations of the goals of care 
and the deliberative process that underpins it, the consent process that authorizes 
the implementation of these treatments, how it is monitored and the safeguards 
that are taken. There is also an increasing fear that the personhood of the patient 
is sacrificed as a result of this treatment. I review these issues as they are seen 
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under the aegis of the three prevailing approaches of sedation at the end of life, 
highlighting the key areas of discussion in the chapters to follow.  
In Chapter 2, I discuss the manner in which the goals of care determine the course 
and means that care is approached and delineated. I argue that the goals of care 
must remain firmly focused upon a palliative intent given an exhaustion of 
treatment options, a limited prognosis of two weeks or less and the continued 
presence of intractable suffering. These goals focus upon the relief of all forms of 
suffering, even at the cost of hastening the patient’s demise (19,20). The limits as 
to what manner and what indications steer these determinations are discussed. Of 
specific interest is the position afforded to existential suffering in the CDPS 
framework.  
Chapter 3 considers the decision-making process that underpins the application of 
CDPS. There are no clearly specified guidelines on how decisions are made and 
most decision-making approaches remain focused upon the patient-physician 
dyad seen in clinic settings rather that the realities of end-of-life care where there 
are many parties involved (31-33). I argue that addressing the complexities of 
decision-making in the presence of so many interested parties and within the 
emotionally charged arena of end-of-life care requires a multidisciplinary-team-
led holistic review of the case (34-41). I will consider the process that should be 
adopted in the deliberative process, which will better engage the patient and their 
family within the deliberative process without compromising the best interests of 
the patient (14,35,41). This is addressed in particular to societies that favour a 
family centric approach to care determinations (35-37).  
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The presence of intimate involvement of the family in the decision-making 
process also raises the question about the viability of consent in TS, PS and 
CDPS applications (35-37). Chapter 4 considers this question in the light of the 
effects of intractable symptoms, treatments and clinical conditions amongst these 
patients and shows that they negatively impact the ability to consent. Chapter 4 
argues for the application of best interest determinations, ascertained by the MDT 
as an alternative form of authorization when all attempts to obtain informed 
consent from the patient have failed (35,41,42). Further, in keeping with the 
patient centred care determination that is applied, I argue that best interests 
determinations of a particular patient cannot be based upon a priori judgement but 
must consider the specific wishes, values and goals of the patient, including their 
views and consent at all stages of treatment (34,35,41). This process must be 
overseen by the prevailing professional and legal standards  
Chapter 5 considers the increasing concerns regarding the implementation and 
monitoring of CDPS, particularly whether reliance upon the traditionally 
conceived ideas of proportional response to symptom management that continue 
to steer the employment of sedation at the end of life, are accurate and indeed 
effective (16,17,43-47). Underpinning this is the fact that there is increasing data 
to suggest that even in an unconscious state, patients may still be aware of their 
suffering, suggesting that other endpoints to assess the efficacy of the treatment 
applied should be employed (43-47). I provide alternative means to realizing 
these goals. 
However, in realizing this goal of rendering a patient unconscious in order to 
negate their awareness of their suffering, concerns with regards to the personhood 
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of the patient are raised (21,22). Chapter 6 considers the most recent concern 
regarding the application of sedation at the end of life. I review concerns by some 
commentators on the practice of PS that the application of sedation to 
unconsciousness is akin to negating a patient’s personhood which in turn appears 
to be ethically indistinct from the practice of euthanasia (21,22). Central to this 
belief is the primacy accorded to consciousness as the definitive property to 
personhood (23-25). A human life without personhood is held to be lacking value 
and is comparable to non-existence, making comparisons with biological death 
possible (21,22). I present a critique of this position based on ethical 
considerations and a clinically derived, empirically validated account of 
personhood within the palliative care patient population that overcome these 
concerns (48,49).  
This concept of personhood, referred to as the Ring Theory of Personhood also 
serves to aid in the study of the impact of suffering upon the person (48,49). This 
is the central feature of Chapter 7 where I show that irrespective of the manner 
that intractable existential suffering is conceived, its effects upon personhood are 
significant and multidimensional. This analysis serves to justify the inclusive and 
holistic view of suffering adopted within this thesis and the applicability of CDPS 
for the treatment of all forms of intractable suffering so long as all the 
prerequisites are met. 
Through study of the issues featured in the chapters to come, this thesis will 
address the main prevailing and the prime anticipated concerns relating to the 
practice of CDPS to pave the way towards appropriate, accountable and justified 
13 
treatment of patients suffering from intractable symptoms at the end of life 
(Fig I.1)  
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Chapter 1 
THE PRACTICE OF SEDATION AT THE END OF LIFE 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The practice of sedating patients at the last stages of life has been increasingly 
applied internationally, yet its prevalence outside Europe, Japan and North 
America remains unstudied [Appendix 1,2,3,5 and 6]. While many studies show 
an increasing trend in its application amongst terminally ill cancer patients within 
the hospital setting in countries where palliative care practice is more established, 
a study by Krishna et al within a similar setting in Singapore revealed no cases 
meeting prevailing definitions of this practice (1-3) [Appendix 1,2,3,5 and 6]. 
This omission is instructive if only to highlight the complexities inherent in this 
practice that have yet to be acknowledged in the extant literature on this subject.  
I argue that existing definitions in this sphere of practice, such as terminal 
sedation (TS) and palliative sedation (PS), do not adequately capture key 
meanings of the act of sedating patients nearing death for healthcare professionals 
(HCPs) who practice within specific ethical, legal, social and policy contexts 
[Appendix 1,2,3,5 and 6].  
To be clear, this thesis concerns itself with a very specific and small subset of 
terminally ill patients. These are patients who experience intractable suffering, 
have a prognosis of less than two weeks to live, and have exhausted all curative 
measures; palliation of their continuing suffering through medical, psychological, 
spiritual and social support, either on their own or in combination, has failed and 
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despite all forms of alternative and holistic care continue to suffer. This subgroup 
of patients also represent those who have not responded to other forms of 
sedation be it light intermittent, light continuous or deep intermittent sedation. 
With deep continuous sedation as the only alternative after stepwise increments 
of sedation and palliative options, these patients require specialist palliative care 
review within an institutional setting where a multiprofessional, multidimensional 
review of their psychosocial, spiritual, clinical and existential concerns can be 
addressed. It is also in this setting that a review is undertaken with regards to 
these patients’ understanding of their condition, their views, values, beliefs and 
goals of care, as well as their opinions concerning treatments attempted and those 
proposed. Informed consent is desirable wherever possible and for those patients 
who cannot consent, a best interests determination is made by the 
multidisciplinary team (MDT) in conjunction with independent specialists and 
input from family and indeed the patient themselves.   
To begin, this thesis describes a cluster of practices around sedating patients at 
the final stages of a patient’s life, observed in clinical settings within Singapore. I 
shall examine them from a clinical, bio-psychosocial, ethical and practical stand 
point in order to describe and defend in ethical terms an observed practice, which 
I shall denote by the term “continuous deep palliative sedation” (CDPS).  
CDPS is defined as the proportional and monitored induction of deep continuous 
sedation for the amelioration of all forms of intractable physical, psychological 
and existential suffering in a cancer patient with a prognosis of less than two 
weeks following holistic multiprofessional assessment of the patient’s condition 
to affirm that suffering is indeed intractable and the application of such an 
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intervention is in the patient’s best interests. The intent of this procedure is to 
circumnavigate awareness of suffering through the maintenance of deep levels of 
sedation in a manner that is consistent with current guidelines and clinical 
standards after other forms of light and deep intermittent sedation have been 
employed and have failed to reduce the severity of the suffering. This procedure 
is monitored and overseen by a MDT to ensure accountability, transparency and 
justifiability of this intervention and that life is not intentionally abbreviated. 
CANH is provided as a matter of routine in the application of CDPS unless 
clinically contraindicated.  
The prerequisites for implementing CDPS in cancer patients are:  
(1) a diagnosis of intractability where there is an exhaustion of treatment 
options to palliate the distressing symptoms experienced to a tolerable level 
within an acceptable time frame; 
(2) “terminality” of the illness where a prognosis of less than two weeks is 
anticipated; 
(3) a diagnosis of “futility” when it is determined that the cancer progression is 
no longer responsive to disease altering treatments; and 
(4) a determination that application of this procedure is in keeping with the 
holistically determined best interests of the patient. 
I argue that CDPS is a practice of last resort whose goal is to alleviate intractable 
symptoms of terminally ill patients for whom all curative and palliative 
treatments of their underlying disease condition have been exhausted. I argue that 
there is sufficient ethical and clinical evidence to allow the application of CDPS 
for the treatment of all forms of intractable symptoms that cause unremitting 
suffering in the terminal phase of life. This includes unremitting existential 
suffering experienced by patients, though at present it is generally not applied for 
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the treatment of these forms of intractable suffering (4-13) [Appendix 3 and 5]. 
My position on the use of CDPS for the treatment of intractable existential 
suffering does not rely solely upon the positions taken by all the major European 
guidelines on palliative sedation nor the positions taken by the major textbooks of 
palliative medicine [Appendix 5 and 6]. It rests primarily on the arguments 
presented in Chapters 2 to 7 and on the safeguards elaborated throughout the 
thesis. While I believe this position is ethically defensible, acceptance of the 
position in practice must depend on further social debate and consensus.  
The focus of this chapter is to highlight the complexities of the practice of CDPS 
and the ethical issues facing prevailing practices of terminal sedation (TS) and 
palliative sedation (PS). CDPS raises questions in a number of areas. Through 
careful, practical and ethical analysis of these practices, key points of interest will 
be highlighted and become the focus of coming chapters. These include sedating 
patients with intractable suffering at the end of their life, the goals of care and the 
extent to which relief of suffering is a goal of medicine, the means and ethics of 
shared decision-making, the place of consent under these specific conditions, the 
analysis of proportionality of response within this application, and the potential 
effects of this treatment as well as the effects of suffering upon a patient’s 
personhood. 
To begin, I offer a descriptive account of a localized practice of sedating cancer 
patients near death in a hospital setting. This practice is influenced by the 
guidelines set out by the following textbooks: the Oxford Textbook of Palliative 
Medicine, Saunders’ Palliative Medicine and Textbook of Palliative Medicine 
(14-16). 
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1.2 CONTINUOUS DEEP PALLIATIVE SEDATION (CDPS)  
1.2.1 Goals of CDPS 
1.2.1.1 Distinctive option of last resort 
CDPS is focused upon the goal of alleviating intractable symptoms of terminally 
ill patients for whom all curative and palliative treatments of their underlying 
cancer have been exhausted (14-16).  
CDPS as an “option of last resort” is restricted to terminally ill adult cancer 
patients with a prognosis of less than two weeks (16). Typically it is applied for 
the treatment of fits, delirium, agitation, pain and dyspnea, which appear remedial 
to standard palliative interventions (14-16).  
In all cases the level of sedation that is desired is a function of symptom response 
to the treatment applied (14-16). For those cases where CDPS is required, it is as 
a result of a failure of lighter levels of sedation or indeed deep intermittent 
sedation therapy (14). It is only when “lesser” options prove ineffective that 
stronger doses of treatment or indeed more substantial interventions are employed 
(14). Increasing doses of sedatives are proportionally titrated according to 
response and need, and CDPS is applied to render the patient unaware of their 
intractable symptoms (14-16). 
Attempts to engage the patient in the consent process for this intervention are 
carried out at all stages of the deliberative process, as are efforts to involve the 
family in the decision-making process. In situations where patient consent is not 
possible, their previous wishes and views along with their stated goals, values and 
beliefs are considered by the multidisciplinary team in determining care options. 
23 
Significantly, their opinions and consent for lesser levels of sedation are of great 
importance in the deliberative process leading up to the application of CDPS. 
This process must be overseen by a specialist palliative care physician and carried 
out within the setting of a hospital or hospice. Close monitoring of the patient is 
normally carried out, with clear guidelines to the staff on the manner that they 
ought to respond both to recurrences of symptoms and ill effects both of this 
treatment or progressive disease (14). In all cases, unless clinically 
contraindicated, artificial hydration and nutrition is maintained (14-16).  
Concurrently for all patients and their families, psychosocial, pastoral and 
counselling support are provided in tandem with regular updates of assessments 
of the situation and appraisals of treatment response (14-16). It is integral for care 
to be provided for family members caring for patients in these situations in order 
to allow for better assessments of the patient and for bereavement support of the 
family upon the patient’s demise (14,15). 
 
1.2.1.2 Relief of physical symptoms 
The applying of CDPS within the Singaporean context for example reveals a 
number of considerations. CDPS would not be applied for the treatment of 
existential suffering at present (14). This is partly due to the difficulty in 
identifying, diagnosing, treating and monitoring these symptoms (8-12). The 
subjective nature of symptoms of existential suffering, the difficulty in agreeing 
upon objective criteria for its clinical assessment, a lack of understanding and 
recognition of existential complaints, inadequate training and an inability to treat 
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the person beyond simply the illness and their immediate effects amongst dying 
patients obfuscates diagnosis of existential suffering (8-13,17-20). I will discuss 
this issue in more depth in Chapter 2. 
Although psychological symptoms are not taken to be part of existential suffering, 
their presence can confound diagnoses of existential suffering (12). 
Differentiating symptoms such as depression and anxiety from existential 
presentations within the end-of-life setting is confounded by the fact that many of 
the behavioural manifestations of existential suffering and symptoms of 
depression and anxiety described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (Text Revision) IV (DSM IV –TR) are commonly present in 
terminally ill patients (12,21-25). Treatment options, too, are affected by patients’ 
brief prognosis (12). Many non-pharmacological adjuvants such as psychotherapy, 
pastoral interventions, meditation, massage and hypnosis to alleviate these 
symptoms are unlikely to be effective in this “limited” time (11,12). Similarly, 
Schuman-Olivier et al’s proposal of applying concurrent psychopharmacological 
interventions may be limited given the poor prognosis of these patients (12). 
Schuman-Olivier et al suggest the consideration of timeframes does not only 
consider the “proximity to death” and the time available for effects of an 
intervention to be experienced by a patient but also the patient’s “functional 
capacity to engage in the logistics of a therapeutic relationship” (12). Many 
patients in these situations are liable to be suffering from altered levels of 
consciousness, reduced levels of concentration, reduced mental alertness and 
exhaustion, limiting their participation in these interventions and attenuating this 
treatment window. Similarly, treatments with concurrent psychopharmacological 
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interventions that Schuman-Olivier et al propose may be of limited use given the 
duration they require to take effect may outstrip the patient’s prognosis or may 
begin to take effect much too late to provide the patient with any meaningful 
relief (12,26-28). These conventional measures may also cause harm to some 
patients due to their propensity for inducing sedation, interactions with other 
medications and for side effects amongst these frail patients (26). Alternative 
treatment options such as electroconvulsive therapy and psycho-stimulant 
interventions are also not without risks (26-28).  
Not infrequently if conventional medications are applied, intermittent sedation to 
allow rest and relief for the patient is also applied. Here the sedation is 
intermittent and may take the form of light or deep sedation to ameliorate the 
patient’s suffering while the pharmacological agents begin to take effect or even 
to allow respite overnight. The situation is closely monitored and if it is felt to be 
effective, the sedatives are tapered and stopped as early as possible. The views of 
the patients of their experience of lesser levels of sedation are also noted and duly 
considered when CDPS is being contemplated and formal consent may not be 
possible. This process is overseen and monitored by the primary physician, the 
palliative care physician and the psychiatrist in tandem with the psychologist, 
counsellor and the nursing teams.  
Notably, whilst sedatives are applied in this manner with due consideration of the 
wishes of the patient, this procedure cannot be requested for by the patient and 
remains a treatment of last resort when all other means of treatment have failed to 
ameliorate symptoms. Similarly, even if a patient wishes to remain sedated after 
the application of intermittent sedation, that request in itself cannot be the reason 
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for circumventing trials of alternative pharmacological measures if these 
alternative options are felt to be potentially helpful. This point raises issues about 
the manner that authorization for treatment is granted and how the deliberative 
process that underpins it is carried out. I will discuss this issue in further depth in 
Chapter 4.  
 
1.2.2 Prerequisites for applying CDPS 
A key consideration with regards to the application of CDPS is the prerequisite of 
a cancer diagnosis. There are a number of reasons for this and they are outlined 
below.  
A prime consideration for this limitation to patients with cancer is the variability 
in the pathologies encountered and the effects they have upon the process of 
prognostication, the determination of intractability and the diagnosis of futility, 
which represent three of the four prerequisites for valid application of CDPS. A 
general lack of practical guidance, experience and access to specialized palliative 
care to contend with the complexities of non-oncological end of life conditions 
compounded by pharmacodynamics and pharmacokinetics worries in the face of 
polypharmacy and complex comorbidities ultimately serve to limit considerations 
of extending the application of CDPS to the non-cancer setting.  
This is not to denigrate the needs of non-cancer palliative care patients nor to 
suggest that their symptoms are any less severe that those experienced by cancer 
patients. However, variances in access to general medical care and specialist 
palliative care, variability of clinical practice, differences in monitoring and care 
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provision and the assorted views on the overarching goals of care for these 
patients create a significant amount of ambiguity that cannot be deemed 
acceptable for a practice that is encumbered with concerns of being a form of 
“slow euthanasia” or of being on a slippery slope towards this vexed practice. 
These considerations re-emphasize the importance of the four prerequisites for 
the application of CDPS, which are themselves influenced by prevailing 
guidelines set out by the Oxford Textbook of Palliative Medicine, Saunders’ 
Palliative Medicine and Textbook of Palliative Medicine:  
(1) a diagnosis of intractability in which it is ascertained that there is an 
exhaustion of treatment options available to palliate the distressing 
symptoms experienced by the patient to a tolerable level within an 
acceptable time frame (14-16);  
(2) a diagnosis of “terminality” of the illness where a prognosis of less than two 
weeks is anticipated (14-16); 
(3) a diagnosis of “futility” when it is determined that the cancer progression is 
no longer responsive to disease altering treatments (15); and 
(4) a determination that application of this procedure is in keeping with the 
holistically determined best interests of the patient (14-16). 
I will briefly describe the various aspects of these criteria in sections 1.2.2.1, 
1.2.2.2, 1.2.2.3 and 1.2.4 and provide a more detailed account of them in 
Chapters 3 and 4. 
 
1.2.2.1 Intractability 
The context in which symptoms experienced are determined to be intractable is 
dependent upon the persistence or worsening of symptoms despite the application 
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of maximally tolerated doses of medications and the exhaustion of non-
pharmacological interventions either individually or in combination with one 
another. Here neither light levels of sedation, applied intermittently or 
continuously, nor deep intermittent sedation have been found to relieve suffering 
to a tolerable level.  
Determination of such a diagnosis is complex and is in part dependent upon 
access to specialist care, medication and palliative input. This makes the 
deliberative process underlying any determination variable and highly dependent 
upon the views of those who assess the symptoms and their estimations of the 
benefits accrued from ongoing and previous interventions. Applications of 
treatment options are also situationally dependent and can only be considered if 
deemed acceptable for the case at hand. The use of the term “acceptable” here 
reiterates the subjectivity of this determination and reinforces the need for any 
determination as to whether CDPS is applied as one that is primarily a negotiated 
statement agreed upon within the multidisciplinary team (MDT). The participants 
of a MDT and the manner in which such a determination is arrived at will be 
discussed in Chapter 3.  
 














The MDT will also determine the “terminality” of the patient’s condition. 
Terminality is a clinical judgment of a prognosis of less than two weeks. Whilst 
this estimation can be difficult, accuracy in such estimations does improve with 
the proximity to death and with clinical experience complemented by the 
presence of a spectrum of experience and skill in end-of-life care contained 




The MDT is also tasked, upon due consideration of the holistic situation, with 
determining if available treatment options are futile. This is primarily to confirm 
that all treatment options have been exhausted and CDPS is the treatment of last 
resort as well as to corroborate diagnoses of intractability and terminality (Fig 1.1) 
In this context, a futile intervention is one where “there is a low (e.g., less than 
1%) likelihood that it will achieve its physiological objective” or one where there 
is “no benefit to a patient and therefore should not be prescribed” (35). In keeping 
with the holistic approach adopted in palliative care, opinions are sought from 
patients and their carers and family to ensure that the determination of the 
burdens and benefits concerning “value-laden quality-of-life decisions” are 
appropriately assessed and considered within what has traditionally been a purely 
clinical determination (36). Whilst a consensus building process between HCPs 
and the patient and family is desirable, it is also clear that the final decision lies 
30 
with the clinical team, given the concerns about viability of surrogate decision-
making, in particular by the family, within the local context (37-41). I will discuss 
the decision-making process for CDPS in Chapter 3. 
 
1.2.3 Treatment decision-making in CDPS 
From clinical observations and practice influenced by guidelines forwarded by 
the Oxford Textbook of Palliative Medicine, Saunders’ Palliative Medicine and 
Textbook of Palliative Medicine, there is little in the way of explicating how 
decisions are arrived at for the application of sedation at the end of life (14-16). 
For the most part the decisions for CDPS appear to vary from a medical 
paternalism approach to a familial centric decision-making process (14-16,37-41). 
More consistent and transparent are the decisions made on treatment options and 
the manner that sedation ought to be applied.  
The decision to apply sedation is usually applied by the MDT with agreement by 
the primary decision makers and is viewed as a form of basic medical care to 
control intractable symptoms such as those previously mentioned. To begin, the 
application of intermittent sedation usually takes the form of subcutaneous or 
intravenous injections of the benzodiazepine, midazolam for the treatment of 
agitation or fits, or the antipsychotic, haloperidol for hallucinations or agitation 
(14-16). Administration of these drugs in this manner allows some insight into the 
responsiveness of the symptoms to these interventions and further titration of this 
medication according to response (14-16). The objective of this intervention 
would be to induce the desired effect through the application of the lowest 
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possible doses of the sedative whilst minimizing any ill effect to the patient’s 
condition. 
These drugs may be used in tandem with ongoing treatments such as morphine or 
other opioids for the treatment of other coexistent symptoms such as pain and 
dyspnea (14-16). The midazolam for agitation will be used to supplement the 
morphine for exacerbations of pain or shortness of breath, whilst haloperidol may 
supplement exacerbations of agitation and confusion (14-16). However it may be 
that frequent doses of midazolam or haloperidol are required and usually when 
more than four doses are required within a 24 hour period, a continuous infusion 
of these drugs are sought to provide better control and to dampen down the 
frequency of symptom exacerbations.  
Further indications for the need for a continuous infusion include rapidly 
recurring symptoms and frequent use of extra doses of medications, symptoms 
that require repeated dose escalations and symptoms that only partially respond to 
medications and for variable durations despite consistent dosings. Frequently 
patients and families become more distressed as doses of medications wear off 
and symptoms recur. In some cases these symptoms may revert to their original 
state even before the next dose can be administered. Once again the doses applied 
are titrated gently under the supervision of a senior palliative care physician based 
upon the effect these doses have upon the symptoms and upon the patient as a 
whole. All increments are closely monitored, as are the patient’s vital parameters 
and symptoms. 
In Chapter 2, I shall discuss the goals of care that oversee such applications and 
the desired endpoints of an application of CDPS. In Chapter 6, I will discuss the 
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ethical questions that arise from relieving suffering by means of extinguishing 
consciousness or awareness in patients. In Chapter 7, I will highlight the effects 
of intractable existential suffering has on a patient’s personhood and thus their 
quality of life and comfort and consider whether it as a valid indication for CDPS. 
 
1.2.4 Patient consent to CDPS 
Seeking patient consent is not simply a means of ensuring that patients and family 
have an informed understanding of proposed plans but it also respects patient 
autonomy and maintains a patient-centred care process (42,43). Beauchamp and 
Childress define informed consent as consisting of preconditions which contain 
elements of competence and voluntariness, informational elements which include 
disclosure, recommendations of a plan and understanding, and consent elements 
which are composed of decisions in favour of the plan and authorization of the 
chosen plan (44). With a potentially dangerous treatment option such as CDPS, 
gaining the patient’s consent also serves as a protective measure that wards off 
criminal liability (43). Skegg suggests that the presence of legally effective 
consent mitigates criminal liability by allowing physicians to report that they had 
warned the patient of the risks, discussed their options and respected their 
exercise of autonomous choice to proceed with them after deliberation (42,43).  
Within the present context, medical and psychosocial considerations conspire to 
compromise a patient’s capacity to consent. By most legal definitions a patient 
lacks capacity if at the material time he is unable to make a decision for himself 
in relation to the matter because of an impairment of, or a disturbance in the 
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functioning of, the mind or brain that is irrespective of its temporality, the 
patient’s age, appearance, behaviour or condition and is derived following a 
“balancing of probabilities” (45). This inability to make decisions in turn arises if 
the patient is unable 
“ (a) to understand the information relevant to the decision; 
(b) to retain that information; 
(c)  to use or weigh that information as part of the process of making 
the decision; 
(d) to communicate his decision (whether by talking, using sign 
language or any other means)” (45). 
In light of the high incidence of delirium, loss of consciousness, confusion, 
hallucinations, various states of sedation and coma, it is not uncommon for 
patients to be unable to receive information in any meaningful sense 
(40,41,46,51-53). At the same time, the information itself needs to be conveyed in 
a manner that may be understood by the patient (46,52).  
The idea of complete and thorough disclosure is thus impractical in many 
situations where CDPS is being considered, particularly given the effects of 
intractable symptoms, comorbid conditions and the presence of a cocktail of 
medications (46). Furthermore disclosure of information tends to be biased and 
incomplete in such circumstances (40). To begin with, determinations of what 
information is relevant is decided upon by the physician based their own 
assessment of the capacity of the patient, the psychosocial situation, the patient’s 
clinical context and prognosis, the physician’s own beliefs and values as well as 
biases and the influences that they are under to formulate “bite size chunks” of 
information that they envisage the patient may be able to “deal” with. Blanket 
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disclosures as much as inadequate information provision can be damaging to the 
deliberative process of the patient. Reliance on the professional’s ability to gauge 
what will be necessary for meaningful consent pivots on the trust between the 
MDT and the patient and their family (54). 
Onara O’Neill proposes that the consent process be viewed within the wider 
context of the communications of HCPs and patients spanning their whole 
relationship rather than a sentinel moment in the deliberative process (42,54). 
There are good reasons for such a review. The first may be that the patient is 
unlikely to be able to consent in the presence of intractable symptoms that are 
liable to affect their decision-making capabilities or serve as coercive factors in 
their deliberative processes (46,55). A second factor to consider might be the 
presence of mood and cognitive disturbances such as delirium, depression and 
anxiety amongst many dying patients that further cloud their ability to deliberate 
upon these important considerations (42,46). In both these cases, a review of past 
conversations and statements may throw light on a patient’s wishes as would 
discussions with the patient’s carers, loved ones and healthcare providers (25,51). 
When a patient’s consent cannot be obtained for CDPS, who should authorize 
such a course of treatment? I discuss this problem in Chapter 4 where a 
description of the process of involving different relevant stakeholders in the 
decision is given. First the family’s concerns and goals are considered.  
The influence of the family cannot be discounted. Within the local setting family 
members frequently occupy the position of proxy decision makers even when 
they may neither be best placed or authorized to do so (3,51-56). Despite cultural 
expectations that may be seen to require families to act as primary decision 
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makers, their ability to meet the demands of this role has come under increasing 
scrutiny (3,51-56). Evidence suggests that families are ill equipped to meet the 
demands of these roles with studies showing that only 13% of family members 
are aware of a patient’s treatment preferences (44,56-58). This is unsurprising as 
discussions about death are considered taboo in many societies and cultures (37-
41,59-71). Additionally, efforts to minister to a patient’s psychological and 
spiritual needs and to maintain hope, adherence to filial roles and observance of 
the duty of non-abandonment may complicate the manner that family members 
meet their obligations as prime decision makers in affairs of the patient’s health 
(37-41,46,59-74).  
The family’s role in the deliberative process is also based on recognition that 
without their support and involvement many of the care provisions suggested by 
HCPs will fail. Relevantly, local families do provide the main source of physical 
care, psychosocial support and financial subsidy for many of these patients (39-
41,53). In many cases these provisions come at a great cost to the family as a 
whole. Additionally, local sociocultural expectations place great expectations on 
the family to maintain hope and continue to care for the patient irrespective of the 
financial, psychological and physical costs (3-41,53,70,71). Tied in to these 
expectations are beliefs in family honour and filial piety that compel many local 
families, irrespective of culture, religion or ethnicity, to act to maintain hope of 
cure despite dire outlook and press for extreme and sometimes futile treatment 
options (40,41,70,71).  
Additionally, the role of the family that has become etched in social and cultural 
traditions finds apparent backing in law and policy (75-85). The local health care 
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financing framework requires partial self-funding of care and this inevitably 
involves the family (37,83-85). Furthermore, by the Maintenance of Parent Act 
2010 and Singapore’s Shared Values Initiative, Singaporeans are socioculturally 
and legally required to support their parents (85-87). These are but a few 
examples of how the role of the family within the deliberative process has been 
misconstrued by some local healthcare professionals to validate the apparent right 
of the family to shape decision-making on care and treatment (37,39-41,83).  
Where patients are unable to function autonomously either as a result of 
informational limitations, ongoing disease processes, treatment side effects or as a 
result of coercive or influencing factors that may limit their ability to deliberate 
on matters clearly and unhindered, it falls upon HCPs to protect the rights and 
opportunities of the vulnerable patient (52). Legal, professional and societal 
expectations obligate HCPs to protect and further the patient’s best interest 
guided by a MDT whenever possible, seeking the advice of proxies and 
surrogates, particularly in considering CDPS (45,86-93). This is in line with the 
Mental Capacity Act (45,86-93). 
The best interests of the patient are a means of considering the “value of the life 
for the person who must live it” and are discerned from a multidimensional 
review of the patient’s case derived from the patient’s own appraisals and views, 
those of their family and a multi-professional assessment (44). The various parties 
come together in keeping with the tenets of shared decision-making models to 
deliberate and attempt a consensus decision. If consensus cannot be gained or 
when the minimum standard of care to the patient is threatened, the responsibility 
for the final decision falls upon the primary decision makers based on their 
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estimations of the patient’s best interests (44,45,88-93). Singapore’s Mental 
Capacity Act 2008 (MCA) does not utilize the term “best interest”; however, its 
amended version in 2010 does, as does its advisory notes for deputies produced in 
2010 (45,90-93). It states that deputies must “act in the best interests of the person 
who lacks capacity” and defines “best interest” as “a duty to consider many 
factors on what is best for the person lacking capacity before making a decision 
on his behalf” (93). Part II Section 6 paragraphs 5-8 of the 2010 Amendment of 
the MCA itself covers a number of areas including ensuring that the person 
making the determination is well intended and acting in the best interests of the 
patient (45). It also considers  
(1) the patient’s past and present wishes and feelings; 
(2) the patient’s beliefs and values; 
(3) the patient’s psychosocial considerations; 
(4) [the views of] carers and family members and those engaged in the 
patient’s care, any donee of a lasting power of attorney and any court 
appointed person (45). 
Family involvement is neither set aside nor negated, but is not conferred the 
authoritative position it has sometimes enjoyed (39-41,59-74,94-99).  
 
1.2.5 Treatment procedure in CDPS 
Once the need for sedation is established and assuming that the problems of valid 
consent have been overcome, sedation is applied through the administering of 
either midazolam or haloperidol (40). The selection of these drugs is dependent 
upon their efficacy when administered in an intermittent manner for the control of 
symptom exacerbations (14-16). Other measures that were being used that are 
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deemed useful are maintained and for the most part the sedative is simply added 
to those interventions that have been found to be necessary and effective for the 
patient’s care thus far. Medications with purely sedative characteristics are ceased 
to avoid overlap wherever possible. If extra doses or breakthrough doses are 
required then they will be administered at doses and in a manner that is in 
keeping with strict guidelines and monitoring protocol. For the most part 
midazolam breakthrough doses used to treat additional symptoms that manifest 
themselves over and above the level of symptom intensity and frequency that the 
infusion is tasked with managing is usually identical to the hourly rate of the 
midazolam infusion (100). The same proportions are applied for haloperidol 
breakthrough doses with respect to its maintenance dosing within the infusion 
(100). The maximal dose of midazolam applied is 240mg per day and the 
maximal dose of haloperidol is 30mg per day (14,15). This process is closely 
monitored and changes in care patterns and drug provisions are carried out 
according to clear guidelines not unlike those presented by the European 
Association of Palliative Care (EAPC) or within the Oxford Textbook of 
Palliative Medicine, given the lack of local guidelines (14,15,100) In keeping 
with these guidelines, nursing staff monitor the patient at least once an hour for 
the presence of the target symptoms as well as side effects (14). Should either be 
present, steps are taken to remedy the situation according to guidelines set out.  
Response to the breakthrough dose is then noted after a 24-hour period as are the 
total doses administered over this duration. This total dose is added up and the 
overall infusion rate is increased accordingly (14,16,101). If the baseline dose is 
insufficient in that the patient remains very symptomatic or if the rescue doses are 
inadequate, then the review of the baseline dose may be brought forward and the 
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corresponding dose of the breakthrough dose, increased proportionate to the 
overall increase in the infusional dose. Side effects, should they become present, 
usually call for a change in drug or a reduction in the overall dose provided. The 
baseline dose refers to the total amount of drug being administered whilst 
breakthrough dose refers to the extra doses of medication that are required over 
and above that of the baseline to control any exacerbations of symptoms (2). 
Family and carers of the patient are regularly briefed and supported during this 
period with updates of the patient’s condition and counselled for any concerns 
that they may have (14-16). 
Morphine or fentanyl, the only two opioids available locally in intravenous 
formulations is only applied if there is a clear indication for the treatment of pain 
or dyspnea (2,3). Combinations of these classes of drugs are rare and are only 
carried out when there are specific indications (2). Opioids are however 
frequently applied in tandem with sedatives (2,3). The indications for 
combinations of opioids and sedatives include the treatment of pain, dyspnea or 
cough (2). Whilst opioids do have secondary sedative properties, these effects are 
taken into account and the primary sedative dose is lowered in keeping with the 
goal of sedating the patient as lightly as possible with as little drug as possible for 
the purpose of reducing their awareness just sufficiently to reduce their awareness 
of their intractable symptoms. Thus far, all patients that have been sedated in this 
manner have been for physical symptoms and not solely for existential symptoms 
though an overlap of symptoms does occur.  
A further pertinent consideration is the relatively low prescription of opioids and 
other constituents of sedation in the end stages of life (1,2,102,103). Whilst 
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unpacking the reasons for this fact lie outside the remit of this thesis, it may be 
said that a significant factor in this rather low employment of opioids at the end 
of life when compared with other nations ranked amongst the top 20 nations in 
“The Quality of Death” survey is societal fear of the use of these drugs (2,102). 
This can present problems, which I take up in Chapter 5 in a discussion of what 
appropriate and proportional treatment requires in the context of CDPS. 
 
1.2.6 CDPS and clinically assisted artificial nutrition  
and hydration (CANH) 
In describing the approach toward CANH within the practice of CDPS, it is 
societal fear and expectations that underpin key considerations in the provision of 
hydration and nutrition even amongst the terminally ill (3,94-99,104-107). 
Prevailing cultural attitudes toward the meaning of food and hydration among 
families consider these to be a “symbolic personal intervention” that is part of a 
carer’s duty of care and non-abandonment, and a minimum standard of care 
within the “traditional medical model of care” (1,70,71,74,108-119). Such views 
are also held in Japanese, Taiwanese, Korean and even Israeli, Canadian, 
European, US and Latin American care settings (108-119). In Singapore, the 
Advance Medical Directive (AMD) Act, which calls for the reasonable provision 
of nutrition and hydration unless clear contraindications exist, serves to 
encourage this practice (69,70,104).  
Whilst data reported on the effects of CANH upon prognosis remains largely 
unclear, growing evidence does appear to be veering towards the belief that the 
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non- provision of hydration at the end of life is unlikely to hasten death (1,120-
123). However it appears some HCPs state that if there is a possibility that such a 
prognostication could be inaccurate and that life may be potentially abbreviated 
as a result of the concurrent application of CDPS, not applying a means to reduce 
the chances of this may be construed as willing the patient’s demise. They, like 
those who state that they would prefer to err on the side of caution, opt for 
continued application of hydration even in the terminal phase. 
With data still ambiguous as to the benefits and indeed risks of CANH amongst 
the terminally ill, there may be just consideration to employ this intervention, if 
only to reduce or even negate the reported side effects such as confusion, sedation 
and delirium that Ellershaw et al, Bruera et al and Fainsinger et al assert occur as 
a result of ceasing hydration amongst the terminally ill (119,124-129). 
 
1.2.7 Intentions in CDPS 
The application of sedatives is primarily to alleviate intractable symptoms 
through the induction of unconsciousness of the patient following the failure of 
other conventional treatment options and the applications of light sedation and 
intermittent deep sedation. The primary premise here is that by rendering the 
patient unconscious, the patient will not be aware of their intractable physical 
symptoms and thus no longer be afflicted by the effects of these symptoms (12). 
Yet there is also an acceptance that the provision of such an intervention is not 
taken lightly but seen to be part of the greater goal of palliative care as delineated 
by the World Health Organization (WHO) to relieve suffering (130). 
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However, Juth et al and Matersveldt and Bosshard suggest that any practice 
where consciousness and thus the personhood of the patient is effectively 
extinguished lies closely related to the practice of euthanasia (131,132). It appears 
that underpinning this position is the belief that the suppression of consciousness 
simply reduces a patient to a basic biological entity dispossessed of all that is 
significant and particular about the individual in question. Importantly, the 
ensuing “social inertness” that follows sequesters the patient from their social 
interactions, and this is said to leave them “socially dead” (131,132). For Juth et 
al and Matersveldt and Bosshard, “social death” is not so dissimilar to biological 
death particularly as this level of sedation is continued ostensibly till the patient’s 
biological demise (131-133).  
This situation is made all the more complex given the practice of routine 
cessation of all life-prolonging measures and the withholding of resuscitation 
should the need arise, even if this deterioration is an immediate result of the 
application of CDPS. The authors observe that the patient, no longer able to 
communicate, has said their good byes to loved ones and is sedated with no real 
intention of “bringing them back” (132). The combination of this can be 
described to be a state not dissimilar to that of the “living dead” and not too far 
from the practice of euthanasia (132). The difference between the two practices is 
more than simply about the fact that CDPS is reversible. CDPS is less likely to be 
open to conjecture and the slippery-slope argument due to its denial of 
psychological and existential suffering as an indication for use and the 
continuation of CANH ostensibly till death (132,133). Furthermore, the 
objectives of these two procedures as well as the intentions behind their 
applications, the presence of patient consent for these procedures, compliance 
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with prevailing ethical practice in applying these interventions and a 
circumstantial review of the clinical situation also set the two practices apart (43). 
These elements become prime considerations within this study of the practices of 
CDPS, terminal sedation (TS) and palliative sedation (PS) (43). 
This extinguishing of personhood and the provision of CANH as a means of 
maintaining life even in the face of ceasing all other life-prolonging measures 
need some clarification of the intentions that drive them. Personhood may be 
taken to be “the individual substance of a rational nature” that highlights the 
uniqueness of a person (134). This neuroscientific view of the concept of 
personhood revolves around the presence of consciousness as the primary 
determinant of personhood and holds that it is the capacity to think, decide, 
choose, understand, act, exercise autonomy, have intentions, rights, duties, moral 
responsibility and have ongoing relationships that confers personhood upon an 
individual (134). Yet within the CDPS scenario, many if not all these elements 
that confer personhood are extinguished, leaving stubborn protection of 
personhood thus conceived largely superfluous. Similarly, as Cassell argues, 
many of the integral “needs” and functioning of the person are unlikely to be met 
without “sentience” or consciousness, thus attempting to protect the potential for 
these facets when they are unlikely to be attained is also misplaced (20,134).  
The idea of personhood within the palliative care setting is essential and reiterates 
Dame Cicely Saunders’ aspirations of individual and holistic care of patients, 
where physical, psychological, social and spiritual care are provided specific to 
the needs of the patient. The neuroscientific idea of personhood described earlier 
fails to capture the true essence of how personhood is viewed by many thinkers 
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(135-137). Rather, the palliative care ideal of personhood transcends these rather 
limited views and refers to a wider conception replete with relational connections 
and enduring interests that persist even after the patient is unconscious. The 
importance of a good death, the maintenance of dignity and preservation and 
improvement of quality of life of the patient and family persist, requiring that 
personhood be respected even when many of those elements that Cassell suggests 
have been extinguished (138,139). This wider ideal of personhood is seen to 
persist and warrants respect and dignity even when the person may not be fully 
functioning. In Chapter 6 I propose a wider view of personhood that is more 
culturally appropriate, ethically relevant and clinically sensitive and counters 
many of these concerns. 
The process of employing CDPS presented here describes local practice that has 
evolved in accordance to current clinical practice, sociocultural expectations and 
regnant professional and legal standards. Much of this practice is still based upon 
the frameworks of prevailing practices of sedation at the end of life such as TS 
and PS set out in palliative care texts such as the Oxford Textbook of Palliative 
Medicine, Saunders’ Palliative Medicine and the Textbook of Palliative Medicine, 
though with important differences (14-16). It is these differences that are of 
concern here both in distancing CDPS from the concerns of euthanasia that 
continue to plague both TS and PS but also in highlighting the various issues that 
have been neglected in current TS and PS practices. To begin with, a review of 
terminal sedation (TS) is called for. 
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1.3 TERMINAL SEDATION (TS) 
Coined in 1991 by Enck in the US, the term “terminal sedation” was seen shortly 
after in a review article on the practice of sedation at the end of life by Williams 
in 1992 (140,141). On both occasions the term “terminal sedation” (TS) was not 
fully defined. At its inception, Enck was commenting on the use of sedatives and 
opioids at the end of life by Ventafridda et al and Greene and Davis (141-143). In 
the first study of its kind, Ventafridda reported on the incidence of patients 
reporting “unendurable” physical symptoms amongst 120 terminally ill Italian 
cancer patients within a home care setting. He reported that in 52.5% of reported 
cases, “sedation-inducing sleep” was required to ameliorate these symptoms 
(142). This report, along with Greene and Davis’ retrospective case reports of 17 
imminently dying urological cancer patients managed in the community in South 
Carolina who required the same manner of treatment for a “constellation of 
desperate symptoms”, appears to have provided Enck with the inspiration for the 
term “terminal sedation” (141,143).  
In all these cases the patients attained good symptom amelioration of their 
previously poorly controlled complaints (141-143). Greene and Davis also 
described the basic “prerequisites” for such a treatment modality, which became 
the standard adopted by many frameworks that followed (141-143). These 
conditions included a diagnosis of terminal disease, the exhaustion of all other 
treatment options for the amelioration of these symptoms, the presence of a “Do 
Not Resuscitate” (DNR) order, imminent death, consent of patient and family and 
the presence of the family at all times (143).  
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Despite being conceived at least initially as the administration of sedatives to 
imminently dying patients with intractable symptoms, many definitions of TS 
exist [Appendix 1]. To some extent, it is due to these variances in conceiving this 
practice that ambiguities surrounding the practice of TS remain (55,120,144).  
 
1.3.1 The term TS 
The definitions in Appendix 1 reveal the various conceptions of TS over the years 
and highlight the differences of opinion regarding this treatment option and 
controversy that this treatment option has courted. These variances include the 
actual goals of TS, the manner that they may be met and their indications for use 
[Appendix 2 and 3]. 
Enck’s original introduction of the term “terminal sedation” made only one 
reference to this term that was to become synonymous with the practice of 
sedation at the end of life (141). Given there was little direct definition nor 
explication of this term within his editorial, Cowan and Walsh and Chater et al 
reported that there was a lack of consensus “amongst experts” on Enck’s 
conception, though Chater et al did note the presence “a general understanding 
among palliative medicine practitioners today that it is sedation for intractable 
symptoms near the end of life” (120,141,145).  
Little has changed from Chater’s 1998 report in Palliative Medicine and the 
Cowan and Walsh review in Support Care Cancer in 2001 (120,145). When 
Simon et al opted to carry out a questionnaire survey of the 477 members of the 
German Academy for Ethics in Medicine on the most common term used to 
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describe the use of “sedation in the imminently dying patient”, these authors 
found that TS was known to 92% of the 281 respondents but a clear lack of 
consistency in their perceptions of this procedure prevailed (146). However, in a 
study on the attitudes of members of the German Association for Palliative 
Medicine by Muller-Busch et al in 2003, nearly 95% of palliative care physicians 
supported the use of the term TS leading the authors to conclude that “doctors 
clearly considers TS a medically adequate and ethically justified means to 
overcome suffering in that phase” (147). Rietjens et al also showed that in the 
Netherlands, the term TS is the most popular term to describe sedation at the end 
of life with 211 out of 410 surveyed physicians reporting that they had employed 
TS in the past (148).  
Simon et al’s study revealed that whilst there was wide acceptance of the term TS, 
there was variation in understanding the substance of this intervention (146). In a 
survey of 697 Japanese oncologists and palliative care physicians on their 
attitudes towards TS, Morita et al found that nearly 95% of respondents felt that 
TS was a necessary end of life treatment option within the armamentarium of 
palliative care (149). However 17% of clinicians in this survey reported feeling 
that this practice was indistinguishable from euthanasia (149). Whilst reiterating 
the importance of TS, the scope and boundaries of its goals, depth of sedation, 
inclusion criteria, the practice of cessation of CANH and ethical acceptance of 
this intervention had come under scrutiny (146).  
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1.3.2 Goals of TS 
1.3.2.1 Distinctive option of last resort 
The goals of TS are unclear on a number of areas as highlighted in Appendix 2 
and 3. Whilst it does seem focused upon the rendering of unconsciousness to 
patients with intolerable, intractable, unendurable, uncontrolled, unbearable, 
severe symptoms or “extreme exacerbations of conditions”, significant variations 
exist as to the prognostic requirements for TS, the depth of sedation, the 
underlying pathology of the illness, the manner that it is applied and the drugs 
that are utilized [Appendix 3 and 4].  
 
1.3.2.2 Relief of physical and psychological symptoms 
There is significant variation in whether TS is indicated for solely physical 




The prerequisites for TS also appear variable. Firstly, the diagnosis of 
intractability or refractory symptoms do not appear universally accepted, with 
wider, more subjective and less vigorously ascertained inclusion criteria such as 
intolerable, intractable, unendurable, uncontrolled, unbearable, severe symptoms 
or “extreme exacerbations of conditions” being suggested [Appendix 4]. 
Secondly, terminality does not appear to be a universally specified consideration 
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with Quill et al in the American College of Physicians-American Society of 
Internal Medicine (ACP-ASIM) Position Paper, suggesting that it may be 
considered for potentially curative conditions such as burns, whilst Morita et al 
suggests that a prognosis of three weeks is applied (150,151). Thirdly, given the 
ACP-ASIM position, there is also variance over the issue of futility of remaining 
treatment options ranging from the variability of access to the “acceptability” of 
alternative treatment option (150). Fourthly, the applicability to non-cancer 
diagnosis also appears to be not uniformly adopted [Appendix 3]. Fifthly, the 
application of TS for existential and psychiatric indications is also a source of 
divergence [Appendix 3].  
 
1.3.4 Treatment decisions 
Many guidelines advocate the application of a MDT-led holistic appraisal as a 
precursor to this deliberative process and the application of second opinions but 
this approach is not unanimously adopted [Appendix 3]. Such a wide ranging 
review is useful given the inherent variability of access to treatment, the societal, 
cultural and practical differences within the individual determinations, and the 
subjective nature of largely patient-determined terms such as acceptability, 
intolerability and unendurability of symptoms [Appendix 4]. 
Similarly variances exist with respect to the decision to cease all life-prolonging 




Whilst considered important in all the guidelines, the process of getting consent is 
not easy [Appendix 3]. This is unsurprising given that Rietjens et al found that 
patient consent for TS only occurs in 61% of cases in the Netherlands, largely due 
to the patient being incompetent or “subcomatose” (152,153).  
There are a number of alternative means to obtain consent. Cherny and Portenoy, 
Morita et al and Greene and Davis suggest that the consent process must 
necessarily involve the family (141,143,144,154). Quill et al and Hawryluck et al 
approach this issue from a multidimensional appraisal of best interests (55,155). 
Rietjens et al report that in the Netherlands consent for TS usually involves 
familial involvement and proxy decision-making in 94% of cases but make no 
mention of the remaining 6% of cases where it would seem TS was applied based 
solely on the physician’s orders (152,153).  
 
1.3.6 Treatment procedure 
There is disagreement regarding the treatment procedure in TS and there is 
minimal consensus on the manner and depth of sedation that would be employed 
[Appendix 3]. Dose ranging is also variable as are the type of drugs that are 
employed (2,3,59,60,103,120,121,145). There is no agreement as to the 
constituents of this procedure and a dearth of clear guidelines as to how, when 
and where it could be applied and to whom it is applicable. There is also no clear 
delineation as to what, how and by whom this procedure will be monitored, how 
constituents of TS will be titrated, and for how long TS would be applied.  
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1.3.7 Clinically assisted artificial nutrition and hydration (CANH) 
The issue of the continued application of CANH is divisive within TS 
deliberations. Muller Busch et al, Lanuke et al, Gillick, Quill et al, Hawryluck et 
al, Sykes and Thorns, Jansen and Sulmasy, Tannsjo, and Rietjens et al maintain 
that CANH ought to be ceased as a matter of a wider decision of stopping all life-
sustaining treatments or as a matter of routine practice of end-of-life care or even 
as routine practice upon the application of TS [Appendix 3].  
On the other hand, Materstvedt et al, the EAPC guidelines, Yamagishi et al and 
Morita et al suggest that hydration be continued as a matter of routine, whilst the 
ACP-ASIM Position Paper, Morita et al and Hallenbeck suggest a case by case 
review [Appendix 3]. Frequently, this act is seen as a “symbolic personal 
intervention” that would allude to a duty of care and non-abandonment, a part of 
the “traditional medical model of care”, or as a minimum standard of care or in 
keeping with cultural and societal beliefs, expectations and values (1,39-
41,53,54,74,92-99,110,122,158-161) For clinicians such as Quill, Bruera, Billings, 
Ripamonti, Stiener, Orentlicher, Lanuke, Valko, Troug and Loewy routine 
cessation of CANH was viewed as having negative connotation upon a patient’s 
care and life expectancy (55,150,162-167). 
 
1.3.8 Intentions 
Intentions are believed to separate TS from euthanasia. Kaldjian et al’s reports 
attest to this when they reported that whilst many internists place great value in 
ameliorating symptoms and maximizing comfort, they draw a clear distinction in 
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intending death as part of achieving this goal from merely intending comfort and 
risk death (168). Compliance with guidelines and accepted clinical practice will 
also serve to focus review of actions upon the true intentions behind actions (46). 
Battin suggests that discerning the intentions of the physician in the light of such 
variability of practice, the lack of consensus based guidelines, the presence of 
sociocultural and practical variances, the dearth of treatment algorithms and 
monitoring procedures make adjudging intentions through compliance of 
guidelines difficult and leaves the process open to conjecture (169). 
 
1.3.9 Evaluating TS 
Fatal flaws exist within the prevailing understanding of TS in its efforts to remain 
overly inclusive, pragmatic and open to adaptations in care provisions 
[Appendix 1, 2 and 3]. The lack of a clear definition and understanding of the 
pivotal terms and practice not only negates much of the positives that clinical 
research on the subjects of hydration, opioid use and sedative use amongst the 
terminally ill has brought to bear upon the discernment of TS, but allow many 
ongoing concerns such as its possible overlap with euthanasia to simmer 
(120,170-179). 
Connotations about the term “terminality” and the indeterminateness of purpose 
particularly with the inclusion of non-cancer diagnoses and psychiatric and 
existential distress as indications for TS have clouded understanding of this 
procedure and have seen an abortive attempt to reclassify TS as part of the 
practice of euthanasia in the Netherlands (120,123,146,149,150,162-166,181). 
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The proportionality of this procedure and the appropriateness and manner of its 
responses have also been open to conjecture (153). 
“Unfortunate” connotations with “terminating” life are also highlighted in the 
variable practice of CANH, particularly given the strong public and professional 
sentiment in favour of its continued use (92-99,158-161,182-186). Even amongst 
signatories of the EAPC who have adopted the guidelines set out on TS, 
persistent differences in basic end-of-life practices continue (119,187-192). 
Among Dutch and Danish patients, 64% were reported to not have hydration in 
their last phase of life, which contrasts starkly with the practice in Italy where 
only about 35% of patients in a similar condition did not receive this intervention 
(119,147,188-192). Such variability in practice have only served to heighten 
concerns about the real intentions behind the practice, particularly when data does 
reveal that many of the feared contraindications to its provision are largely 
overstated and negatively impact public sentiment and patient trust of palliative 
care teams and of the hospice movement within the local setting (1,74).  
Concerns of abuse of this practice are also widespread. Battin and Krishna raise 
doubts as to whether consent for the application of TS can actually be valid 
particularly when one considers the presence of the cognitive impairments that 
are associated with the dying process such as deterioration in concentration and 
alertness, the high prevalence of mood disorders such as depression and anxiety 
that would affect the cogitative ability of patients, the ubiquity of delirium at the 
end of life and the coercive influences that range from familial considerations to 
the presence of intractable symptomology (46,169). Reliance on surrogates, 
proxies and familial determinations are also suspect, particularly where the 
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interests of the patient succumb to those of the wider family in the face of 
conflicts of interests (37-41,46).  
Proportionality of response and the manner that patients are monitored have also 
been a source of disquiet. Tannsjo suggests that central to the practice of TS is the 
requirement that the “risks of causing harm must bear a direct relationship to the 
danger and immediacy of the patient’s clinical situation and the expected benefit 
of the intervention” (193). As a result, in clinical cases, proportionality can be 
highlighted through clearly showing that treatment options adopted are 
commensurate with the exigencies of the medical situation, medications are 
titrated according to symptoms and doses revised when side effects are present or 
as a result of changes in the patient’s condition. Similarly supportive measures 
such as the provision of CANH are provided dependent upon the actual clinical 
needs of the case rather than in compliance of a general rule.  
Clay Jackson, Lanuke et al, Koh et al, Chin and Woods argue that estimations of 
commensurability of interventions must necessarily include holistic appreciation 
of the bio-psychosocial and cultural elements of the individual case if care needs 
are to be appropriately met and abuses negated (70,71,99,177,194,195) This is a 
particular concern within the practice of TS where there is little if any monitoring 
of the process despite the acknowledged ill effects of this procedure and even 
when present clinical observations remain focused upon monitoring for side 
effects rather than the success of the process. The concern here is that there is 
growing data that suggests variability in conscious levels under sedation and 
without close monitoring patients may not be appropriately sedated and thus may 
be aware of their suffering.  
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The absence of a clear set of practice guidelines especially upon the frequency 
and manner that monitoring of these patients ought to take further highlights the 
inconsistencies in the prevailing practice of TS (4,144,145,163,182,183). 
Exemplifying this dissonance in current TS practice is the debate surrounding the 
prerequisite for a DNR order. Any such prerequisite fails to meld the overall 
goals of care with the clinical data on the outcome of measures of resuscitation, 
the overarching duty of care, and a holistic appreciation of the patient’s condition. 
Furthermore, it emphasizes the lack of coherence amongst prevailing TS 
guidelines and variability in perception amongst health care professionals as to 
the implications of an application of TS (196).  
This position, though adopted by some guidelines, is not universally accepted and 
such variability of practice highlights the fatal flaw in the practice of TS 
[Appendix 3]. Seen as a natural evolution to the practice of TS in light of 
increasing concerns regarding its apparent associations with the practice of 
euthanasia, the phrase and concept of palliative sedation (PS) was forwarded.  
 
1.4 PALLIATIVE SEDATION (PS) 
1.4.1 Goals 
1.4.1.1 Distinctive option of last resort 
The basic goal of PS is alleviating refractory suffering of imminently dying 
patients through the application of medications that lower their consciousness. 
Whilst differences between the various guidelines appear to revolve around their 
boundaries with some choosing to dispense with distinctions as to the 
applicability of PS to cancer and non-cancer diagnoses, the pivotal difference for 
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some of these treatment guidelines lie in their treatment of “suffering” and in 
particular in addressing existential suffering [Appendix 5 and 6]. 
 
1.4.1.2 Relief of physical, existential and psychological suffering 
This more inclusive approach to care appears to take root in the more expansive 
role of palliative care, which sees existential suffering (ES) as being “within the 
scope of the approach to palliative care” and thus dispensing with attempts to 
delineate applicability of treatment along etiological lines of suffering upon the 
belief that this would safeguard the personhood of the patient and meet the 
primary goals of palliative care [Appendix 5 and 6]. 
 
1.4.2 Prerequisites 
A primary prerequisite for PS remains the diagnosis of intractable symptoms, 
though the means of diagnosing this entity varies. Vague when considering 
physical symptoms, present PS guidelines do not contain any means of 
diagnosing existential suffering much less determining its refractoriness 
[Appendix 5 and 6]. 
Terminality appears to be a key requisite but there is no firm definition of this 
within many of the guidelines [Appendix 5 and 6]. The KNMG, NHPCO and the 
EAPC guidelines do describe the “dying phase”, which does shed light on 
patients entering this phase (100,121,197,198). 
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Futility of life-prolonging treatments and an emphasis on comfort driven goals of 
care are delineated by some of the guidelines; however, there is little in the way 
of delineating when and how treatments of existential symptoms are to be deemed 
futile [Appendix 5 and 6]. 
 
1.4.3 Treatment decisions 
The means by which treatment decisions are arrived at with respect to the 
application of PS are also variable. Only the KNMG, Alberta, HPNA, VNA and 
Massachusetts guidelines, the Sedation Guideline Task Force in Japan and the 
guidelines set out by the palliative care textbooks employ a MDT-led approach 
and use second opinions in the deliberative process to ensure holistic appraisals, 
and balanced and accountable decision-making [Appendix 5 and 6]. Additionally 
the four guidelines set out by the respective palliative care textbooks also express 
a need to ensure that DNR protocols are in force [Appendix 6]. 
There is however no mention of whose input will be considered within this 
deliberation, what weight would be provided to the opinions of the various parties 
and how the decision-making process will take place, particularly when it 
involves so many different parties and views; nor is there any clear specification 




The ubiquitous requirement for consent is present in all the prevailing guidelines. 
However, a consistent stance on how this may be attained when the patient is 
clearly incapable of consenting is not viable [Appendix 5 and 6]. Even the 
guidelines set out in the palliative care textbooks do not agree [Appendix 6]. The 
Principles and Practice of Palliative Care and Supportive Oncology and Saunders’ 
Palliative Medicine, and the HPNA and Fast Facts guidelines appear unwavering 
in their requirement of informed consent, whilst the AMA-CEJA, AAHPM, VNA, 
NHPCO, EAPC, Massachusetts and Alberta guidelines and the guidelines set out 
in the Oxford Text Book of Palliative Medicine and the Textbook of Palliative 
Medicine allow for the input of surrogates in the event the patient is not 
competent [Appendix 5 and 6].  
The NMA guidelines revert to best-interests determinations should the patient be 
unable to consent to this procedure whilst the KNMG guidelines allows for HCPs 
to overrule surrogate decisions if it is felt that they obstruct the best interests of 
the patient (121,188). 
 
1.4.5 Treatment procedure 
Procedural guidance for PS is largely inconsistent with only some guidelines 
providing procedural checklists, titration algorithms and monitoring protocols 
[Appendix 5 and 6]. However whilst guidelines such as those found in the 
KNMG and the EAPC guidelines form the basic standards of care expected of 
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HCPs upon applying PS, significant variances in practice and even in conception 
exist (96,121). 
Indeed the term PS has been applied in relation to a number of treatment 
procedures at the end of life, most famously by Quill et al in their article entitled 
“Last Resort Options for Palliative Sedation” in Annals of Internal Medicine in 
2009 (162). In this article Quill et al describe three forms of PS (162). They are 
“ordinary sedation”, proportionate palliative sedation (PPS) and palliative 
sedation to unconsciousness (PSU) (162). In “ordinary sedation”, sedation is used 
to treat symptoms without affecting the patient’s level of consciousness (162). In 
PSU, “unconsciousness is the intended goal of sedation rather than the side effect” 
as opposed to PPS where sedation is merely the foreseen but unintended effect of 
progressive titrations of sedatives to ameliorate suffering (162). Whilst most 
resembling the practice of CDPS, the term PPS has not been adopted here given 
that it does not specify either the route nor manner of the administration of 
sedation (162). The term PSU on the other hand misrepresents the manner and the 
intention behind CDPS and thus also found wanting (162). 
 
1.4.6 Intentions 
Elucidation of intention for the application of PS appears to be underpinned by 
the proportionality of response and the maintenance of appropriate and justifiable 
treatment in order to prevent a slippery slope slide to the abuse of PS as a means 
to euthanasia. Compliance with treatment algorithms such as those set out by the 
EAPC and KNMG guidelines then help delineate the intentions of HCPs in 
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applying this option as do observance of applicable care and professional 
standards.  
 
1.4.7 Evaluating PS 
There are two important considerations regarding the present PS guidelines. 
Firstly, it attempts to treat suffering rather than symptomology, and secondly, it 
extends the idea of suffering beyond the physical domain to include the 
consideration of existential suffering. At first blush, such an expansive 
accommodation of treatment objectives would be in line with a grander, more 
holistic view of the goals of palliative care as envisaged by the founder of the 
modern hospice movement, Dame Cicely Saunders, and a society that 
increasingly sees multi-professional, multi-dimensional palliative care as a basic 
right for all dying patients regardless of etiology (134,136,137,199-201). 
However, concerns arise when little is made on what is to be understood from the 
term “suffering”, how suffering would be diagnosed and when it would be 
considered intractable. The underlying concern here is that such complex 
indications that are in turn largely dependent of highly subjective factors will lead 
to a loosening of practice standards and a precipitation of a slippery slope. In 




1.5 SUFFERING AND DISTRESS 
1.5.1 Defining suffering and distress 
The term “suffering” is not new to palliative care and is found within the 
definition of palliative care as set out by the WHO (130). Relevantly, the phrases 
“relief of suffering” and “the treatment of pain and other problems, physical, 
psychosocial and spiritual” allude to the idea that suffering as it is understood 
within the present definition is multidimensional (130). Cassell defines suffering 
as the state of severe distress associated with events that threaten the intactness of 
the person as a complex social and psychological entity (13,17-20). Suffering has 
also variously been described as a complex negative emotional response that may 
result from psychosocial and spiritual factors (202).  
It is its close association with pain that has brought this phenomenon to the fore 
(202). The terms “suffering” and “pain” have been used interchangeably in the 
past, with suffering being seen as part of the secondary response to pain (11,202-
209). Increasingly, however, pain and suffering are viewed as distinct entities 
albeit with significant overlap as the concept of suffering has evolved to include a 
wider spectrum of consideration, dependent on cultural and inter-individual 
variations that leave it difficult to clearly differentiate, particularly along physical 
and existential lines (11,202-209). This multidimensional view of suffering 
defined within the particularities of the individual contrasts starkly with the 
concepts of the regnant “Cartesian disconnect” which maintains the idea that 
physical and existential symptoms are separate and distinct and can be effectively 
disentangled and addressed individually (202-209).  
62 
This categorical approach appears to underpin Jansen and Sulmasy’s position that 
envisages suffering as two distinct entities, and underlies the AMA’s position on 
a tenable distinction between physical and existential suffering (10,101,210). This 
differentiation is said to underlie the AMA’s prerogative to address suffering on a 
physical plane and clearly demarcate existential distress as being outside the 
remit of palliative care (101,210). The first category taken by the authors credited 
with being the architects of the AMA’s present stance is referred to as 
“neurocognitive suffering” which is envisaged to bear a “direct causal 
relationship with the patient’s underlying condition” and is akin to physical 
suffering (10,101,210). This type of suffering would include pain, seizures, 
insomnia and psychiatric symptoms (10). The second category within Jansen and 
Sulmasy’s conception is “agent narrative” suffering. This appears to be 
understood in the same manner as existential suffering, which does not share a 
“direct link” with the ailment (10,13). This manner of suffering would include 
symptoms such as angst, fear, loneliness, sadness, disgust, anger and 
worthlessness (10,13). Jansen and Sulmasy deny that refusal of PS for intractable 
agent narrative suffering is a reflection that the severity or need for treatment of 
this form of suffering is in any way below that of physical suffering but maintain 
that as this second category of suffering is resistant to medical and supportive 
care, it lies outside the remit of medical care and thus beyond the applicability of 
PS (10). In her reply to Rich and Cassell some eight years later, Jansen appears to 
have softened this stance and states that there must be flexibility in 
determinations between her two categories and if the case is clear and the need 
dire enough, then PS may even be applied irrespective of its designation (211). 
This moderation of Jansen and Sulmasy’s approach appears to raise questions as 
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to the rationale of maintaining this categorization and appears to return 
conceptions of suffering to a holistic and individual view of suffering as 
suggested by Saunders in 1984 (135,211). 
Cassell and Rich reject Jansen and Sulmasy’s approach to suffering, stating that 
there is no clear justifications for this symptom categorization and prefer to adopt 
a position akin to Dame Cicely Saunders’ posit of the multidimensional nature of 
suffering at the end of life or “total pain” (135,199,200). This approach remains a 
central theme of modern palliative care with most research on the subject 
supporting this premise (11-13). However, as Jansen and Sulmasy concede, 
diagnosis of these elements of suffering may not be easy given the wide range 
and frequently overlapping symptomology that include loss of personal meaning, 
dignity and purpose of life, fear of death, anguish, despair, hopelessness, being a 
burden to others, helplessness and betrayal (11-13,17-20). This has led Rich and 
Cassell to conclude that a cohesive approach is warranted (13,205). 
 
1.5.2 Identifying suffering and distress 
Dean and fellow palliative care physicians suggest that distress may be identified 
through conversations with the patient and/or their family, simple verbal 
descriptors, facial expressions, behavioural changes, postural changes and 
autonomic changes (212). These authors argue that in 80% of cases these 
symptoms and signs will be present, allowing the experienced clinician a chance 
to diagnose distress and act to overcome it (212). Failure to act appropriately is 
envisaged to predispose the onset of suffering (212-214). 
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In terms of recognizing suffering, Cassell and Cherny are clear in stating that 
“diagnosis is made by considering the person, not only the body” and at a highly 
interpersonal and experiential level (20,213). Cassell identifies five domains to 
suffering and posits that the presence of any element of these five domains “of 
special concern for the dying” suggests the presence of suffering (20). The five 
domains are inadequate pain and symptom control, loss of control, a prolonged 
dying process, being a burden to those around them, and straining personal 
relationships (20).  
Tan et al corroborate these findings in their study amongst Malaysian palliative 
care patients (205). They found that there are 10 types of suffering that can be 
clinically identified through a multidisciplinary team approach, reiterating that 
despite its many personal and patient-specific manifestations, suffering can be 
both identified and potentially addressed at least in the “early stages of the dying 
process” (205).  
 
1.5.3 Justifying an “inclusive” idea of suffering 
For patients with intractable symptoms replete with their own ideas of suffering 
and a poor ability to communicate, as is the case for patients in this phase of life, 
an endeavour to uncover the specific meaning underlying their suffering may be 
difficult particularly in the face of a fast receding time frame and limited means 
available. A patient-specific review may reveal that in the face of such troubling 
symptoms and the unabated deterioration in clinical conditions, treatment options 
that are available are unlikely to be effective within a “tolerable” time frame. 
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Thus, as a corollary to a physician’s duty to alleviate suffering, standards of care 
and the right of the patient to adequate relief, all suffering must be treated in the 
speediest, most efficient manner which includes PS (213-219).  
This position can be justified on three fronts. The first comes from the stance that 
all patients have a right to health care and with that a right to good palliation of 
their symptoms. This right arises from the legal obligations of nations being 
signatories to the International Covenant to Economic Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) which imposes obligations upon these governments to meet the goal 
that “everyone has the right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
physical and mental health” (219). From these legal obligations and those 
enshrined with Articles 12, 24 and 25 of the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights come binding legal obligations that in turn evince standards of care and 
pursuant obligations of the physician and the rights of the patient to such care. 
Brennan argues that the “foundations of a right to palliative care”, which are 
derived from local statues and legislation either directly or indirectly from the 
stipulations of the UNHCR Declaration and the ICESCR statements, provide 
patients with rights to the “highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health” (218-220). The argument then follows that this will necessarily include 
health at the end of life, which would include palliative care. As such it can be 
argued that this engages the right of terminally ill patients to relief of pain and 
suffering (201,218). This position is supported by the Korea Declaration, the 
Montreal Statement on Human Rights to Essential Medicines, the 2006 Papal 
Address and the Cape Town Declaration (221-226). Given that the goals of 
palliative care is the “relief of suffering” and the “improvement of quality of life”, 
it follows that there is an inherent right to effective management of suffering and 
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with the diagnosis of intractability as a result of an attenuation of alternative 
treatment options, the options for PS ought to be considered for “all avenues” of 
suffering (130). However, does this actually follow? 
The Oxford Textbook of Palliative Medicine as do Quill and Bycock maintain 
that treatment of suffering is part of the “continuum of symptom management” 
that lies within the domain of palliative care (49,150). Such a wide and holistic 
aspiration thus determined, the rather discriminatory treating and non-treatment 
of “subtypes” of suffering along lines of diagnoses is set in conflict with these 
goals. Weight may be added to such a stance given that other more widely 
accepted goals of palliative care such as quality of life have also been found to be 
affected by suffering. A decrease in a patient’s quality of life, an increase in their 
suicidal ideations and their desires for death and an increase in their frequency of 
pain reporting have all been shown to be associated with suffering 
(6,11,14,150,227). More specifically Cherny and Blinderman noted that 
existential suffering increased morbidity amongst palliative care patients (228). 
Boston and Bruce in their systematic review of the suffering of palliative care 
patients found that the impact of existential suffering on patient quality of life and 
care was not insignificant and also noted that a lack of clear conceptualization has 
left diagnosis and management protocols floundering and as a whole appearing to 
be in dispute with the central ideals of palliative care (11).  
Unsurprisingly Rich and Cassell, the EAPC guidelines and the KNMG guidelines 
appear to adopt a stance in favour of the application of PS for existential suffering 
particularly in light of Jansen’s concession that prevailing ambiguities between 
the types of suffering do make it possible for PS to be applied for complex cases 
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where overlap between the various “types” of suffering may occur (11-
13,100,121,211). It may be that in light of the attenuation of alternative treatment 
options and at the risk of continued suffering that will affect both the quality of 
life of the patient and that of their carers and family, the application of PS may be 
viewed as making the best out of a difficult situation despite unsubstantiated 
evidence of its efficacy in the treatment of “all” types of suffering. Importantly, 
within an amorphous concept of suffering that is clearly not easily delineated, the 
provision of PS may still be applied if only to treat the physical as a means of 
ameliorating the existential suffering in the face of overlapping symptomology. 
However, is such a practice acceptable? 
The second justificatory argument arises from the stance taken by the EAPC and 
KNMG guidelines that it is a doctor’s duty to relieve suffering and pursues the 
idea that physicians have a duty to alleviate all suffering irrespective of cause 
through the use of efficient and safe means of maximizing comfort 
(96,211,213,229). This philosophy of care must be in line with established 
standards of care for such conditions, which in turn would necessarily include 
consideration of PS such as those, set out by the EAPC (96). Wider questions that 
also need to be addressed are, whether attempts to treat existential distress lie 
within the remit of palliative care, and even if the answer is “yes”, given the 
limited treatment options available even within its multidisciplinary set up, is 
palliative care adequately equipped to meet the challenges of treating existential 
distress?  
Further, suffering in some settings and cultures is considered to be acceptable 
(70,71). Thus, there is a need for balance in considering the various facets within 
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the goals of care and it is suggested that within the evolving context of the disease 
process, the MDT, replete with their multi-professional and multidimensional 
appraisals, are best placed to review and realign care stances on an individual 
basis.  
The third justification is founded upon the uncoupling of palliative care goals 
from the traditional goals of medicine and seeing them on a wider plane of 
practice that is no longer shackled to a monocular view of care (204). Dame 
Cicely Saunders oversaw a conception of palliative care that moves beyond a 
blinkered medical perspective to adopt an inclusive multidisciplinary, multi-
professional, multidimensional approach to care (136). This wider view has since 
become the central theme of palliative care (130). Within the larger medical 
sphere, too, wider stances appear to be adopted with Cassell stating that without 
such a transformation, medicine as a whole would be failing in its basic goals by 
not catering to the needs of patients with existential distress, particularly when 
one of the pivotal goals of medicine identified by the Hastings Center Report 
relate to the promotion and maintenance of health (230-232). Here “health” is 
defined by the WHO as “a state of complete physical, mental and social well-
being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity”, sharply focusing 
considerations upon the mental aspects of care (230). 
However questions still remain unanswered. Does it follow that “relief of 
suffering” necessarily suggests the application of PS? Does it follow that PS is 
appropriate for the treatment of “total” or all forms of suffering? Does the 
treatment of all suffering actually lie within the remit of medicine? 
 
69 
1.6 STANDARDS OF CARE 
As part of its proposed standards of care, the EAPC guidelines delineate four 
“problem practices”; these are abuse of PS, injudicious use of PS, injudicious 
withholding of PS and substandard clinical practice of PS (96).  
Abuse is described as being the application of PS with the intention to hasten 
death (96). Injudicious use of PS occurs when there is no intent to hasten death 
but PS is applied without adequate assessment or input from specialists, when 
reversible cause of symptoms are not appropriately evaluated and reversed or 
when PS is demanded by the patient or the family or is applied without 
appropriate consideration (96). Injudicious use of PS is also envisaged in 
situations where HCP, exhausted and frustrated by the complexities of a situation, 
may resort to the application of PS as a means to circumvent the complications of 
the situation (96).  
Injudicious withholding of this treatment option is exhibited when PS is clearly 
warranted but physicians hesitate to provide it due to “counter phobic decisions to 
treat” or the physician’s own anxieties or self-serving interest (96). Inadequate 
consultations, monitoring, assessments, responses of the patient or indeed 
inadequate care and concern for the family would be deemed to be provisions of 
substandard care (139). These issues are taken up in Chapter 2. 
 
1.7 TREATMENT DECISIONS 
Despite the presence of treatment protocols for PS and TS, individual subjectivity 
still affects the deliberative process. One such example pertains to treatment 
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decisions regarding existential suffering. The AMA and the VHA in stating that 
existential and/or psychological symptoms ought not be treated by PS despite 
determinations of intractability and ought to be addressed by means other than PS 
simply to negate inter-HCP variability in application is but one of the responses 
to this concern (100,210,233).  
However the “wisdom of taking a conservative stance with respect to palliative 
sedation for existential suffering” proposed by the VHA and the posit that 
existential suffering “is not an appropriate indication for treatment with palliative 
sedation” because “the causes of this type of suffering are better addressed by 
other interventions” set out by the AMA-CEJA report on PS, appear to be 
discordant with the statement that the duty of a physician is “to relieve pain and 
suffering” and the understanding that no viable alternative exists other than PS to 
ameliorate this suffering (9,101,210). Aside from contradicting statements, it fails 
to take into account a number of issues. The first is that it provides no means of 
discerning between psychiatric symptoms and those it would consider to be of 
existential origin; neither does it lay down any clear approach for determining the 
applicability of PS if there is in fact a mixture of psychological, physical and 
existential suffering present (9).  
Secondly, as Rich argues, there is no justification for such categorization of 
suffering as the American College of Physicians-American Society of Internal 
Medicine’s (ACP-ASIM) position takes (9,150). Banja suggests that in the face of 
physicians’ fears of having their integrity and intentions questioned, categorizing 
those elements that a physician may find difficult to justify allows physicians to 
circumnavigate their conscience (234). Aside from these self-serving concerns, 
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categorization of suffering along lines of etiology make no recognition of the fact 
that treatments such as conventional antidepressants are liable to be ineffective 
and treatments such as methylphenidate, and semi-psychotherapeutic techniques 
remain relatively unproven in this phase of life, raising questions over the care of 
the patients (6,27,28,235). It is thus no surprise that such categorization also falls 
foul of the EAPC and the KNMG’s standards of care (96,121).  
A further matter to consider is the manner in which a diagnosis of intractability or 
refractoriness is arrived at. Variances of access to specialist care and treatment 
may make for variable determinations of intractability and refractoriness of a 
symptom. This is particularly important within nations in South East Asia where 
there is a limitation to access to palliative care specialist centres and interventions. 
It is largely for this lack of expertise and depth of experience in such care that 
local practitioners for instance refrain from effecting PS for existential distress. 
This also highlights the need for contextual and practical considerations within 
any determination of this diagnosis.  
Such variances call for flexibility of practice; however, such pliancy and 
individualistic approaches also open themselves for concerns regarding a 
potential slippery-slope situation where creeping “advancements” in practice take 
operational platforms beyond acceptable parameters and standards of care and 




Sedation at the end of life must evolve in order to meet the specific demands of 
the determinative social, cultural, legal and practice considerations. The 
dissonance in the goals of the treatments, the consent process when consent itself 
is suspect, the decision-making process particularly in the utilization of an 
inclusive MDT in the deliberative process, the consideration of the impact of the 
treatments upon personhood and in appreciating proportionality of their 
application are prime considerations as to the acceptability of such intervention. 
Given these issues, this thesis will approach the five areas of interest beginning 
with the study of the goals of palliative care and the place of the treatment of 
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GOALS OF CARE 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The goals of care determine the manner and the extent of care that is provided by 
a treatment approach. This chapter considers the practice of continuous deep 
palliative sedation (CDPS) from the perspective of its goals and the extent that 
these are identified with the broader goals of the practice of medicine. CDPS is 
defined as the proportional and monitored induction of deep continuous sedation 
for the amelioration of all forms of intractable physical, psychological and 
existential suffering following holistic multiprofessional assessment of the 
patient’s condition. The intent of this procedure is to circumnavigate awareness of 
suffering through the maintenance of deep levels of sedation in a manner that is 
consistent with regnant guidelines and clinical standards. This procedure is 
monitored and overseen by a MDT to ensure accountability, transparency and 
justifiability of actions and that life is not intentionally abbreviated. Clinically 
assisted artificial nutrition and hydration (CANH) is provided as a matter of 
routine in the application of CDPS unless clinically contraindicated. As already 
stated earlier, the prerequisites for implementing CDPS in cancer patients are:  
(1) a diagnosis of intractability where there is an exhaustion of treatment 
options to palliate the distressing symptoms experienced to a tolerable level 
within an acceptable time frame; 
(2) “terminality” of the illness where a prognosis of less than two weeks is 
anticipated; 
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(3) a diagnosis of “futility” when it is determined that the cancer progression is 
no longer responsive to disease altering treatments; and 
(4) a determination that application of this procedure is in keeping with the 
holistically determined best interests of the patient. 
The discussion of this thesis and chapter centres on the application of forms of 
sedation at the end of life that involve the application of deep and continuous 
sedation for the treatment of intractable symptoms for patients with a prognosis of 
less than two weeks. Reference to palliative sedation (PS) will be included under 
this specific subtype of sedation.  
Debates on the goals of CDPS are animated by disagreements over the care of 
patients with existential suffering, and whether CDPS should be offered as a 
treatment option should this condition become intractable at the end of life. There 
are two main groups of arguments shaping this debate. On one side are the 
positions adopted by the American Medical Association’s Council on Ethical and 
Judicial Affairs (AMA-CEJA) and the National Ethics Committee of the Veterans 
Health Administration (VHA), which oppose the application of PS for existential 
suffering (1,2). The VHA and the AMA-CEJA positions, which were produced in 
2007 and 2008 respectively, draw from arguments by Jansen and Sulmasy (1-7). 
On the other side sits the position taken by Cassell and Rich, which holds that as 
a result of the entwined nature of different aspects of suffering, discriminating 
between the various etiologies of suffering is untenable (8-20). This position is 
echoed by the European Association for Palliative Care (EAPC) and the Royal 
Dutch Medical Association (KNMG) in their guidelines on PS (21,22). Both 
these guidelines were produced in 2009 (21,22).  
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The disagreements in question reach into debates on the goals of medicine, 
medical and philosophical accounts of suffering, and proportionality and 
appropriateness in the treatment of suffering, including existential suffering (5,8). 
Jansen and Sulmasy see medicine focused upon a restorative function, which the 
authors maintain “persist until death, for even very sick terminally ill patients” 
(5). Jansen and Sulmasy believe that the role of the physician is  
“not just to treat symptoms, but to care for their patients. A primary goal 
of medicine is not simply to relieve suffering, but also to restore the 
patient to a state of health. Serving this restorative goal requires 
physicians to attend to the psychosocial well-being as well as the physical 
well-being of their patients” (5). 
Jansen and Sulmasy reiterate the need to consider treatment of psychosocial and 
physical suffering separately and with equal importance: 
“Like other patients, terminally ill patients’ well- being consists of both 
physical and psychosocial aspects. If they are experiencing agent-
narrative suffering, it may be possible to treat them in a manner that 
restores them to a state of psychosocial well-being.” (5). 
Jansen and Sulmasy state that the extent of this restorative interest is “as much as 
their condition permits” (5). 
The VHA and the AMA-CEJA guidelines, drawing from Jansen and Sulmasy’s 
position set out in 2002, maintain that there are two categories of suffering: 
neurocognitive suffering and agent narrative suffering (1-5). Jansen and Sulmasy 
maintain that there is a  
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“clinically and ethically significant difference between suffering that has a 
direct causal relationship to the patient’s underlying disturbance in 
physiological, neurochemical, or mechanical function or integrity (what 
we call neurocognitive suffering) and suffering that is belief-dependent, 
bearing, at most, an indirect relationship to the patient’s underlying 
medical condition (what we call agent narrative suffering)” (5). 
The VHA and the AMA-CEJA guidelines maintain that agent narrative suffering 
or existential suffering lies outside the remit of medicine and ought not to be 
addressed by medical interventions (1-4). The VHA and the AMA-CEJA 
guidelines represent a general medical view, whilst Dame Cicely Saunders and 
the palliative medicine movement view this issue rather differently (1,2,23-32). 
Saunders, much like Cassell and Rich, holds that care should “remain the centre 
of a team who work together to relieve where they cannot heal, to keep the 
patient's own struggle within his compass and to bring hope and consolation to 
the end” (31). 
Cassell and Rich maintain that the goals of care should be focused upon the relief 
of suffering rather than a continued focus upon a restorative goal (8). Cassell and 
Rich’s position is inspired by improvements in clinical capabilities and changes 
in the manner that suffering is viewed by society (8). They state that  
“the relief of suffering has recently become a more pressing imperative 
because of the increasing dominance of chronic diseases resulting both 
from medicine's successes and demographic shifts; in addition, social 
changes in the last generation have removed suffering from the almost 
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exclusively private domain it occupied in the past to a more public view, 
where demands for its recognition and relief have become acceptable” (8). 
On the issue of suffering, Cassell and Rich maintain that suffering is always of 
the whole person rather than of the mind, or the body in isolation (8). Nor is it 
meaningful to think about suffering in terms of causal relationships as Jansen and 
Sulmasy advocate (5-9). Cassell points out that suffering  
“cannot be whole in body alone. Nor should the threat to the whole person 
be understood as solely a quantitative matter – that persons subjected to 
more than x amount of pain or y amount of tissue destruction suffer (even 
if this amount of pain or tissue destruction may virtually always cause 
suffering) – since one individual may suffer from pain considered 
unimportant by another. They see suffering as a homogenous entity that is 
indivisible into discrete kinds” (11).  
Important to this present discussion, given that CDPS is being employed under 
the aegis of a palliative care approach to end-of-life care, this perspective 
resonates with the views of Dame Cicely Saunders who maintains that “physical 
and mental suffering are seen almost dialectically: each capable of influencing 
and shaping the other” (31,25,32). It is therefore unsurprising that this 
multidimensional view of suffering that Saunders espoused when confronting 
“total pain” has in turn become one of the central tenets of the palliative care 
philosophy of holistic care (31,25,32). Clark, Dame Cicely Saunders’ biographer, 
adds that Saunders had maintained that  
“[s]uch an approach required attention to the meaning of pain, leading to a 
medicine capable of an orientation to suffering which allows the finest 
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human sentiments to shine through. In this way pain is seen as something 
indivisible from the body and the personality, but also as something 
caught up in wider social circumstances” (31). 
Saunders accepts that as a result “a profound challenge had been issued to the 
Cartesian body-mind dualism of modern medical practice”(31).  
Underpinning this departure from a wholly Cartesian approach is the advent of a 
more patient-centred care approach where the patient’s own goals become the 
“compass” for care provision (31). Here there is acknowledgement of the 
subjective nature of suffering with the views, wishes and beliefs of the patient 
influencing the manner that suffering is seen and addressed within each specific 
context. 
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Table 2.1 Analysis of positions held by various parties 
Table 2.1 represents a summary of the positions taken by the various parties 
featured in this chapter. In what follows,  
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I will consider these competing positions in critical perspective, beginning with 
Jansen and Sulmasy’s views. 
 
2.2 THE JANSEN AND SULMASY POSITION 
2.2.1 The physical-existential approach to the treatment of suffering 
In their article entitled “Proportionality, terminal suffering and the restorative 
goals of medicine” published in 2002 in the Journal of Theoretical Medicine and 
Bioethics, Jansen and Sulmasy posited that there are two discrete types of 
suffering (5). They state that 
“there is a clinically and ethically significant difference between suffering 
that has a direct causal relationship to the patient’s underlying disturbance 
in physiological, neurochemical, or mechanical function or integrity (what 
we call neurocognitive suffering) and suffering that is belief-dependent, 
bearing, at most, an indirect relationship to the patient’s underlying 
medical condition (what we call agent narrative suffering)” (5).  
Jansen and Sulmasy maintain that this discriminative account of suffering enables 
appropriate clinical response based on causal relationships (5,33).  
Agent narrative suffering is held not to have immediate associations with 
suffering (5,33). Jansen and Sulmasy describe this to mean  
“it is not the medical condition as such that causes the patient to suffer. 
Nonetheless, it may arise from the patient’s beliefs about what the 
condition means or will mean to his or her life. So characterized, agent 
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narrative suffering depends on factors that are (largely) particular to the 
person experiencing the suffering” (5).  
The authors add that when the roles and relationships of a suffering patient 
“are threatened or undermined, the narrative interests of the patient are 
adversely affected. Quite understandably, terminally ill patients often 
experience suffering as a result of reflection on the significance that their 
medical condition has or will have on their ability to be an agent in the 
world or to sustain valuable social relationships. Moreover, they often 
experience suffering as a result of reflecting on the fact that their 
condition causes suffering to family members or other loved ones. 
Suffering that results from this kind of belief-based reflection is agent 
narrative. Examples include, but are not limited to, various forms of 
psychosocial suffering that are not correlated with underlying pathologies 
of the brain such as despair, loneliness, perplexity and alienation” (5). 
Jansen and Sulmasy adopt this interpretation of suffering in response to what they 
feel is an overcompensation of the medical fraternity for their previous neglect of 
the psychological aspects of care (5). For instance, they note that there was a 
tendency of clinicians to respond to suffering at the end of life with “aggressive 
pharmacological interventions” that they feel is harmful to the patient (5). Their 
discrimination of the two forms of suffering also serves a further purpose. The 
authors believe that each form of suffering can be treated independently of the 
other (5). 
To highlight the importance of responding appropriately to the two forms of 
suffering, Jansen and Sulmasy discuss the cases of Patient A, who suffers from 
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severe phantom limb pain and agent narrative suffering, and Patient B, who 
suffers solely from agent narrative or existential suffering (5). In the case of 
Patient A, the authors assert the appropriate clinical response lies in “recognizing 
the differences between the types of suffering” in order to treat them 
proportionally (5). As a result medications are used to treat the neurocognitive 
suffering whilst psychosocial and/or spiritual counselling are used to restore the 
patient’s psychosocial well-being (5). Whilst on the surface application of opioids 
and anticonvulsants may have treated both sets of symptoms, Jansen and Sulmasy 
insist that such application of pharmacological interventions would not be in 
keeping with the physician’s overarching restorative duties (5). Furthermore 
pharmacological intervention would inhibit thorough assessment of the patient, 
prevent direct patient involvement in care decisions, negate the potential to 
strengthen the relationship between patient and physician and thus improve the 
physician’s insight of the situation (5). A multidimensional and thorough review 
of the patient’s overall situation will ensure that careful considerations have been 
made before actions are taken (5). 
Medical treatment for symptoms ostensibly resistant to conventional measures 
would also run against the authors’ conception of proportionality (5). The 
Principle of Therapeutic Responsiveness, which Jansen and Sulmasy propose, 
emphasizes the concepts of (a) appropriateness of a response with respect to the 
etiology of the patient’s suffering, and (b) proportionality of treatment in keeping 
with the goals of care (5). The authors state “the measures implemented are 
appropriate for the type of suffering the patient is experiencing and, therefore, are 
properly responsive to the patient’s restorative interests” (5). 
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Accordingly, the application of alternative treatment options such as pastoral 
care, meditation, relaxation, imagery and/or psychotherapy would represent the 
best means of realizing the patient’s overriding interests to be restored to a state 
of psychosocial well-being despite being in a state of “irreversible physical 
deterioration” (5). The authors stress that the two states of well-being may exist 
independently, necessitating that physicians respond to the demands of these 
symptoms in a manner that best “fits the nature of their suffering” (5). When 
delineation between the two forms is not “clear cut or straightforward”, the 
authors maintain that efforts ought to be redoubled and more patient-centred (5).  
Appropriateness of treatment is crucial both in ensuring that overall goals of care 
are preserved and also in treating suffering in a discriminative manner (5). It also 
requires that physicians recognize the limits of medicine and their own medical 
authority (5). In situations where medical interventions have reached the limit of 
their efficacy, physicians must be prepared to defer to the expertise of non-
physicians (5). 
At the limit of their capabilities, physicians must also resist attempting to treat 
suffering despite requests by patients or families to provide PS (5). Jansen and 
Sulmasy offer a further example to reinforce their opposition to the use of PS (5).  
Patient B, a man with end stage amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) “suffers 
intensely from his profound dependence upon others” despite intensive efforts to 
restore his psychosocial well-being (5). Jansen and Sulmasy argue that sedation 
would not be appropriate for the amelioration of his existential suffering for a 
number of reasons (5). The first is that despite maintaining consistently that he 
has no interest in remaining conscious, Jansen and Sulmasy maintain that he does 
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in fact have an overriding interest in being restored (5). Jansen and Sulmasy stress 
that in the presence of a high degree of psychological and psychiatric 
complications, the ability of patients to act rationally is suspect (5). An 
appropriate response to these issues will reverse the patient’s wishes for 
disproportionate measures and reaffirm their need to realize their fundamental 
interests (5). Jansen and Sulmasy maintain that patients have “an important 
interest” in responding to psychosocial, spiritual and familial concerns and 
interests “in a manner that is consistent with their character and considered 
values” (5). These considerations engender an abiding interest in restoration “as 
much as their condition permits”, and underscores the importance of helping 
patients “find the appropriate means to satisfy this interest” (5). This is in keeping 
with their conception of proportionality and “even if past efforts to restore a 
patient have failed, it does not follow that the patient has no interest in 
restoration” (5). Jansen and Sulmasy’s Principle of Therapeutic Responsiveness 
holds that  
“[a] physician’s therapeutic response to terminal suffering is justified, 
even if it imposes a high risk of hastening the patient’s death, if and only 
if (i) the measures implemented are directly proportionate to the intensity 
of the patient’s suffering; (ii) the measures implemented are appropriate 
for the type of suffering the patient is experiencing and, therefore, are 
properly responsive to the patient’s restorative interests; and (iii) the 
patient or the patient’s legal surrogate understands and accepts the risks 
associated with the measures” (5). 
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In a situation where a patient in similar circumstances to Patient B asks for PS, 
employing this intervention would be “inappropriate insofar as the restorative 
interests of patients are ignored or set back” (5). Furthermore, any such 
intervention would “violate a fundamental norm of medicine” in overstepping the 
boundaries of acceptable and proportional care (5). Furthermore, as agent 
narrative suffering may be tied with “psychological and psychiatric complications 
during the terminal stage of illness”, it is common and pervasive and open to 
treatment options that might still be able to restore a patient to a “condition of 
psychosocial well-being” (5). There is a need for physicians to evaluate 
conditions closely and discriminate between agent narrative suffering and 
neurocognitive suffering whilst being cognizant of the limits of pharmacological 
interventions for the treatment of agent narrative suffering (5). Physicians should 
also be aware of the limits of medical treatment and intervene appropriately and 
in keeping with the duty to “care for patients” (5). Importantly physician has to be 
aware that these interests do not “vanish simply because the medical team has 
been unsuccessful in advancing them” (5). To ignore this fact with the application 
of sedation in these circumstances would be incongruent with the patient’s 
“character and considered values” (5). In the case of Patient B, for example, this 
action would leave this fiercely independent and private professor of sociology in 
a position where he would be even more dependent upon “hired strangers” and 
merely compound his increasingly “unbearable” state of lost independence and 
“pride” (5).  
Jansen and Sulmasy do accept that a patient may refuse all appraisals and 
interventions, as Patient B does, which would precipitate the need to consider PS 
as a last resort; however they maintain that such an intervention would still be ill 
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advised (5). This is because Jansen and Sulmasy hold that this treatment would 
not be medically appropriate as it does not attend to the problems at hand but 
merely circumnavigates them (5). Likewise sedating the patient would mean a 
failing on the part of the physician in developing the “skills that make it possible 
to diagnose, and appropriately attend to, the different types of suffering present at 
the end of life” (5). Therefore applying PS would appear to always be wrong 
since it renders impossible any attempt to meet the patient’s important interest in 
responding to their social, cultural, familial and spiritual needs, especially on the 
basis of an uncertain diagnosis of intractability (5).  
Jansen states that dependence upon a diagnosis of intractability can be complex 
and leaves a potential for abuse of this treatment (33). Jansen states in her 
response to Cassell and Rich in 2010 that  
“[c]ompared with neurocognitive suffering, it is exceedingly more 
difficult to establish that agent narrative suffering is truly refractory. It is 
all too easy to mischaracterize as refractory agent narrative suffering that 
is merely difficult to treat” (33). 
However, in this same response, Jansen does appear to accept that under very 
specific conditions where intractability is established, PS may be considered (33):  
“[S]uppose that in a given case it could be ‘proven’ that agent narrative 
suffering was indeed refractory. Does this possibility justify adopting 
guidelines that counsel physicians to treat end-of-life suffering with 
palliative sedation, irrespective of its nature and its origin? No. Guidelines 
speak to the general case” (33). 
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According to her modified position, patients must be diagnosed with intractability 
before attempts at PS are considered, and this would signal a clear failure of 
alternative options for the treatment of existential (i.e. agent narrative) suffering 
(33). Thus, Jansen has distanced herself from the stance of the AMA-CEJA 
framework, which consistently maintains that the application of sedation at the 
end of life for agent narrative suffering is never indicated (see Table 2.1), and 
now adopts a position that is more consistent with the position of Cassell and 
Rich (8,33). 
Underpinning this shift in Jansen’s position is a development in her conceptions 
of proportionality and appropriateness of treatment and an evolution in the 
manner that she views suffering within her understanding of medicine as a 
restorative enterprise (33). In her later view, Jansen argues that the goals of 
medicine are not immutable (33). Neither the goal of “restoring the patient to a 
state of health” nor the premise that “even very sick terminally ill patients have an 
interest in confronting their death in a manner that is consistent with their 
character and considered values” are unchanging over time (5,6,33). A “proven” 
diagnosis of intractability of suffering and a limited prognosis should indicate a 
shift in the goals of care from attempting to restore physical and psychosocial 
function and addressing suffering in a manner that “fit[s] with the nature of 
terminal suffering” to one that is focused on relieving suffering (33). Emphasis 
here is on the term “proven” and the difficulty in precisely discriminating “causal 
relationships” (33).  
Acceptance of the potential obstacles to correctly delineating the nature of 
suffering may potentially highlight the rationale for Jansen and Sulmasy’s 
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resistance in accepting a determination of intractability, particularly given the 
great variability in access to specialist care (5). This situation is compounded 
further by Jansen and Sulmasy’s insistence on maintaining mutual exclusivity 
between physical suffering and existential suffering (5).  
However, this uncompromising view highlights a number of inconsistencies with 
Jansen and Sulmasy’s position on existential suffering (5). Jansen and Sulmasy 
associate existential suffering with psychiatric and psychology presentations, 
which show either an acceptance in the overlap in the presentations of these 
elements of suffering, or a view that the presence of these elements compounds 
the manifestations of existential suffering. Both these positions may make 
discriminations between various presentations difficult particularly as 
etiologically based treatments that do not consider wider repercussions of 
suffering are likely to fail. Rich sees these difficulties in determination as merely 
a symptom of a categorically inconsistent approach underpinned by an equally 
flawed understanding of suffering and a misplaced reliance upon an inflexible 
and ultimately untenable comprehension of the goals of care (5,6,19,33).  
So what underpins this unwavering focus upon a restorative goal even in the 
terminally ill? Evidence for the existence of such an overall duty for restorative 
care may lie with a study that Sulmasy was involved in, on the preferences of 
cancer patients for quality of life and length of life (34). This study validates 
Jansen and Sulmasy’s position as cancer patients within this study reported a key 
interest in the maintenance of their abilities, roles and lifestyle, suggesting that 
restorative goals were a prime consideration (34). Validation for this position may 
come from the findings of the 1996 Hastings Center report entitled “Specifying 
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the Goals of Medicine”, where the first of the four goals of medicine identified 
was the promotion and maintenance of health (35). Jansen and Sulmasy’s 
restorative duties supports this goal, though it does appear to be a rather focused 
view of this duty underpinned by the statement, “Healing is a very real possibility 
even when the body cannot be restored to a well-functioning state” (35). 
However, whilst Jansen and Sulmasy’s position is validated by the Hastings 
report on Aging and the Goals of Medicine, Daniel Callahan the main author of 
this report, does not support the unwavering persistence in restoration that Jansen 
and Sulmasy maintain (36). Callahan stresses upon a more realistic view that  
“[the] goals of medicine that lie behind life cycle traditionalism are those 
of helping people to remain in good health within the boundaries of a 
finite life span, and helping them to cope well with the poor health they 
may have. It is thus a more modest view of medicine's appropriate goals, 
aiming to restore and maintain health within a limited time frame rather 
than substantially improve the human condition” (36). 
There is also little substantiation within present data to suggest that an 
uncompromising view of this restorative goal is held in such a manner by either 
patients or physicians (37). Jansen and Sulmasy’s position on this matter does 
open itself to temperance, given that they do state that the extent of this 
restorative interest is to be “as much as their condition permits” (5). However 
such concessions do not appear to extend to acknowledgement of the intractable 
nature of the patient’s suffering, their abbreviated life expectancy, nor what can 
realistically be carried out to restore function (5).  
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Jansen and Sulmasy’s reliance upon their concept of the Principle of Therapeutic 
Responsiveness to validate their rigid position on the application of PS, too, 
comes under increasing threat with the dispelling of two central parameters upon 
which it is constructed (5). The first is that the application of PS would abbreviate 
life (5). This point has since been disproved by prevailing clinical evidence which 
shows that in most cases the application of sedatives and opioids either on their 
own or in combination with one another does not abbreviate life when applied in 
a manner that is in keeping with clinical guidelines (38,39). Sykes suggests that 
survival may be improved for patients who are administered PS as compared to 
patients who are not provided this treatment (40).  
The second disproved tenet underpinning the Principle of Therapeutic 
Responsiveness is the belief that care determinations still depend upon the 
determinations of a single healthcare professional (HCP) (5). The AMA-CEJA 
guidelines, for example adopts a multidisciplinary team (MDT) approach to care 
determinations since Jansen and Sulmasy first proposed this framework in 2002 
(1). As a result Jansen and Sulmasy’s insistence on discovering alternative 
treatment options beyond medicine – when a MDT similar to what I have 
described in Chapter 1 ought to have considered all reasonably available 
alternative avenues of treatment – is no longer warranted.  
Persisting with treatments that are medically futile and inflexibly adhering to a 
restorative duty over all other considerations, including intractable suffering and 
patient preferences that are legally allowed, also suggest a dogged paternalistic 
approach that defies both clinical evidence and an appropriate standard of medical 
practice under the law. Jansen and Sulmasy also use this position based on the 
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“working assumption … that all can be restored in some way and some degree” to 
insist that it will prevent “simply summing up all kinds of suffering” and as a 
result prevent the advent of a slippery slope down the path where symptoms are 
mischaracterized as intractable and treated as such (5). This position raises a 
number of substantial objections. 
In considering both the clinical context of Patient A with his phantom limb pain 
and agent narrative suffering and Patient B with a diagnosis of ALS and agent 
narrative suffering, Jansen and Sulmasy fail to site their arguments within the true 
dimensions of where treatments such as PS would be applied (5). They do not 
consider the situation where in fact the prognosis of the patient is actually less 
than two weeks and where up to 86% of patients are not capable of participating 
in the “alternative treatment options” being advocated as treatment for their 
“agent narrative” suffering (5,41-45). 
This rigid approach to determining if treatment is appropriate based upon whether 
or not it “fits with the nature of the terminal suffering experienced by the patient” 
is equally problematic particularly when the patient is diagnosed with “proven” 
intractable physical and existential suffering. Suggestions that efforts ought to be 
redoubled in delineating the root cause of the suffering ignores Jansen and 
Sulmasy’s own overarching goals of providing “care for patients” in keeping with 
the patient’s prognostic status and clinical needs (5).  
These inconsistencies remain unaddressed by the Jansen and Sulmasy position 
and serve to highlight the true intentions and primary goal for Jansen and 
Sulmasy’s undertaking – the prevention of a slide towards the practice of 
euthanasia – which whilst laudable, do not translate well in clinical practice. As a 
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result there is a need to consider alternative approaches to this clinically troubling 
predicament of some patients who are very near the end of their lives (5,6). 
Table 2.2 represents a summary of the evolving views on the goals of care and 
views on existential suffering taken by the various parties. 
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Table 2.2 Analysis of views held by various parties on goals of care  
and existential suffering 
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2.3 THE CASSELL AND RICH POSITION 
Consider Patient C who shares an identical background, personality and set of 
circumstances to Jansen and Sulmasy’s Patient B, with one exception. Patient C is 
a Hindu, who in the face of a diagnosis of intractable existential suffering, does 
wish to have PS as he believes that it will help clear his mind of thoughts and 
“free” his soul from the chains of his present circumstances. Patient C subscribes 
to the belief that meditation has healing properties and also allows him to 
“concentrate on God and discover [his] inner self” (46-48). For Patient C, PS is 
“beneficial” if only as a means of moving to another plane of existence by 
silencing his tumultuous inner voices and removing all sensory distractions so as 
to enable him even in his weakened state to focus upon his meditative goals. 
Patient C has complied with and exhausted all treatment options, both physical 
and psycho-existential, and still continues to report persistent suffering. He does 
not demand for sedation but voices his wish to pursue this option as a result of the 
MDT’s confirmation that with a prognosis of less than two weeks of life and 
proven intractability of symptoms, there are no more viable treatment options 
available to ameliorate his symptoms.  
Under both the AMA-CEJA and VHA guidelines, the intractability of Patient C’s 
existential suffering will be overlooked in favour of yet more attempts at 
“alternative” treatment options (1,2). PS would not be available to Patient C even 
though he chooses to have it after complying with and failing all other treatment 
options employed thus far (1,2). Patient C’s goals and wishes, short prognosis and 
failure thus far to respond to both conventional and alternative measures would be 
set aside in favour of the paternalistic leanings of a restorative goal of care (1,2). 
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Part of the reason underpinning this stipulation is the acknowledgement that the 
VHA guidelines still operate under the premise that evaluations and treatments 
are being carried out by a single physician or a small team of HCPs rather than a 
MDT (1,2). This inevitable lack of a holistic assessment and multidimensional 
expertise necessitates that these guidelines require second opinions be sought and 
“alternative” interventions be attempted to meet the requirements of a diagnosis 
of intractability. The situation within these guidelines is further complicated due 
to their requirement of careful elucidation of the etiology of the suffering and the 
limitations placed upon the treatment of existential suffering (1,2). In such, 
circumstances Cassell and Rich offer an alternative means to addressing the goals 
of care based upon an alternate view of suffering (8).  
Based on his article “Diagnosing Suffering: A Perspective”, Cassell explains that 
suffering is a multidimensional experience that affects every element of the 
person (10). Cassell believes that 
“[s]uffering involves some symptom or process that threatens the patient 
because of fear, the meaning of the symptom, and concerns about the 
future. The meanings and the fear are personal and individual, so that even 
if two patients have the same symptoms, their suffering would be 
different” (10). 
This position is not dissimilar to the position that Jansen and Sulmasy adopt that 
extend the implication of this subjective experience beyond the corporeal plane to 
involve temporal and wider psychosocial considerations such as cultural, social 
and personal beliefs (5,10). The two positions appear to diverge in the manner 
that they view treatment of this suffering (6,10). Jansen and Sulmasy hold that 
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suffering that does not have a direct relationship with the cause of the suffering is 
not best treated pharmacologically, Cassell holds that the patient’s suffering poses 
a threat to the integrity of the person which should be addressed by the physician 
through any means available so long as they are proportional to the demands of 
the situation and the patient’s particular contextual considerations (5,10). Cassell 
argues that suffering  
“is a specific distress that occurs when an impending destruction of the 
person is perceived and continues until the threat is gone or the integrity 
of the person can be restored. A person is an embodied, purposeful, 
thinking, feeling, emotional, reflective, relational human individual 
existing through time in a narrative sense. Generally, all of these parts are 
consistent and are harmoniously accordant. Suffering, in which all of 
these parts are affected, variously destroys the coherence, cohesiveness, 
and consistency of the whole. It is in this sense that the integrity of the 
person is threatened or destroyed” (8).  
Offering a biological basis for this claim, Cassell observes, firstly, that whilst 
pain and suffering are two different and distinct forms of distress, they are closely 
related (16). The human nociceptive apparatus or nervous system pathways 
involved in the transmission of noxious stimuli routinely enhances, diminishes or 
inhibits the messages or information transmitted to the central nervous system 
from the location of injury (16). Thus, the nociceptive apparatus modulates the 
perception and therefore the meaning of these pain messages. Chemical 
messengers and their receptors within the nervous system also influence the 
original message, for instance endorphins or drugs exert analgesic effects by 
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binding to specialized receptors, and neurotransmitters like serotonin and 
dopamine temper the transmission of the nociceptive message. Cassell argues that 
pain is a perception, and qua perception, it is a cognitive state involving judgment 
(16). The actions human beings take in response to pain, which “generally take 
account of location, severity, cause and anticipated course of the pain”, are 
indicative of the operations of cognitive knowledge and judgment (16). 
Secondly, the concept of suffering that Cassell adheres to involves an inextricable 
link between the physical, existential, psychological and psychiatric planes 
making the “arbitrary discrimination of suffering” inherently misguided (8,12). 
Cassell maintains that 
“[w]hat is called existential distress arises from the impact of their 
sickness on their existence; helplessness, isolation, and loss of control that 
characterize severe illness, and which is brought on by symptoms as 
varied as pain or profound weakness. When these things are seen by the 
person as threatening their destruction as the persons they have known 
themselves to be, they start to suffer. Their suffering then becomes the 
problem. Their suffering, as suffering, is no different than the suffering 
that comes about because of pain” (8). 
Cassell argues that the goal of care is “to maintain the intactness and integrity of 
the person in the face of severe or increasing sickness and a deteriorating body” 
(12). This goal of care cannot be limited by concern for only physical suffering 
(12). Cassell explains that at the centre of this endeavour is a goal of care, which 
is focused on the relief of suffering and that 
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“[w]hen a source of distress, like pain, produces suffering, it is the 
suffering that becomes the central distress not the pain. It is not valid to 
make a distinction between suffering whose source may be physical, such 
as pain, and suffering coming from the threat to the integrity of the person 
from the very nature of the person’s existence” (8). 
Whilst Jansen and Sulmasy hold that suffering can be treated according to the 
“causal relationship to the patient’s underlying condition”, Cassell and Rich 
maintain that even if causal relationships were possible, the overlap between the 
various elements of the patient’s psychological, physical, existential and 
psychiatric dimensions would see such etiologically-focused treatments unlikely 
to be effective without an equally holistic response to the suffering (5,8).  
Jansen in her article “Hastening Death and the Boundaries of Self” in 2006, 
accepts this more inclusive view (14). Jansen acknowledges in this article on the 
boundaries of personhood that  
“the composition of the self cannot be determined simply by appealing to 
biological or genetic considerations. These considerations are relevant to 
fixing the boundaries of the self, but they do not settle the matter. We 
have also seen that the self cannot be defined by spatial boundaries” (14). 
Cultural and temporal factors play their part in Jansen’s view that shares some 
similarities with Cassell’s idea of “topology of a person” (14). Rich explicates 
that  
“Cassell offers a ‘topology of a person.’ On this account, the unique and 
essential characteristics of person are a body; personality and character; 
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behavioral patterns; a sense of both a past and a future (as well as 
awareness of existence in the present moment); life experiences; a cultural 
(social) background and family ties, as well as roles associated with those 
relationships; a political status (rights and obligations); a private life; and 
finally, a transcendent dimension or life of the spirit (distinguishable from 
religiosity or adherence to theological dogma). In this article Cassell goes 
on to critique reductionism in the domain of persons as antithetical to a 
full understanding and appreciation of their essential nature, instead 
emphasizing by means of the topology how complex, highly nuanced, and 
interrelated are the dimensions of human persons. He asserts, 
categorically and unequivocally, contrary to the received view of medical 
science heretofore, that the body, qua body, does not suffer; persons suffer” 
(19). 
Cassell and Rich’s view of the “self sustaining” nature of suffering is 
diametrically opposite to Jansen and Sulmasy’s perspective (5,8). Cassell and 
Rich see suffering persisting even if the precipitating symptoms are ameliorated, 
quite unlike Jansen and Sulmasy’s view of existential suffering, which recedes 
upon amelioration of its underlying cause (5,8). Jansen and Sulmasy pursue 
focused, etiological-based care options where “agent narrative suffering” is 
addressed by treatment focused at ameliorating its source of suffering (8). 
However, little is made of the possibility of there being more than one such cause 
that threatens the disintegration of the person and more than one element within 
the topology of the person affected by the threat (5,8). Similarly, Jansen and 
Sulmasy ignore the possibility that there may be more than one underlying illness 
involved, a commixing of comorbidities, or even an effect that may not be as a 
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result of the primary complaint but indirectly as a result of a coexisting pathology 
or illness, or even as a result of the patient’s particular experiences and/or beliefs. 
Such complexity, particularly within increasingly frail patients, makes 
discernment of causal relationships more difficult to discern than Jansen and 
Sulmasy claim (5).  
These difficulties also serve to polarize opinion on the goals and extent of care 
provision and serve to highlight the extent of the variance between the position of 
Jansen and Sulmasy, and Cassell on the issue of the goals of medicine (14). In an 
article in 1977 for the Hastings Center Report entitled “The function of medicine: 
Restoring autonomy to the patient”, Cassell began to set out his view of the 
function of medicine that formed the basis of his critique of Jansen and Sulmasy 
later (8). In this article, he envisaged the goals of medicine to be firmly focused 
upon “do[ing] everything possible to maintain the integrity of the person in the 
face of death” (5,14). To Cassell, this must involve a multidimensional review of 
the patient’s situation since  
“[i]t appears that to know the suffering of others demands an exhaustive 
understanding of what makes them the individuals they are – an 
awareness of when they feel themselves whole, threatened, or 
disintegrated. This necessitates knowledge of their ideas about their 
identities, their views of the past, present, and future, their relationships to 
others and their environment, their aims and anticipated actions” (11). 
Therefore from the outset, Cassell dispels the belief that identifying the cause of 
suffering is always possible and maintains that  
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“[s]offering may occur when one does not expect it or is ignorant of its 
source, or pain and other physical symptoms may be so intrusive that they 
push aside consideration of suffering. (In such circumstances the sufferer 
may wrongly believe that if the pain were gone everything would again be 
well when, in fact, the injury to the person's self-identity now transcends 
the pain.)” (11). 
Pursuant to this holistic view of suffering, Cassell and Rich, who build upon 
Cassell’s original position, hold that suffering must be an entwined concept that 
cannot be discriminated upon on the basis of etiology or apparent causal 
relationships (8). This clarifies their position of a holistic approach to the 
treatment of suffering (8). This position runs parallel to the stance taken by 
Callahan et al for the Hastings Center report entitled “Specifying the Goals of 
Medicine” on the “causal relationship to the patient’s underlying condition” (49). 
Rich states further that the “phenomenon of suffering in the advanced stages of 
terminal illness cannot be sliced, diced, compartmentalized, or otherwise 
relegated to such watertight compartments” (19). Together these positions and a 
lack of substantive evidence casts doubt on the viability Jansen and Sulmasy’s 
maintenance of a “causal relationship to the patient’s underlying condition” 
(5,8,19).  
Reverting to the case of Patient C, Rich and Cassell view the severity of 
Patient C’s existential suffering as being  
“no different than the suffering that comes about because of pain. To see 
such suffering as somehow not as real as (say) vomiting or as ‘just 
emotional’ is not true of severe illness as any clinician knows it to be” (5).  
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As “all other options failed” and as Patient C is in “the final stages of terminal 
illness”, Cassell and Rich would treat Patient C’s suffering with PS (8,19). This 
action would be justifiable upon clinical standards and regnant views of suffering 
(8,19). Rich states that  
“[i]f medicine and society are to deprive even a distinct and insular 
minority of dying patients of sedation that would relieve their otherwise 
intractable distress, and to claim an ethical justification for doing so, our 
common understanding of the nature of suffering must be shown to be 
demonstrably false and thereby inadequate to support the palliative care 
approaches that have been developed consistent with that understanding” 
(19). 
Rich’s position moves beyond simple diagnoses of intractability and reaches to 
the established goals of palliative care and indeed to the general goals of 
medicine (19). If the goals of care are indeed to relieve suffering, Cassell 
maintains that in light of intractable suffering at the end of life, such suffering 
may in fact be alleviated via the application of sedation given that he argues that 
suffering does not exist without sentience or consciousness (16).  
So here is a treatment that Cassell feels is valid and effective and one Rich would 
argue would be in keeping with the “rights” of the patient in keeping with the 
positions taken by the US courts (11,16,18). Based on a review of US court 
judgments on the cases of James v Hillhaven Corp and Bergman v Wing Chin, 
where the judges in the respective cases found in favour of the complaint that care 
did not appropriately address their suffering, Rich draws the conclusion that the 
continued application of a discriminative treatment approach to the relief of 
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suffering would be legally and ethically unacceptable (18). Rich states that this 
would also be incongruent with a physician’s duty to  
“ensure that dying patients did not suffer, because when all other options 
failed, palliative sedation could be provided consistent with clinical, 
ethical, and legal standards of professional conduct” (18). 
Despite their multidimensional, evidenced-based view of suffering, Cassell and 
Rich still leave a number of issues unattended to. There is no clear means of 
tailoring this focus upon the relief of suffering to the needs of specific patients 
particularly when some patients hold that some suffering is actually desirable or 
acceptable in order to realise other goals. Consider Patient D, who like Patient B 
and Patient C, is identical in character and condition save for one point. Patient D 
unlike Patient C is a Buddhist and, in keeping with his beliefs, despite his 
existential suffering does not wish complete relief of his suffering. For him his 
suffering is seen as a means of “atoning for his past indiscretions” (50). For 
Patient D, “repaying karma” is the overarching goal of care, not relief of suffering 
(50).  
It is unclear in light of a failure to site determinations of the overarching goals of 
care on a case by case basis, how Cassell and Rich balance the wishes and views 
of Patient D under a rigid overarching goal of care that they espouse nor how the 




2.4 THE POSITION OF CDPS 
Patient D’s scenario is not altogether uncommon amongst the terminally ill. Many 
patients do have goals of care that may not be entirely centred upon the 
alleviation of suffering much less a restorative goal. The modern palliative care 
framework upon which CDPS responds to the needs of Patient D, adopts a 
framework to end-of-life care that is guided by patient-determined goals of care. 
It also approaches care from a holistic perspective and adopts a multidisciplinary 
team (MDT) approach in keeping with the central palliative care approach 
advocated by Dame Cicely Saunders (3). Various members of the MDT address 
elements of the patient’s appraisal and care according to their area of expertise. 
Saunders sees this approach as the best means of delivering the holistic review 
(31). 
However, Saunders, like Cassell and Rich, is vague on the manner that the 
MDT’s response would balance and respond to Patient D’s stance on suffering 
and how it would determine the appropriateness and proportionality of its 
response.  
 
2.4.1 View on suffering 
The position of CDPS on the issue of suffering represents an evolution of 
Saunders’ views and one that is congruent with Cassell’s views of suffering (8-
17,23-32). This view of suffering also incorporates social and practical 




Figure 2.1 Conceiving of suffering within CDPS 
The CDPS view of suffering does not attempt discrimination between the “types” 
of suffering and is inspired by Saunders’ concept of “total pain” where “terminal 
pain can fill the whole consciousness of a patient and be a most complex and 
interwoven problem” (28,32). Drawing from her own experiences caring for the 
dying, Saunders held that suffering is not solely manifested in physical signs and 
symptoms but it has impact upon the whole person, his family and their 
psychosocial-spiritual well-being (32). Subscribing to the multidimensionality of 
suffering, Saunders held that “mental distress” afflicts patients the hardest and is 
apparent in their psychosocial-spiritual suffering, leading her to conclude that this 
would inevitably be linked to the patient’s physical problems (27,28). The relief 
of psychosocial-spiritual suffering, therefore, sits at the centre of her vision for 
palliative care (32). 
The goals of care that underpin CDPS encompasses seeing suffering as being 
multidimensional in nature and entwined with the various “elements” of suffering 
extending far beyond their etiological focus. Acceptance that there are many 
elements of suffering speaks of an acknowledgement that suffering must be 
addressed by more than simply one professional or one approach but many, each 











established lines of clinical specialities is merely pragmatic and a reflection of the 
fact that care is provided by specialists with specific areas of interests whose 
views of the dominant area of suffering would see it classified by that domain or 
area of speciality. However, whilst such a multidimensional view of suffering and 
the requisite holistic, multidimensional, multiprofessional review by the MDT 
represent the principles behind the position of CDPS on suffering, questions as to 
how they are practiced become a concern, particularly given that they do not 
feature in any of the guidelines discussed thus far (1-4). 
This omission is instructive in highlighting the lack of a widely accepted 
definition for existential suffering despite the presence of multiple definitions 
(41,51-55). This serves to underline the complexities of understanding the 
features of this form of suffering at the end of life. Screening, diagnosing and 
treatment of existential suffering then come under scrutiny and raise concerns 
about how it is determined to be intractable. These shortcomings reaffirm Jansen 
and Sulmasy’s fears that PS and CDPS could be used as a means to euthanasia 
(5).  
These guiding principles particularly in the manner that they are applied to 
existential suffering come under sharp focus. This practical bedside care and 
evidenced-based review makes up the second element of the triumvirate of 
considerations that underpin the manner that suffering is conceived within the 
CDPS framework (Fig 2.1). Conceiving effective, efficient and consistent review 
and assessment methods are but two elements of a larger consideration for the 
extension of treatment of CDPS to include all forms of suffering (Fig 2.2). 
However, there is scant guidance on making a diagnosis of existential suffering 
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much less a universally accepted means of screening for this form of suffering 
(52). Furthermore, even when diagnosed, there is little in the way of determining 
its intractability.   
The issue of determining intractability of existential suffering is not addressed in 
either the KNMG nor EAPC guidelines for PS even though they do make 
provisions for the treatment of intractable existential suffering (21,22). Whilst the 
KNMG guidelines do state that intractable existential suffering is the “feeling that 
one’s existence is empty or meaningless”, which cannot be relieved despite 
spiritual and psychosocial support amongst patients with a prognosis of a week or 
two, they do not state how this may be diagnosed nor treated prior to a 
determination of intractability (22). The KNMG guidelines do however aid 
identification by stating that 
“[e]xistential suffering may be expressed as feelings of pointlessness, 
emptiness, existential distress, a desire not to experience death or the 
dying process consciously, psychosocial problems, spiritual problems, or 
for instance the desire to preserve one’s dignity” (22). 
The EAPC guidelines do not provide any indication as to how existential 
suffering can be screened for or how it may be diagnosed (21).  
From a practical clinical and evidenced-based perspective, there is much that is 
left undeclared about how existential suffering is conceived and this affects the 
viability of considering existential suffering as an indication for CDPS. Prime 
amongst these are the oft-neglected issues of how existential suffering is 
clinically assessed, diagnosed, treated and reviewed (Fig 2.2). I will consider each 
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of these elements in due course and defer discussions with regards to 
determinations of intractability to Chapter 3.  
 
Figure 2.2 General requirements for appraisal of symptoms for CDPS 
 
2.4.2 Assessment and diagnosis 
There is much that has been said of existential suffering though there is little in 
the way of clear indicators of the presence of this form of suffering beyond what 
may be garnered from a complete and thorough palliative history. Yet despite 
being alert to its possible presence, all too often existential suffering is a 
diagnosis of exclusion, one made in light of continued suffering despite the 
treatment of psychological and physical suffering. Part of this problem moves 
beyond a clear understanding of the goals of care or the remit of appropriate end 
of life care but as a result of a lack of validated assessment tool or effective 
screening tools.  
At present there are no validated tools for the identification of suffering. 
However, Schuman-Olivier et al do propose a clinical classification system for 
existential suffering (41,51). Difficulties with validating this system include 







convictions. Furthermore, the general poor physical and cognitive conditions of 
these patients make concrete screening tools unwieldy and not easily portable 
across various care settings.  
An acute shortage of trained staff in palliative care makes adoption of this more 
inclusive view of suffering difficult. Whilst the EAPC guidelines suggest the need 
for “a multidisciplinary case conference, including representatives from 
psychiatry, chaplaincy and ethics, as well as those providing care at the bedside, 
because of the complexity and frequently multifactorial nature of this situation”, 
such oversight may not always be possible (21).  
Similarly, the requirement for “repeated assessment by clinicians skilled in 
psychological care who have established a relationship with the patient and their 
family” may be hampered by the general poor physical and cognitive conditions 
of these patients, and emphasizes the need for competent and practiced hands in 
such appraisals (21). The issue of competence of the appraiser is also a concern, 
particularly when one considers the Brongersma case, where “act[ing] outside the 
scope of his professional competence” led to Dr Philip Sutorius’ conviction for 
the treatment of existential suffering with physician assisted suicide (PAS) (54). It 
is interesting that the judges in this Dutch case – heard some four years before the 
enactment of the Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review 
Procedures) Act of 2002 that legalized euthanasia and PAS in the Netherlands – 
focused in their judgment on the competence of the physician rather than the 
illegality of the act itself (54). 
Palliative care appraisals, however, have evolved much since that time, with the 
adoption of a holistic review process; even the employment of smaller palliative 
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care MDTs is not in itself a significant obstacle to good care appraisals nor a 
significant impediment to a wider role for CDPS (51,55). Tan et al in their recent 
article in the American Journal of Hospice and Palliative Care entitled “The 
experience of suffering of palliative care patients in Malaysia: A Thematic 
Analysis” show that even in a multi-faith, multicultural, multi-ethnic, multilingual 
country such as Malaysia where specialist palliative care services are still in their 
infancy, multidimensional reviews of suffering can still be carried out effectively 
(51).  
In this study, diagnosis of ten forms of suffering was made through interviews 
and thorough reviews of the case, devised upon existing standard palliative care 
reviews (51). This study reveals that only slight adaptations to standard palliative 
care appraisal processes are required and the appraisal needs only a healthcare 
professional (HCP) well versed in palliative care practices to undertake it (51). 
Kissane in forwarding his concept of “‘typology’ of existential suffering” in his 
article entitled “The Relief of Existential Suffering” in the Archives of Internal 
Medicine further improves prevailing holistic appraisals (55). It is clear that so 
long as holistic and regular reviews are carried out, existential suffering will be 
identified.  
 
2.4.3 Treatment and reviews 
Tan et al’s data shows that treatments and reviews of existential suffering can be 
carried out by social workers and psychologists without the need for palliative 
care specialists (40). Many of the treatments suggested by Schuman-Olivier et al 
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are available in most psychology services (40). However, as an added precaution 
within the CDPS framework, a specialist palliative care physician is required to 
review the patient both to ascertain intractability and to act as an independent 
reviewer before CDPS can be applied. The study also reveals the requirement that 
suffering must be addressed by more than one professional or one approach, and 
by many MDT members, each experts in their own areas of interest.  
This cautionary stance is in keeping with regnant clinical practices. A further 
requirement is a need for uniformity and social acceptability for this undertaking. 
These represent the third element of this triumvirate of considerations behind how 
existential suffering is conceived in CDPS (Fig 2.1). The Brongersma case, albeit 
related to the application of PAS rather than PS, crystallizes the need for social, 
legal and evidence-based acceptability before CDPS can be safely applied within 
a specific setting (54).  
In the assessment and treatment of Patient C, for example, differentiation of care 
provision along established lines of clinical specialities is merely pragmatic and a 
reflection of the fact that care is provided by specialists with specific areas of 
interests and experience in various elements of care. This does not suggest 
exclusivity of this type of suffering but rather reflects the multidimensional 
approach to care that is adopted. It may be that Patient C does have physical 
suffering too, enmeshed within this existential suffering and whose relationship 
with the dominant form of suffering may be primary or secondary to his 
existential suffering. A multidimensional appraisal and treatment approach would 
be better suited to addressing these needs (8). In Patient C’s situation, his loss of 
interest in “carrying on” may be because he is no longer independent as a result 
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his own growing weakness and physical limitations and even possibly pain and 
shortness of breath. Treating only his physical symptomology to the neglect of his 
existential suffering denies the interrelated nature of suffering and the 
“traditional” palliative care approach that his care is under. This approach is also 
congruent with the overarching goals of CDPS. 
 
2.5 THE GOALS OF MEDICINE 
The goals of care adopted by CDPS build upon a Saunders-inspired palliative 
care framework for the relief of suffering within the domain of patient-centred 
care (23-26). In her 1995 paper “In Britain – Fewer Conflicts of Conscience”, 
Saunders states that under the auspices of palliative care, the goals of medical 
care move beyond the ideal of a restoration of health that is held by Jansen and 
Sulmasy and evolves to one akin to Cassell and Rich’s stance on relieving 
suffering (5,8,23-26). The point at which this change in goals occurs is when 
curative options are exhausted and focus is centred upon meeting the goals of 
care set out by the patient and the family. Under the aegis of these new goals,  
“there is still much for a doctor to do and he is entitled to do all that is 
proper and necessary to relieve pain and suffering, which include 
treatment options that may ‘incidentally’ shorten life” (26). 
To meet this wide ranging objective, Saunders turns to the expertise of the 
multidisciplinary team guided by the patient and their carers and loved ones, to 
ensure the patient that adequate and timely spiritual, social, “mental” and physical 
support is provided in a manner appropriate to the specific demands of a case. As 
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part of the two-pronged approach of patient-centred goal-setting and holistic care 
provision through this multidisciplinary care approach, “all the anxiety, the 
loneliness and the despair of long pain as well as the galaxy of physical 
symptoms common to this phase of illness” are addressed (26). However, 
Saunders does not explain how these varied and frequently competing 
considerations are weighed up in the determination of the overall goals of care. 
 
2.5.1 The Duty of Palliative Care (DoPC) 
To overcome this lack of clarity in the determination of the overall goals of care, 
the CDPS guidelines adopt the Duty of Palliative Care (DoPC) in order to oversee 
the manner that care is provided (56). The concept of the DoPC provides 
guidance to health care professionals on balancing conflicting moral principles, 
providing each with a specific “weight” within this period of a waning duty to 
cure and prolong life and an ascension of the duty to maximise comfort (56).  
First, the DoPC places more “weight” on the duties to optimize comfort and 
ameliorate suffering that allow them to override any duty to attempt to cure (56).  
Second, the DoPC relies upon evidenced-based practices and best practice 
guidelines to inform case-specific deliberations on the appropriate course of 
action led by “a team who has undergone appropriate standardized training within 
the speciality and possesses the experience required to be accredited as a 
specialist by the local accrediting board” (56).  
The DoPC is not prejudicial in holding onto predetermined ideas of the goals of 
care and is limited only by the laws of the land, culturally appropriate beliefs, the 
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practical standards of care and what can reasonably and proportionately be met by 
a palliative care team (56).  
 
2.5.2 The Duty of Palliative Care in practice 
In the case of Patient D, aided by the MDT, particular issues such as the decision-
making process, determinations of intractability, consent and proportionality that 
are particularly open to scrutiny and which will be discussed in the coming 
chapters are fully assessed before CDPS is employed. Importantly the flexibility 
within the DoPC, which allows for the changing of the goals of care as the 
disease progresses or as conditions alter, requires that multidimensional reviews 
be ongoing and sensitive to the changing circumstances and their effects (56).  
The appropriateness of response also revolves upon such a review. Suffering by 
its very nature is personal and self-defined requiring some explication as 
appropriateness of response is assessed. In the case of Patient D, appropriateness 
of response moves beyond considerations of physical matters and clinical 
limitations. Critical to this consideration is the meaning that Patient D places on 
his suffering and if his goal of care is consistent and based upon logical rationale. 
A concern for the MDT team as they determine the appropriateness of the 
treatment of Patient D’s suffering is if it is in keeping with the patient’s best 
interests. A determination of appropriateness must be multidimensional and takes 
into account every aspect of the patient’s psychosocial, clinical, cultural, religious 
and emotional needs.  
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A determination of appropriateness also plays a role in the manner that the 
“rights” of the patient to health care are considered (57,58). Underpinning this 
“right” is Sen’s conception of what a “good society must have” and the overall 
goals of care (57,58). In the case of Patient A, it may be argued that he has a right 
to having his agent narrative and neurocognitive suffering addressed, as opposed 
to what Jansen and Sulmasy argue, that treating both forms with opioids is not 
appropriate. This right to health is supported by the premise that it will be 
tampered by appropriate and proportional response, rather than taking Cassell and 
Rich’s approach on face value (8). In the case of Patient B, his rights to treatment 
of his suffering ought to be balanced by his refusal to comply with appraisals; 
care by the various specialists precludes the possibility of applying CDPS simply 
because by definition, his symptoms cannot be considered intractable (8).  
The fear that Patient B would become a candidate for injudicious application of 
CDPS as a means of hastening death underpins Jansen and Sulmasy’s concerns 
(6). Part of this problem is a failure of Jansen and Sulmasy to site their 
delineation both of end-of-life care and indeed of the treatment of suffering in this 
phase of life within the aegis of palliative care. This lack of application of both 
MDT-led palliative care appraisal, decision-making and care approaches and a 
lack of consideration of patients within this stage of life proves to be the undoing 




Ensuring the appropriate citing of the goals of care that underpin any treatment 
approach is critical to the manner that care is provided. In this chapter I have 
shown that as a result of evolving psychosocial expectations and clinical findings 
as well as a more inclusive concept of suffering, the goals of care must be 
appropriately situated within the palliative care setting complete with appropriate 
determination of the limits of care within the evolving disease process. These 
goals cannot be determined solely by the wishes of the patient but require due 
consideration of what can really be met by the MDT in the face of diverse access, 
the prevailing clinical, legal and professional standards and the particular 
requirements of a particular case. A fixed set of goals of care is not clinically 
viable in the face of patient-centred care and the ever changing requirements of 
the complex needs associated with intractable suffering.  
Using the example of determining the place of existential suffering as an 
indication for CDPS under the aegis of goals of care that are focused on relieving 
suffering, the CDPS framework is shown to take all aspects of care into 
consideration with the aid of the combined insights of the MDT, the patient and 
their carers and families. This process is balanced by what can actually be met in 
an appropriate, proportional and coherent manner within the realities of the 
specific clinical setting. However, in doing so, it becomes clear that many 
elements of this process require elucidation. This includes the manner that 
decisions are made, the way that intractability is discerned, how proportionality is 
delineated and how consent is gained. These then become the topics of 
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consideration in the coming chapters. I will begin with a study of how decisions 
are made within the context of CDPS use. 
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“Death in the end (in the Asian context) is not only about the individual  
but the family as well.” 
~Radha Krishna S~ 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
One of the key areas of concern that has arisen from the study of the overall 
goals of care of continuous deep palliative sedation (CDPS) in the last chapter 
has been the manner that end-of-life decisions are made. These decisions have 
traditionally revolved around the patient-physician dyad but the advent of 
palliative care with its multidimensional, multi-professional practice has added a 
further dimension to these interactions. Discussions now involve a group of 
professionals and the patient and their family. How these decisions are made 
have not been appropriately determined. Aside from the variability in the 
number of parties involved in the decision-making process, decisions no longer 
appear to revolve around purely clinical considerations but also the psychosocial, 
religious, financial, cultural and societal factors that are pertinent to the patient’s 
situation.  
The model of decision-making within this variable setting has not been specified 
and does vary significantly – not helped by variability in the availability of 
palliative care specialists, access to palliative care facilities, specialist drug access, 
clinical guidelines and even ancillary support – which as a result has far reaching 
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repercussions on care determinations (1). Within the practice of CDPS, one key 
area that is particularly sensitive to this variability in determinations is the 
determination of intractability.  
In this chapter, I will study the decision-making process behind the determination 
of intractability of symptoms. This process requires a wide understanding of both 
clinical and psychosocial facets involved in the individual patient’s case. 
Evaluating these elements and their importance is the multidisciplinary team 
(MDT). It is the goal of this chapter to delineate the often unspecified decision-
making process that exists between the MDT and the patient and their family in 
arriving at a diagnosis of intractability.  
To begin, I offer a descriptive account of the MDT and its roles within palliative 
care. 
 
3.2 THE MULTIDISCIPLINARY TEAM 
The practice of palliative care revolves around the adoption of a MDT-led 
practice. The MDT is taken to be 
“[a] group of people of different healthcare disciplines, which meets 
together at a given time (whether physically in one place, or by video or 
teleconferencing) to discuss a given patient and who are each able to 
contribute independently to the diagnostic and treatment decisions about 
the patient’’ (2). 
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Within the palliative care setting, this role extends to appraising, supporting and 
treating the various bio-psychosocial factors involved in the provision of holistic 
patient-centred care and support to patients and their families (2). Whilst its scope 
and general functions may be known, membership of the MDT remains 
unspecified (3,4). This variability is as a result of a lack of clear guidelines 
concerning the precise duties of the MDT across different care settings, a general 
lack of understanding of a palliative care led MDT approach, and in part due to a 
shortage of professionals (3,4). The MacMillan Organization suggests that the 
MDT consist of medical personnel such as surgeons, radiologists, 
histopathologists, oncologists, palliative care physicians and a clinical nurse 
specialist (3). Other professionals expected to be part of the MDT beyond these 
core members include physiotherapists, occupational therapists, psychologists, 
dieticians, speech therapists and pharmacists (3). The American Academy of 
Hospice and Palliative Medicine state that basic membership ought to include a 
social worker, chaplain, volunteers and most importantly the patient and their 
family (4). These variances in the composition of the MDT are instructive in 
highlighting a differing view in the precise role of the MDT within different care 
settings and also in different nations.  
However, these differences do pose a problem given that differing membership 
can influence the manner of interactions between patients and the team and also 
how the team assesses a particular patient’s needs within the confines of a 
specific case (5). Deciphering the exact formula to a balanced MDT is therefore 
important if the general goals of the MDT are to be met appropriately.  
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This is relevant to palliative care services in developing nations where access to 
palliative care specialists, palliative care facilities, specialist drug access, clinical 
guidelines and even ancillary support is limited. Assembling a core group of 
professionals to form the basis of a balanced palliative care MDT that is capable 
of meeting its central objectives then becomes difficult and affects the manner 
that palliative care itself is practiced. A shortage of staff will impact upon the 
provision of holistic appraisals of a case, diagnoses and holistic care (5). The 
ethical significance of this shortfall moves beyond confines of health equality and 
access to care, to issues such as the manner that decisions are taken and how end-
of-life care is practiced. 
To highlight these deficits, consider the examples of Patients A and B in Jansen 
and Sulmasy’s paper, “Proportionality, terminal suffering and the restorative 
goals of medicine” where both patients are being assessed for application of 
palliative sedation (PS) (6). In the case of Patient A, who is “experiencing 
neurocognitive suffering brought on by severe phantom limb pain following 
traumatic amputation”, he would have struggled to have his symptoms addressed 
without the support of the specialists (6). Without appropriate care of his physical 
symptoms, his suffering would have progressed, given rise to other forms of 
suffering and invited inappropriate considerations of PS. In effect, a diagnosis of 
intractability would have been made at a much earlier juncture (7,8).  
In the case of Patient B who is experiencing agent narrative suffering as a result 
of his progressive loss of independence from progressive amyotrophic lateral 
sclerosis, a lack of psychological therapy, palliative care, counselling and 
psychiatric support would have meant his symptoms would have been determined 
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at an early juncture and inappropriately to be intractable (6). This would have also 
ushered the injudicious application of PS. 
There is an issue about health equality and access, which is slowly being 
addressed; however, further discussion about this matter lies outside the remit of 
this thesis (9). Setting this issue aside, how a MDT functions with limited access 
to specialist palliative care and amidst uncertainties regarding its complement 
becomes a central concern, particularly in how it sees to its other obligations.  
To highlight these many issues in the deliberations that precede any application of 
CDPS, consider the case of Jaafar. Here the various roles occupied by the MDT 
within the multiple discussions that lead up to a determination of intractability 
and potentially CDPS are crystallized. 
 
3.3 JAAFAR’S CASE 
Jaafar was an active man until about a year ago. He jogged daily and had done so 
since he was 16. Now even for a man of 52, he still managed a weekly game of 
football with his colleagues at the transport company where he worked as a 
supervisor for the last 16 years. About 18 months ago, he hurt his foot whilst 
preparing for his daughter’s engagement party. Over the following weeks, the 
wound on his foot did not heal, not helped by his insistence on continuing his 
routine runs, his regular games of football and his resistance to seeking medical 
help. By the time he did finally present to his general practitioner, gangrene had 
set in. He refused admission or investigations as he wished to continue with 
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preparations for his daughter’s wedding and only consented to taking a course of 
antibiotics and analgesia. 
After much deliberation and pressure from his family in light of his worsening 
condition, he was admitted for an emergency “ray” amputation of his left fifth toe, 
the day after his daughter’s wedding. During the work up, he was found to have 
poorly controlled diabetes, hypertension, hypercholesterolemia and impaired 
renal function. As a result, his operation was delayed as these issues were 
addressed. It was also during this period that he refused further assessments of his 
vascular system, which posed a significant clinical problem for the surgical and 
medical teams caring for him. Despite this obstacle, his doctors proceeded with 
his operation, given that the condition of his toe was worsening. Within two days 
post-operatively, it became clear that the vascular damage was more extensive 
than first thought. He developed critical ischemia of his left leg then his right leg. 
Within a space of three months, Jaafar underwent consecutive above knee 
amputations. 
Following his contralateral above knee amputation, he suffered a large 
myocardial infarction, which severely compromised his cardiac function and left 
him with an ejection fraction of 15%. Despite his continued difficulties and being 
warned of a risk of sudden death, Jaafar discharged himself against medical 
advice as soon as he was able to manage his pain on his own and continued to 
refuse many tests and medical reviews. He was convinced that his hospital stays 
were worsening his condition and he felt that he would recover better at home. 
About a month later, at a rescheduled post-operative review, Jaafar began to 
complain of existential distress, shortness of breath and phantom limb pain. He 
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consented to and attended a palliative care consult where he was convinced to be 
readmitted to hospital. However, despite the efforts of a number of specialists, the 
palliative care team and two imams, Jaafar’s existential suffering worsened. With 
his prognosis poor and the intractability of his symptoms still being determined, 
his son Hussain requested that his father’s repeated wish for euthanasia be 
honoured or a compromise sought. A family meeting was set up the next day, 
during which time, Hussain being fully aware that the team would decline any 
request for euthanasia or indeed physician assisted suicide (PAS), confronted the 
team with the judgment of Justice O’Connor in the Glucksberg case, in which the 
judge applied the “preferred alternative argument” to the issue of PAS (10,11).  
In summing up the Glucksberg case, Justice O’Connor held that palliative 
sedation (PS) ought to be seen as an ethically and legally preferable option to 
PAS (11). Hussain believed that as a result of this precedent, his father’s 
continued suffering, his wishes and his poor prognosis, PS or in this case 
continuous deep palliative sedation (CDPS) could to be provided instead (10,11).  
In order to meet Jaafar’s complex needs, a MDT was convened and tasked with 
the following primary duties: 
(1) to diagnose disease progression and the dying phase,  
(2) to formulate a treatment plan both for the disease as well as the symptoms,  
(3) to ensure that the plans meet ethical standards,  
(4) to implement, monitor and formulate new plans as required,  
(5) to provide comprehensive personal care, support, recognition of suffering, 
alleviation of distress, 
(6) to facilitate preparations for proximate death, 
(7) to provide professional support to family/carers (13). 
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In Jaafar’s case, the role of the MDT began with a determination as to whether 
Jaafar’s symptoms were intractable. This decision-making process is rarely 
discussed. I will address this short coming here, beginning with a review of the 
role of the MDT in determining a diagnosis of intractability.  
 
3.4 THE ISSUE OF INTRACTABILITY  
Determination of intractability is critical to the application of CDPS. Both the 
terms “intractable” and “refractory” will be applied interchangeably within this 
thesis, as it has been in the guidelines of the EAPC, Royal Dutch Medical 
Association (KNMG), Hospice and Palliative Nurse Association (HPNA), 
National Hospice and Palliative Care Organization (NHPCO), The National 
Ethics Committee of the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) and the 
American Medical Association Code of Medical Ethics on Sedation to 
Unconsciousness in the End of life protocols [Appendix 5 and 6]. The EAPC 
guidelines maintain that application of CDPS without a determination of 
intractability (refractory) symptoms is tantamount to abuse (15,16). Juth et al 
reiterate the importance of such a determination within the EAPC guidelines by 
stating  
“the presence of refractory symptoms is a necessary condition for an 
ethically defensible initiation of sedation at the end of life, in particular 
when there is no intention of discontinuing sedation before the patient 
dies” (16). 
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Eisenchlas maintains that the definition of treatments such as CDPS would be 
“meaningless if intolerable/refractory suffering is not also well defined” (17). 
Eisenchlas adds that stating that refractory symptoms are those that persist “when 
all other possible treatments have failed”, is also insufficient for the purposes of 
applying CDPS (17). Eisenchlas proposes the adoption of Cherny’s definition of 
refractoriness (17). Within Cherny’s definition, refractory symptoms are defined 
as those where a patient’s symptoms  
“cannot be adequately controlled despite aggressive efforts to identify a 
tolerable therapy that does not compromise consciousness. The criterion 
for diagnosing refractory symptoms includes that further invasive and 
non-invasive interventions are incapable of providing adequate relief, are 
associated with excessive and intolerable acute or chronic morbidity, or 
are unlikely to provide relief within a tolerable time frame” (18). 
Within Cherny’s definition, terms such as “intolerable” and “adequate” highlight 
the subjective nature of this diagnosis (18). Cherny and Portenoy add that this 
subjectivity within these determinations is only partly addressed by the 
application of a MDT-based appraisal, given the need for consensus-based 
decisions upon the severity of a symptom (19). These authors define a symptom 
as being refractory if  
“all other possible treatments have failed, or it is estimated by team 
consensus, based on repeated and careful assessments by skilled experts, 
that no methods are available for alleviation within the time frame and 
risk-benefit ratio that the patient can tolerate” (19). 
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A further problem with this definition is its prioritizing of clinical signs and 
symptoms. Morita et al counter this by adopting a wider system of appraisal that 
includes “systematic assessments based on the physical-psychological-social-
existential model, survival predictions, competency evaluations and holistic 
understanding as a whole patient” that encapsulates “supportive psychotherapy 
and patient orientated compassionate care” to circumnavigate concerns that 
diagnoses of refractoriness are clinically based (20). Morita et al explain that 
given that “our understanding of patients’ existential distress is still primitive and 
treatment strategies are far less established”, determinations of intractability must 
be holistic if care is to be provided in a manner that is congruent with the needs 
and goals of the patient (20).  
 
3.4.1 The determination of intractability 
Given the wide variety of definitions present, the process of determination of 
intractability needs discussion and has to my knowledge not been adequately 
considered in the medical literature. Despite its centrality in the application of 
CDPS, there has been little attention given to the process of arriving at a 
diagnosis of intractability. In the recent Canadian guidelines for PS, this factor 
remains obscured (21). To allow for a holistic, clinically relevant process, I 
propose that the diagnosis of intractability include the patient-related factors and 
MDT-determined factors summarized in Table 3.1 below. 
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Patient-related factors MDT-determined factors 
1. the patient’s values, beliefs and goals 1. that aggressive efforts have been 
expended in an effort to ameliorate the 
patient’s symptoms 
2. the determination that the symptoms 
endured amounted to suffering and that 
they are of a severe nature 
2. that all non-sedating treatment options 
have been exhausted 
3. the determination that attempted options 
thus far have been unacceptable, 
intolerable or unbearable 
3. prognosis is less than two weeks 
4. the determination that attempted options 
thus far have not achieved acceptable 
levels of relief 
4. estimations of disease trajectory suggest 
that treatment options are unlikely to be 
effective within the given prognosis 
5. the determination that proposed 
treatments options are unacceptable, 
intolerable or unbearable 
5. delineation of “option sets” or a specific 
set of treatment modalities that are taken 
as viable within the confines of the 
particular case  
6. the determination that proposed 
treatment options are liable to bring 
about intolerable or unacceptable 
morbidity 
6. estimations that viable options within 
treatment sets are unlikely to be effective 
or adequate 
7. the determination that proposed 
treatment options are unlikely to relieve 
symptoms within a tolerable time 
7. determinations that attempted treatments 
have indeed failed rather than require 
further adjustment and/or time 
 8. determination that the views of the 
patient are justifiable 
  9. determination that the planned action is 
in fact in keeping with the patient’s 
beliefs, goals and values and free of 
coercion 
 10. differentiate between difficult to treat and 
intractable symptoms 




3.4.2 Patient-related or subjective factors in the  
determination of intractability 
3.4.2.1 Treatment that is in keeping with the patient’s goals, values and beliefs 
A central feature of providing CDPS is that it ought to be in keeping with the 
patient’s wishes, goals and values and must be something that the patient would 
consent to. Recall Patient C who, like Patient B in Jansen and Sulmasy’s example, 
suffers from severe existential suffering, is unwilling to seek further support or 
evaluations, but is keen for CDPS based on the idea that it would help him 
meditate (6). This patient acts in keeping with his beliefs, values and goals, 
motivated by his view of suffering. Patient C must also deem that the treatments 
proposed are likely to be neither effective nor tolerable and are unlikely to 
alleviate his symptoms in an acceptable space of time without resulting in 
unacceptable acute and/or chronic morbidity.  
Let us consider that Patient C is lucid, alert and competent when these goals are 
stated, and aware of the repercussions of his action and the possibility of CDPS 
being applied (which he would welcome) given that if he was not so, the 
determination for CDPS would be based upon a best interest determination (22-
27). In these circumstances, it is unclear whether in the face of efforts to make the 
decision-making process leading up to the application of CDPS transparent, 
accountable and evidenced-based, Patient C would have to justify why and how 
he arrived at the set of goals that he adopts in the same manner that a MDT is 
required to given the implications of this position upon treatment options.  
Recall Patient D from the previous chapter, who like Patient B in Jansen and 
Sulmasy’s example is identical in character and condition save for one point (6). 
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Patient D is a Buddhist and in keeping with his beliefs, despite his intractable 
existential suffering does not wish complete relief of his suffering. For him his 
suffering is seen as a means of “atoning for his past indiscretions”. For Patient D, 
“repaying karma” is the overarching goal of care, not relief of suffering. It would 
appear that in Patient D’s case, sedation would not be appropriate to meet his 
goals of care, thus ought not to be considered.  
Different measures of endpoints are justified so long as a number of 
considerations are met. These include confirmation (i) that the patient made this 
decision whilst being competent and aware of the possibility of the present 
symptoms and suffering arising during the course of his illness when delineating 
his goals of care; (ii) that this option is not deemed to be a physical risk to the 
patient or to be in conflict with another equally weighted goal. Critical here is the 
patient’s competence. Should there be a suggestion that he or she is not, then this 
thesis maintains that decisions be made on a best interests determination. I will 
discuss this matter in Chapter 4.  
Patient D’s situation highlights the fact that patients’ wishes, goals and beliefs 
help determine the “option set” or treatment modalities taken as viable for their 
respective conditions. Wirtz et al refer to this process as “framing” (28). Limiting 
treatment to a specific area or steering away from various forms of interventions 
and limiting the option set available for care create a limited option set from 
which a diagnosis of exhaustion of “all” treatment options may be easier to arrive 
at. Consequent reductions in the number of treatment option offered as a result of 
progressive disease or changes in other elements of a patient’s condition, is 
defined as “funnelling” (29). I will argue later that both these processes drawn 
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from Wirtz et al’s and Sandman and Munthe’s respective work in decision-
making are critical to understanding the decision-making process in 
determinations of intractability (28,29). Given the gravity and scope of these 
determinations, the deeper question to be considered is to what extent this 
delineation of “option sets” or a specific set of treatment modalities ought to be 
taken as viable in the lead up to a determination of intractability.  
Similarly consideration of a patient’s right to refuse treatment further complicates 
this situation. Repeated refusals of proffered treatment options will steer options 
sets towards an ever-tapering number of treatment modalities and will finally 
“usher in” the possibility of CDPS. In Patient C’s case, this outcome is what the 
patient desired from the outset. Treatment refusal at this juncture of care has very 
different connotations, and justifying this action falls upon the MDT who must 
apply objective measures to validate this position. I will discuss the role of 
objective appraisal of the situation in due course. 
 
3.4.2.2 Other subjective elements in the determination of intractability 
The patient determines the acceptability and tolerability of proposed and ongoing 
treatment modalities, the duration of a trial of treatment, the level of efficacy and 
anticipated relief seen and envisaged from them and the acceptability and extent 
of side effects. These determinations are all dependent upon the patient’s 
evaluations and perceptions. What factors influence their views and thinking may 
be difficult to discern but the result must nonetheless be considered within any 
deliberations. 
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Patient B might feel that the time spent with the psychologists and the social 
worker is entirely counterproductive and not in his interests to pursue further. He 
might feel that the relief that their interventions would provide would take too 
long to realize and require too much of an investment of his time and energy for 
what he may feel would be a small improvement in his condition. Influencing 
these judgments are his personality, cognitive styles, past experiences and present 
expectations as well as his perceptions of the interventions tried so far and the 
HCPs assigned to appraise and treat him.  
The manner that information is provided to him regarding the nature, expected 
efficacy and duration of a treatment option, and the expected benefits and the 
time that it will take to realize them are also key in how Patient B determines 
acceptability. Cost and care impacts upon him and his family are also important 
in this decision-making process. Information provision within patient-family-
physician interactive models and decision-making processes will be reviewed 
later.  
Given the level of subjectivity within the key determinations for the application 
of treatment options, it is unsurprising that there are calls for this deliberative 
process to be moderated by objective determinants (22-26). The application of a 
professional’s input is thought to provide some balance to this process. 
 
3.4.3 Professional factors in the determination of intractability 
The MDT is tasked, amongst other roles, with providing accountability for the 
process, beginning with “framing” or construction of the “option set” of treatment 
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possibilities (28,29). This is based on an account of the patient’s wishes, goals 
and beliefs, the patient’s prognosis and disease course and trajectory, as well as 
the patient’s responses with ongoing and previous treatment approaches. This 
process of framing also involves an extrapolation of the HCPs’ own past 
experiences and knowledge about various other options and the MDT’s 
determinations of the likely benefits, risks, efficacy and efficiency of these 
possible treatment alternatives (28,29). Justification for neglecting certain options, 
discontinuing present treatments and opting for other modalities must be 
discussed within the MDT and documented clearly. The rationale for this decision 
must be based on prevailing clinical practice guidelines and evidenced-based 
medicine algorithms and shown to be relevant to the case in hand. It is believed 
that this type of objective review may help balance the subjective nature of the 
process.  
What cannot be neglected is that there are other parties and other factors to be 
considered within the decision-making process. Balancing a patient’s own goals 
against the demands of the clinical needs and what can realistically and justifiably 
be provided is integral to any determination regarding intractability. The role of 
the MDT in this process of balancing expectations of the patient and the family is 
pivotal. 
Treatments offered must be constructed upon what the patient and their family as 
well as the MDT deem is acceptable. In Jaafar’s case for example, if Jaafar felt 
that sedation would have inhibited his ability to recite verses from the Quran 
before he passed away or that it was inherently against his beliefs, it is unlikely 
that CDPS would even be considered. However, if no objection or preference is 
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voiced then a decision to offer sedation is only considered after discussions with 
the family and the MDT.  
However, concerns over this reliance upon previously stated wishes come to the 
fore when it is suggested that Jaafar may have never contemplated such a 
scenario where his best interests for comfort would be in conflict with his other 
interests especially in light of a changing set of goals and clinical considerations.  
In Jaafar’s situation, there were no clear determinations of his own personal goals 
although Hussain’s request for PS was informative. Hussain was Jaafar’s 
acknowledged proxy decision maker, who reported that sedation would have been 
in keeping with the patient’s wishes. In view of Jaafar’s changing goals as 
evidenced by his decision for readmission, the views of the family as a whole 
were still sought. It was not immediately clear that within these changeable goals 
that Jaafar would have wanted sedation. Hussain and Jaafar’s wife Yati both felt 
that he did; however, there were members of the MDT that felt that this option 
should not be offered. I will review the concerns of each of these parties. 
 
3.4.3.1 The social workers’ concerns 
The social workers involved in the patient’s care were of the opinion that undue 
pressure was being exerted on Jaafar by the prospect of his family’s increasing 
financial burdens as a result of his care needs. The social workers felt that these 
same stressors also weighed heavy upon Hussain and Yati in their determination 
to entertain the option of CDPS. However, the social workers’ were allayed by 
the fact that costs were borne by the insurance companies and the unfaltering 
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convictions of these key decision makers and most of Jaafar’s family that this 
would have been the patient’s wish. 
The concerns of the social workers did also serve the further purpose of bringing 
to the fore the position and the motivations of the family within such 
deliberations. I will address this in Chapter 5.  
 
3.4.3.2 The religious workers’ concerns 
The two imams involved in providing for Jaafar’s spiritual interests were also 
opposed to the determination of intractability given that they held that the 
symptoms were still responsive to spiritual support, particularly after Jaafar 
appeared a little less distressed for a period of two days after the two imams’ 
initial involvement.  
However, despite a further two weeks of intensive efforts of the imams and the 
counsellors, social workers and psychologists, his psychosocial condition did not 
improve. The imams, however, remained convinced that the situation was still 
“salvageable”. They felt that admission of intractability would be an 
abandonment of Jaafar. The imams also believed the application of CDPS would 




3.4.3.3 The concerns of Sharizah, Jaafar’s daughter 
Sharizah, the patient’s daughter believed that the application of CDPS was not in 
the patient’s best interests. She was aware that comfort was the primary goal of 
the patient and that Jaafar had exhausted his treatment option. She was also aware 
that CDPS, which Hussain, her brother had requested for their father would not 
abbreviate his life nor was it against her father’s own beliefs so long as fluids 
were maintained.  
However, she struggled to come to terms with his inevitable loss of consciousness 
and felt that it would reduce him to a “vegetable”. She did feel that it would mean 
mourning his loss twice, first upon the loss of his consciousness and personhood 
and again with the biological (total cellular) death of her father. She could not be 
swayed from her disapproving stance to this intervention. 
This dissonance in views and the effect that it has within the determinations of the 
MDT is critical. In the context of an impasse there is little clarity on the expected 
course of action for the MDT. Opinions appear to diverge, with some calling for 
further discussions whilst others suggest reliance upon a majority decision 
amongst the MDT or even second and third opinions to validate the position of 
both sides of the argument. This lack of consensus shifts focus towards 




3.5 SHARED DECISION-MAKING (SDM) 
Impetus for adopting a shared decision-making process remain respect for 
autonomy, better compliance and active participation in care plans, higher 
satisfaction with services, better quality decisions and aiding in maintaining a 
therapeutic relationship (28-34). Additionally, familial satisfaction in the process 
will reinforce the family-HCP relationship and aid in the support that can be 
provided to the family during the bereavement process (35-37). 
The complexities within Jaafar’s case highlight a lack of delineation as to how 
these decisions should be made. There was little attention paid to the deliberative 
process, which sees the many members of the MDT interacting with the patient 
and the various family members. There was also little consideration of how the 
various members of the team adopted SDM within the MDT itself. Even though 
Morita et al and Bruinsma et al have discussed the issue of family involvement in 
the decision-making process for PS, there has been little to describe how this 
decision comes about (35-37). Despite palliative care advocating SDM, nearly 
70% of Portuguese and 63.3% of Italian decisions regarding the application of PS 
in some settings did not involve the patient or their families highlighting a lack of 
transparency in the deliberative process (38,39).  
To address this lack of clarity on the deliberative process behind the applications 
of PS, a theoretical framework of SDM is required for the application of CDPS. 
To shed some light on the issue, I will review Sandman and Munthe’s position on 
this topic (29). Sandman and Munthe, in reviewing the extensive literature on 
SDM, formulate a number of models of decision-making and critically provide a 
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deliberative process that is useful in the present setting and potential applications 
within the small team MDT that this chapter proposes (29).  
Building upon the early work of Charles et al, Wirtz et al and Makoul and 
Clayman, Sandman and Munthe state that SDM’s emphasis “on active 
participation from both patient and professional in the decision-making process, 
and agreement on the decision”, does not delineate the decision-making process 
that underpins it (28-32). As a result Sandman and Munthe attempt to define a 
practical process of SDM (29). 
Applying Charles et al’s description of SDM, Sandman and Munthe show that at 
its core, SDM involves a physician-patient dyad that participates in a decision-
making process that involves “sharing where the decision-making is being shared, 
or involves sharing”, and consensus where “the final decision is mutually agreed 
upon” (29-32). This process is said to meet the basic objectives of SDM stated 
below.  
“1. At a minimum, both the physician and patient are involved in the 
treatment decision-making process. 
2. Both the physician and patient share information with each other.  
3. Both the physician and the patient take steps to participate in the 
decision-making process by expressing treatment preferences.  
4. A treatment decision is made and both the physician and patient agree 
on the  treatment to implement” (29). 
However, these central features can also be seen within “evolved” forms of 
patient choice and paternalistic decision-making models (28-32). To set SDM 
apart from these two models, Sandman and Munthe attempt to delineate SDM as 
a distinct decision-making model (29). Sandman and Munthe begin this process 
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by reviewing the main features of the paternalistic and patient choice models to 
highlight the differences that these approaches have with SDM (29).  
Sandman and Munthe define paternalistic decision-making as being a decision-
making process that “actively ignores to take into account the perspective of the 
patient” or “fails to treat the patient as an autonomous and/or rational being” or 
“even if it does not go against (or is believed to go against) the wants of the 
patient” (29). The more “evolved” form of paternalistic decision-making that may 
consider some elements of autonomy and does share elements of SDM is seen 
“if a person, knowing someone’s preferences, acts to fulfil his preferences, 
without him either participating in the reasoning process leading up to the 
decision and partaking in the decision or having authorized the other 
person to make the decision on her own” (29). 
This evolved paternalistic decision-making formulation highlights the finding that 
despite active participation and sharing of information within the dyad, there is 
neglect of authorization (29). Authorization is dependent upon the premise that 
the patient is autonomous, rational and willing to participate in the decision-
making process (29). Decisions taken with an approximate idea of what the 
competent patient would have done and on the premise of “the professional as 
perfect agent” do not detract from a judgment of paternalism (29).  
A patient choice decision-making process implies “that the patient somehow 
remains in authority over the decision as to what should be done” so long as they 
are “well-informed” and competent (29). “[I]n contrast to paternalism, this model 
allows for patients not only to make choices, but to choose options against their 
own best interest—as long as they are well-informed” (29). It is the responsibility 
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of the staff only to assist in providing information for the evaluative phase (29). 
In the evolved form of patient choice decision-making, the physician may be able 
to frame the treatment options; this, however, does not detract from a judgment of 
patient choice decision-making (29).  
From these definitions and highlighted differences, Sandman and Munthe isolate 
two features distinct to SDM (29). These are (i) the nature of reasoning in SDM, 
which highlights “the reasoning-communication represented in any process of 
joint decision-making”, and (ii) “framing”, which helps define the “construction 
of the option-set, which both frames decision-making and is, in part, a product of 
decision-making” (28,29). Both these facets are carried out with both the patient 
and the physician willing to discuss and alter their opinions as part of a conflict 
resolution process and are willing to share openly within this process. Sandman 
and Munthe add that neither of these “collaborative features” within the 
reasoning-communication and framing processes, are appropriately addressed by 
prevailing SDM theories (28,29).  
 
Figure 3.1 Spectrum of decision-making in the health setting 
There are also other differences to be considered. Paternalistic decision-making 
models and patient choice decision-making models are said to exist on opposite 
sides of a decision-making scale.  
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Movement centrally from either extreme reveals an increase in sharing and sees 
the more “passive” partner in the decision-making dyad provided with increasing 
involvement in the decision-making process and possibly the right to veto. For 
example in paternalism, the physician may make the decision but the patient is 
left with the decision to comply or not. Further steps towards the centre of this 
spectrum will see increasing consideration of the patient’s choices and values 
integrated into the deliberative process. However, it would be a mistake to 
consider such accommodations of wishes within these paternalistic practices to be 
SDM as “decisional authority” remains with the HCP (29). Similarly, movement 
centrally from the patient choice extreme, where a fully informed patient is solely 
responsible for the decisions he or she makes, see increasing consideration of the 
input of the physician, though the decision maker remains the patient. For both 
these decision-making processes, the decision-making process does not become a 
SDM process until they enter the central region of the spectrum occupied by 
SDM. 
Movements toward a SDM perspective at the centre of Figure 3.1 also highlight a 
change in the evaluative basis of both parties within the decision-making process. 
This is characterized by 
“discussion(s) where arguments and reasons have to be presented, 
compared and evaluated, making for a high-level dynamics where their 
evaluative basis may be revised and accommodated in the light of this” 
(29). 
This “high level dynamics” in sharing allows for both a means for conflict 
resolution and better prioritizing of information and adaptation of goals (29). The 
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“high degrees of sharing and high level dynamics” seen within SDM allow 
Sandman and Munthe to postulate that there are four types of shared decision-
making process (29). These four discrete entities still lie within the spectrum of 
shared decision-making (Fig 3.2). 
 
Figure 3.2 Forms of shared decision-making 
In Shared Rational Deliberative Paternalism, the exchange of information, goals 
and facts is bilateral and open, but the physician decides on the course of action 
(29). Here a patient is still able to influence decisions whilst increasing their own 
understanding (29). In Shared Rational Deliberative Patient Choice, after an open 
exchange of ideas, reasons and facts, it is the patient that makes the final decision, 
emphasizing patient autonomy; however, this choice does sit within specific 
boundaries of acceptable practice (29).  
In an ideal situation, the Shared Rational Deliberative Joint Decision Model 
envisages that all parties have an opportunity to take part and forward their views, 
suggestions, evaluations, needs and the rationale for them in an open manner (29). 
This concept is based on a Habermasian concept of “communicative action” 
(29,40).  
“The communicative model of action does not equate action with 
communication. Language is a means of communication which serves 



















mutual understanding, whereas actors, in coming to an understanding with 
one another so as to coordinate their actions, pursue their particular 
aims. … The interpretive accomplishments on which cooperative 
processes [of situation definition] are based represent the mechanism for 
coordinating action; communicative action is not exhausted by the act of 
reaching understanding” (40). 
This multidimensional review must be done whilst being aware of the needs and 
opinions of others and in the knowledge that the “actor’s” own position is being 
scrutinized (29,39). During these deliberations no specific weight is given to any 
one party and all interests are declared (29). Success is measured by a 
compromise agreement that all parties can agree upon (29). Should consensus not 
be reached, the physician in charge is tasked with carrying out what will “ideally 
benefit the patient the most” whilst being cognizant of the “institutionally 
sanctioned idea about the lowest acceptable limit for what could be offered to the 
patient” (29). Motivation for the physician to maintain this position is rooted in 
his or her professional obligations to ensure the best interests of the patient (29). 
Unlike the Shared Rational Deliberative Joint Decision Model, which is not 
focused on “predetermined goals or interests of any of the parties”, a 
Professionally Driven Best Interest Compromise Model seeks to realize just such 
a goal (29). The patient is at least aware of this strategic goal and decisions are 
arrived at largely as a result of “framing” to protect the best interests of the 
patient (29). Sandman and Munthe describe this process as one where  
“the professional is given the opportunity to achieve a compromise that as 
far as possible sees to the patient’s efficient best interest (from the 
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professional perspective) and at the same time is open to accommodate 
this to the value given to patient autonomy” (29). 
Whilst these models explicate the various means that decisions may be shared, 
the exact nature that decisions are reached requires deliberation. Sandman and 
Munthe maintain that consensus agreements are desirable (29). In the event that 
this is not possible, Sandman and Munthe believe that “negotiations in terms of a 
mutual gains bargaining” is not a viable option given that both the physician and 
patient have limitations for what they will compromise and that compromise will 
lead to suboptimal decisions that compromise the patient’s care and best interests 
(29).  
Sandman and Munthe state that where consensus cannot be gained with 
compromise to overall care, a “strategic decision-making mainly on the behalf of 
the professional” should be adopted (29). The assumptions underpinning this 
process are that the physician who has control over the decision-making process 
is committed to patient participation in the decision-making process and duly 
considers the preferences and best interests of the patient within this process (29). 
Limits to the decisions reached are set by institutionally sanctioned requirements 
and what is determined to be in the patient’s best interests. The adoption of this 
strategic action “aims to reproduce meaning (in the sense of a certain way to 
understand things) or to achieve a predetermined goal or interest of a person or 
system/structure” (29). Priority is afforded to best interests within the 
Professionally Driven Best Interest Compromise Model though efforts for 
compromise and accommodation are maintained (29). Protecting these best 
interests may be overt where the patient is aware of the goals of the physician or 
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be latent where the “parties manipulating the other, or through self-deceit by what 
is called systematically distorted communication” (29). “Framing” may be 
adopted. This is where  
“the professional is required to (openly) frame the decisional situation so 
as to achieve what she wants to achieve, although, at the same time, 
involving the patient in the decision-making and ‘taking sharing all the 
way’ (thus caring for patient autonomy as far as is practically possible)” 
(29). 
Whilst Sandman and Munthe offer an evolution in the SDM model, some 
concerns with respect to its applicability within the specific confines of end-of-
life decision-making, remain. 
 
3.5.1 Weakness in the current SDM framework 
Sandman and Munthe’s SDM model appears to be based upon a patient-general 
practitioner/physician interactive model that might be envisaged to occur in clinic 
settings where discussions revolve around more routine care decisions (31). 
Sandman and Munthe’s neglect of wider deliberative models that are employed 
extensively in paediatric care, geriatrics, rehabilitative medicine and palliative 
care limits their model’s applicability within these fields and to care deliberations 
of a more complex and serious nature. These lapses raise four key issues. 
To begin, there is no consideration of changes in the patient’s condition and thus 
their ability to cogitate and communicate effectively, nor holistic review of their 
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particular psychosocial, spiritual and physical circumstances that have significant 
bearing upon interactions within the physician-patient dyad. 
Furthermore, in such complex conditions, neglect in delineating the role of the 
various parties beyond the primary dyad or how the views and interests of these 
parties may often influence care practices, is telling (23-26). This omission also 
raises the question as to how multidimensional factors balance and frame 
healthcare decisions. There is an important issue here that pertains to 
transparency, accountability and compliance with clinical guidelines and practice 
safeguards.  
Sandman and Munthe also do not consider the impact of professionalism of the 
physician within their framework (29). This failing is magnified within the MDT 
setting where professional conduct and standards define work practice and how 
many professionals interact with the patient and their families.  
Finally, Sandman and Munthe’s insistence upon favouring high level dynamics 
and high degree of sharing over the application of framing within the decision-
making process emphasizes the limits of their SDM model. Complex decision-
making processes are not considered, neither are situations where limited patient 
participation have to be contended with (17-26,29). These limitations highlights 
the pivotal failings of Sandman and Munthe’s SDM model: the failure to consider 
a holistic account of the patient’s circumstances and the evolving nature of care 
provisions beyond simple medical interactions. 
Addressing these shortcomings will be the focus of this next part of the chapter. I 
will begin my review of these issues with a study of the role of the MDT in the 
decision-making process. 
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3.6 THE ROLE OF MDTs IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS  
I have discussed the general role of the MDT earlier and will focus now upon 
their position within the decision-making process. The MDT functions on the 
basis of open discussion underlined by professional respect and courtesy. It serves 
as a platform for considering the elements involved in the case, which are 
reviewed first in isolation then weighed up against the particularities, 
considerations, obligations and expectations within the confines of an individual 
case consideration (38). This process is not dependent upon the opinions of only 
the senior members of the MDT nor weighed solely upon clinical merits. “Weight” 
provided refers to the importance and pertinence a specific consideration holds 
within an overall review of a particular case (38). This balancing is also subject to 
professional standards and measures. I will discuss the influence of 
professionalism on the MDT later. 
Aside from weighing up the importance of various considerations, the MDT 
occupies a central role in the reasoning and framing of the decision-making 
process. Within the MDT, the physician’s determination of the course of 
treatments available to the patient is tampered, evaluated and justified by input 
from the various members of the team and by second opinions.  
Application of the MDT approach also serves to limit fears of bias that are seen 
when determinations are carried out by a single HCP. Studies of the decision-
making process of physicians in the Netherlands reveal that the application of PS 
is influenced by demographic factors such as sex, age, place of care and 
education levels of the potential candidates for PS (41-43). Reviews by Rietjens 
et al and Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al in the Netherlands and Jaspers et al in 
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Germany show that it is younger male patients who were more likely to have 
potentially life-shortening treatments such as euthanasia rather than older, less 
educated female patients who tended to be administered PS (41,42). PS is also 
more likely to be employed for existential reasons in a hospice than hospital (42). 
The MDT approach also aids in countering the effects of external pressures upon 
this decision-making process (43). One in six Dutch general practitioners report 
being pressured to start terminal sedation by the patient’s family (44).  
These issues are not considered within Sandman and Munthe’s strategic decision-
making process because of a failure to site their model in care settings that 
involve many facets of care, multiple “interested” parties and a backdrop of 
evolving clinical and psychosocial considerations. How decisions within these 
contexts are arrived at is critical (45).  
Variances in the number, type, level of expertise and experience within MDTs 
have been shown to affect the decisions that are made (46,47). Data does show 
that different professionals place different weight on different aspects of the 
deliberative process meaning that decisions reached by different complements of 
professionals will differ (46-48). For instance, nurses place more weight on 
familial and social considerations whilst physicians place more interest on the 
clinical aspects of the decision-making process (43-45). An imbalance in the 
membership would lead to a skewing of decisions. Janssens et al quoting a Dutch 
study by de Graeff et al reveal that in consultations with palliative care consult 
teams, 41% of decisions by general practitioners to apply PS were overruled, 
reiterating the need for more than a single practitioner’s view (45). The question 
then is who makes up the basic constituents of the MDT, particularly when there 
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continues to be significant shortages in palliative care access and support in many 
parts of the world? 
 
3.6.1 The decision-making process in the context of small MDTs 
In light of these shortages in care providers, would a simple second opinion meet 
requirements of a multidimensional, balanced review required by the various 
guidelines? The KNMG guidelines do maintain that PS can be applied based 
upon a singular physician’s review that is supported by a second opinion (45,49). 
The EAPC guidelines state that a limited review such as that suggested by the 
KNMG guidelines would constitute an inadequate assessment and would 
represent an injudicious application of PS (15,45,49).  
A solution to this dissonance may come from a related practice that also uses a 
multi-professional approach in their practice. Institutional ethics committees (IEC) 
face a similar problem to palliative care MDTs and the American Academy of 
Pediatrics suggests three alternative models of practice to cope with a lack of 
adequately qualified personnel (50). These models consist of individual consults 
and second opinions, a small team IEC and the full Institutional Ethics 
Committee (50). Finding the appropriate form to adapt to the palliative care 
setting is key. 
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3.6.2 Individual consults and second opinions 
Jansen and Sulmasy in their essay “Proportionality, terminal suffering and the 
restorative goals of medicine”, show in their example of Patient A and Patient B 
that the input of a single physician taken together with a second opinion from 
another professional who need not be a physician is adequate for the initiation of 
PS (6). Input from a palliative care physician is not mandatory (6).  
This single physician approach to PS application is also seen within the KNMG 
guidelines (49). These guidelines are issued primarily for the application of PS 
within a community setting and mainly by general practitioners (GPs) who 
require only that the GPs “demonstrably possess the necessary expertise and 
experience” (49). The KNMG guidelines do not require the input of a palliative 
care specialist as they hold that PS lies within the remit of “normal medical 
practice” and “the responsibility for assessing medical indications, decision-
making and implementation therefore lies with the attending physician” (49). The 
committee responsible for the KNMG guidelines states that  
“[g]iven the nature and content of palliative sedation and the indications 
listed in this guideline, the committee sees no reason to impose the 
condition that a physician with specific expertise must always be 
consulted before making the decision to administer palliative sedation” 
(49). 
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As a result, the guidelines also state that  
“the attending physician bears responsibility for determining whether the 
medical indications are present, for decision-making and for the 
practicalities of administration” (49). 
The KNMG guidelines do, however, acknowledge that PS is part of the palliative 
care armamentarium and therefore requires a palliative care approach (49). To 
meet the holistic review process required and to provide balance and oversight, 
the KNMG guidelines recommend the involvement of a nurse to aid in the 
appraisal and employment of PS (49). It also recommends consultation with the 
“appropriate expert(s) with specialist knowledge of palliative care in good time” 
(49). 
The KNMG guidelines are designed for a specific purpose and crafted to allow 
for the inevitable limitations that GPs will face both in terms of support in 
appraising these patients and on practical and monitoring considerations (49). 
Given similar constraints amongst physicians working in nations where access to 
palliative care expertise is still limited and complements of MDT personnel may 
still be lacking, could the KNMG guidelines be effectively employed there to 
meet the decision-making duties set out by a palliative care approach? 
Whilst the KNMG guidelines do acknowledge the need for a holistic palliative 
care approach, they address the requirements in a manner that prevents simple 
translocation of practice to other settings (49). The KNMG guidelines takes into 
account a number of factors that may not be immediately reproducible in other 
settings. An established therapeutic relationship between these patients and the 
GP, which brings with it a long and well documented multidimensional appraisal 
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of a patient’s evolving symptoms and care, forms the primary requirement of the 
guidelines (49). This potentially negates the need for additional psychosocial 
input from a social worker particularly as GPs and nursing staff are well trained 
in palliative care techniques and appraisals (49).  
The Dutch setting is also unique in its view of PS (49). The application of PS is 
seen as routine medical care accepted by the medical and legal fraternities as well 
as the society in general, and therefore does not succumb to scrutiny from these 
quarters, so long as the strict criteria set out by the guidelines are adhered to (49). 
This combination of elements is not always readily found in many developing 
palliative care settings, negating the widespread application of this process.  
 
3.6.3 Small team MDTs 
In most settings, the application of PS remains a treatment that warrants careful 
consideration and monitoring. Within the example of Singaporean practice, 
treatment which may be foreseen to potentially result in the deep and continuous 
sedation of the patient ostensibly until death would require the review and 
consensus of the core decision makers, which include the primary physician and 
the entire palliative care consultant team. This requirement is in keeping with the 
gravity of the situation and one that would demand an independent second 
opinion from a trained palliative care specialist as well as inputs from the patient 
and/or their family or surrogates, given the complicated nature of the patient’s 
condition and the implications of this treatment (22-27). 
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Pragmatically, it is the small team MDT that offers the most viable solution to 
counter the various concerns raised. The assumption behind the application of the 
small MDT is that there is sufficient coverage of the various essential areas of 
care to provide adequate flexibility, diversity and width to holistic considerations. 
Equally, the extant of this process is capped by the MDT’s determination of the 
patient’s best interests and the prevailing clinical and legal standards.  
The decision-making process in turn is one that would hold to consensus 
decision-making under the aegis of SDM. In the event that this might not be 
possible, the KNMG guidelines state, “the responsibility for assessing medical 
indications, decision-making and implementation therefore lies with the attending 
physician” (49). Justification for decisions along with the reasons why objections 
to a specific decision were trumped must be recorded in the MDT proceedings 
and the patient’s case notes. Such accountability and transparency, bound by both 
legal standards and clinical guidelines, allow the small team MDT approach to 
overcome prevailing concerns and health care limitations.  
With the basic complement of the deliberative process established, the manner 
that these professionals interact becomes central.  
 
3.6.3.1 The overriding positions of professionalism upon the MDT  
and the decision-making process 
A basic understanding of professionalism is required to proceed here and this 
thesis will adopt the practical definition of professionalism proposed by Rogers 
and Ballantine (51). This definition draws upon theoretical literature and working 
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practices that have then been validated by empirical evidence (51). It highlights 
five criteria that correspond to professionalism (51). These are responsibility, 
relationships with and respect for patients, probity and honesty, self-awareness 
and capacity for reflection, and collaboration and working with colleagues (51). 
These elements form the platform for inter-professional interactions within the 
MDT and with other professionals. 
It is against this background that the physician in control of the treatment options 
ensures that discussions are open and transparent and in keeping with clinical 
standards of practice. Minimum standards of care that will be institutionally 
supported are also known to all involved so that whilst consensus may not always 
be immediately possible, acceptable compromises that do not subtract from the 
basic requirements of care of the patient are still possible. In the event that 
compromises are not forthcoming without endangering patient safety or best 
interests, more second opinions from both sides of the argument are sought, time 
permitting, if only to allow for a fair deliberative process rather than the 
perception that this is an attempt to replace “opposing” opinions. However, final 
authorization for the employment of CDPS comes from the physician in charge 
who is ultimately responsible for the patient’s care and the second independent 
physician (26). 
 
3.6.3.2 The role of the family in the deliberative process 
Emerging data would suggest that the role of the family cannot be excluded in 
any end-of-life decision-making process (23,24,46,47). Evidence from local data, 
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for example, would suggest that a significant proportion of patients still request 
the involvement of their family in end-of-life decision-making (46,47,52-56). 
This practice is observed across all the local races and cultures and not 
exclusively by the Chinese population or cultures influenced by familial-centric 
values (48,56). This is not surprising given the role of the family in care 
provisions in nations such as Singapore, where care provisions are intimately 
entwined with the role of the family (46-48).  
The adoption of this family-centric approach has also raised other concerns, as 
there is growing evidence to show that the family tend to usurp or trump the 
position of the patient within these decision-making processes (46,47,52-56). 
Conversely, there is significant concordance between decisions made by the 
patient and their family (46,47,52-56). Buchannan and Brock’s theory explains 
that the family are better equipped at understanding the patient’s needs given their 
knowledge of the patient’s beliefs, values, preferences and background as well as 
being better equipped to honour their relationships and realize the patient’s true 
wishes (57). Given the regnant practice of family involvement reinforced by the 
palliative care ethic of support for the family and the patient in end-of-life care, it 
would seem that there is ample reason to involve the family in these decision-
making processes (22-26).  
However, the question that follows is not whether the family should be involved 
but how much “weight” ought they be given in these deliberations. On one 
extreme, Fan Ruiping argues for the primacy of a Confucian-led family 
determination process, whilst I have argued elsewhere to the contrary (58-60). 
My position is that the family ought to have a “voice” or a chance to speak their 
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minds and that their views are duly considered along with the other factors of 
holistic evaluations (22-26,60). However, in keeping with regnant legal and 
clinical standards, the final decision must lie with the physician who is ultimately 
responsible for the care of the patient (22-26,60). Further discussion of Jaafar’s 
case may serve to highlight the reasons for this position. 
 
3.7 DECISION-MAKING IN DETERMINATIONS  
OF INTRACTABILITY 
Having established the complement and manner of conduct for PS decisions, I 
will now consider how determinations of intractability come about. These 
decisions consider the entire evolution of the symptoms holistically and include a 
re-evaluation of all care decisions, a review of the rationale behind an 
employment of a certain treatment option and the reasons for disregarding the 
alternatives. Previously discarded treatment alternatives are revisited to review 
their feasibility to ensure that all alternative treatments have been considered and 
reconsidered during the decision-making process. This process is also carried out 
to see if an alternative can be found to the final product of the consecutive 
episodes of framing and reasoning: “nothing”.  
The conclusion that “nothing” can be done is a product of “funnelling” and 
“framing” (28,29). Wirtz et al describe the process of “framing” as the manner 
upon which the scope of the “option set” of “medically reasonable alternatives” is 
determined (28). Determination of the option set is narrowed down with each 
process of framing until there exist only a few acceptable treatment options that 
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the patient, the family and the MDT would consider acceptable (28). Wirtz et al 
see the progressive factoring of influences as “funnels” that are formed by the 
choices and practical considerations of each case context as the situation changes 
and the disease progresses (28). The effects of these influences progressively 
work to reduce the treatment options available to a few “acceptable” treatment 
approaches (Fig 3.3) (28,29). The end result, however, is still a determination that 
there are no alternative treatment options available. a determination that there are 
no alternative treatment options available. 
 
 
Figure 3.3 The process of funnelling 
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3.7.1 Reviewing the processes 
The nature of the interactions between those involved in the decision-making and 
the content of the information that has been provided to the family and the patient 
are reviewed in this section, given that the manner that this information is 
organized and provided is critical to how the decision is taken and how 
authorization is acquired. Such information also plays a significant role in the 
funnelling process through the influencing of patient choice. 
Disclosure of clinical findings, discussions regarding treatment options and 
attempts at consenting are subject to varying levels of influence or “guidance” by 
the professional (61). O’Neill argues that even when capable, competent and 
involved in the decision-making process, patient’s labour under the ideal of action 
under “certain descriptions” (61,62). There appear to be three aspects to these 
“descriptions”. The first relates to the internal or patient-dependent factors, which 
are associated with the patient’s bio-psychosocial considerations, personal goals, 
individual deliberative processes as well as affective factors. The second relates 
to the external factors that include the practical considerations, clinical factors 
and physician-led factors. The third is related to the contextual and temporal 
factors involved and straddle the two other considerations. 
Whilst these elements of influence play a significant role within the decision-
making process of a patient, in many cases it is the external factors that take 
precedence. Frequently, medical and practical considerations define the nature of 
the choices provided with only a passing consideration of the psychosocial, 
personal, spiritual, societal and cultural factors that may be involved in a case. 
The role of the physician cannot be underestimated. Deliens et al, Chambaere et 
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al, van den Block et al, Kwee et al, Wu et al and Foo et al show that the 
physician’s age, religion and attitudes as well as clinical experience are integral in 
influencing how care decisions are made (46-48,56,63-65). The physicians’ level 
of comfort in prognosticating and communicating their findings also impacts the 
decision-making process, which is also influenced by treatments that they fine 
conscionable (71-78). The willingness of physicians to share and involve the 
patients and their families in the framing process is also pivotal to the decision-
making process (71-77). 
Other factors that influence decisions include a patient’s ethnicity, cultural beliefs, 
societal expectations, social class and gender as well as their underlying illness 
and their level of education (51-55,59,64,66-70). All these factors form a part of 
the funnelling process that influences the final decision on intractability. 
 
3.7.2 Considering Jaafar’s situation 
In reviewing Jaafar’s case, the question that arises is what reasons were there to 
prompt a diagnosis of intractability? Was a motion to determine intractability in 
Jaafar’s case simply a means of acknowledging that all attempts had been tried 
and that the treatment of last resort should be opted for, or was it the result of an 
exhausted family and an overwhelmed MDT “resorting to sedation because [they] 
are fatigued and frustrated by the care of a complex symptomatic patient”? (15).  
Sharizah’s concerns were instructive to the team and the family in scrutinizing the 
rationale for this formal determination. It also highlighted the gravity of this 
process and reiterated the implications. It also set Jaafar’s case apart from the 
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usual occurrences with patients with intractable suffering. In Jaafar’s case, the 
family’s request for CDPS triggered these reviews; however, this occurrence is a 
rarity. In most cases, in my experience, determinations of intractability do not 
take place due to medical resistance and familial strife, particularly as a 
conclusion that “nothing” more can be done except CDPS can seem like an 
abandonment of the patient. 
In the ideal situation, a consensus decision between all the parties after 
confirming that the decisions taken up to this point were correct, would be in 
keeping with the goal of the MDT. When all parties agree that there are no 
options less risky or less sedating than CDPS exist, that all options that remain 
are either intolerable to bear or will take too long to work, a determination of 
intractability can be made.  
However, in Jaafar’s case, this was not to be. The divisions both within the MDT 
and the family were too great. This made a thorough review of the case necessary. 
Overturning one view in favour of another is never easy especially when such 
divisions exist. This was not simply a decision made by the physician alone, 
either as the chairperson for the MDT or as the final arbiter of treatment decisions. 
Given the importance placed upon accountability and transparency, the decision-
making process re-evaluated all the various facets involved in Jaafar’s case. This 
process was MDT-led. A final decision that was ultimately the physician’s did 
not, however, dilute the ability and function of the MDT to ensure that decisions 
were appropriately balanced. The physician’s “prerogative” to act as the final 
arbiter is one that is adopted “hesitantly” and only when divisions are 
insurmountable and time limitations prevent a convening of an ethics consult.  
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Within Jaafar’s case, given the dissent and the concerns within the MDT, a 
consensus decision was not forthcoming. When Sandman and Munthe’s strategic 
decision-making process adapted to the end-of-life situation was employed, it 
became evident that there were a number of considerations that needed to be 
addressed (29). These considerations included the fact that  
(a) The MDT controls “what the decision is about”. 
(b) The MDT “allow[s] patients to take part in decision-making to different 
extents”.  
(c) The MDT maintains the institutionally sanctioned idea of “lowest acceptable 
limit of what could be offered to the patient”. 
(d) The MDT has an “idea” of “what would ideally benefit the patient the most”. 
(e) The MDT aims at consensus decisions. 
(f) The MDT, in the event of discrepancy between what the patient wishes and 
what the physician offers, aims at compromise within the limits of points (c) 
and (d). 
(g) The MDT is motivated to act out of “caring for the autonomy of the patient”. 
(h) The MDT is motivated in securing adherence. 
(i) The MDT will adapt to various circumstances in accordance “to the 
professional ideal”. 
(j) In order to secure compromise, the MDT may act strategically by balancing 
patient autonomy and best interests. 
(k) In the event that consensus is not attained, then the Professionally Driven 
Best Interest Compromise Model is adopted if best interests takes precedence; 
if autonomy is prized above best interests, then Shared Relational 
Deliberative Joint Decision Model or even the Shared Rational Deliberation 
Patient Choice is adopted. There is no advice as to how “weight” is given to 
each of these determinations (29). 
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3.7.3 Accepting that “nothing” is possible 
Underlying the dissent of Sharizah and the imams was a fear of abandonment. For 
the imams, it was fear that they would not to be able to pray with Jaafar when 
death came; for Sharizah, it was more a sense that there was “nothing” more that 
medical science could offer her father beyond circumnavigating his awareness. 
Understanding her conception of “nothing” was enlightening to the deliberation. 
What is “nothing” within the end-of-life context? 
The elucidation of what “nothing” means requires some “unpacking”. Jaafar had 
had a determination of “nothing” or no treatment options available a number of 
times before. Initially he had been told that there was “nothing” that could be 
done to cure him, and later “nothing” could be done to stem his disease 
progression. Later “nothing” could be offered to prevent his suffering, and finally, 
when a determination of “nothing” meant that there were no treatment modalities 
either medical or alternative available that could be used to ameliorate his 
suffering, “nothing” gave way to CDPS.  
“Nothing” is also a matter of perspective. For Jaafar, “nothing” would seem to be 
the failure of conventional and alternative measures to relieve his suffering; 
however, in light of his continued suffering, “nothing” provided hope of relief. 
For the medical team, it was that there were no more viable treatment options 
available, save the application of CDPS. However, when Jaafar was comfortable 
and no longer distressed, many members of the MDT viewed it as a “success”. 
For his wife Yati and son Hussain, it was that their efforts, support and care had 
not brought about an appreciable difference in Jaafar’s condition. However, even 
for them, the level of comfort that Jaafar exhibited after CDPS was employed 
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proved to be an improvement. For Sharizah, it was that “nothing” was an 
abandonment of her father. For the imams it was a sign of a lack of faith that God 
would provide a solution. 
“Nothing” is also a time-sensitive conclusion. For the imams, the situation was 
still salvageable, if given more time. Their position appears to resonate with that 
of Aldous Huxley who once commented that “[e]xperience is not what happens to 
a man; it is what a man does with what happens to him” (79). They believed that 
given sufficient time, Jaafar may see the means of improving his own experience 
of illness (79). In practice, CDPS was considered as there were no treatments 
available that would likely provide an appreciable improvement in an acceptable 
time frame. Remaining treatment options were deemed either likely to take too 
long to work to provide any sustained improvement in the patient’s condition, or 
would likely result in intolerable or unacceptable effects upon the patient. For the 
MDT, a significant consideration was the balancing of the possibility of success 
with the ongoing suffering that the patient would endure during any treatment.  
“Nothing” is also a determination that can only be made after the patient’s 
condition has been thoroughly reviewed. A holistic review of treatment choices 
and their rationale for use and their selection over other options need to be 
considered. Review of the discarded options to see if in the present light, they 
may be viable, must be carried out. Balancing between expected benefits and 
estimated risks are also tampered by what the patient would have deemed to be 
acceptable and tolerable and what the family may feel on this issue. 
The social and indeed familial repercussions of a determination of “nothing” 
cannot be ignored. I have in the past argued that the effects upon the family, 
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particularly in the presence of filial piety and larger social and familial 
expectations to continue to care of the patient, are pivotal (23,48,60). For 
Sharizah, there was a semblance of this feeling that she was remiss in her duty to 
protect her father’s life, particularly in a society where cultural and social 
expectations would hold a child to this wider obligation (24,60). Failure would be 
tantamount to an “abandonment” of the patient (24,60,80). Sharizah also found 
the sentiment, which Dyer offers, of simply “being there” for the patient or 
“journeying” with her father rather empty and “vacuous”, as did the imams who 
felt praying for Jaafar would be no substitute to praying with him (81). 
The implications of a determination (or non-determination) of “nothing” is as 
critical as the diagnosis itself. For Jaafar, it meant that he would suffer without 
this determination being made. For his family and carers, it was that death would 
now not be stifled or delayed any further. A realignment of expectations and a 
further adaptation to the goals of care ensued. Anticipatory grief and preparations 
took place at different levels amongst the various parties and support by the MDT 
continued. 
While the offer of an ethics committee referral was made, both Sharizah and the 
imams declined stating that they were satisfied that they had “said their piece”. In 




3.7.4 Considering CDPS 
The decision for CDPS is the decision that follows a diagnosis of intractability. 
“Funnelling” has come to an end and we stand at the “sharp” end of Wirtz et al’s 
funnel (Fig 3.4) (28). The framing process replete with due considerations of all 
parties and factors and the revisiting of other options and alternatives has already 
been done. The options left before the patient, the MDT and the family is a stark 
one – whether to allow the patient to continue to suffer or to be sedated to 
unconsciousness. It is this decision that ultimately sits at the base of any diagnosis 
of intractability. 
 
Figure 3.4 Wirtz et al’s funnel 
Under the aegis of an overarching of goal of care for symptom relief, the decision 
that follows must be one that would see the patient sedated to unconsciousness 
unless there are very good reasons to the contrary. In Jaafar’s situation, the 
decision did not come easily for members of the extended team and some 
members of the family. In both the imams’ case and Sharizah’s situation, the 
decision to overturn their decisions was not without long and hard deliberations 
and upon a comprehensive assessment. It is clear too that complying with their 
requests breached clinical guidelines, ran against evidenced care options, 
Final diagnosis of intractability 
Progressively fewer treatment 
options as the symptoms  
and the disease  
progresses 
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breached the minimum acceptable care standards and placed the best interests of 
the patient in jeopardy. Both these parties were still offered support by the MDT 
and counsellors who monitored Sharizah’s situation especially closely as did the 
remaining members of the family.  
For Jaafar, however, application of CDPS was brief as he suffered a massive 
myocardial infarct two days after CDPS was commenced. He died peacefully and 
in the company of his family and loved ones. The two imams were present at his 
last breath and prayed for him. 
 
3.8 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have shown that whilst intractability is often discussed, 
differences and limitations in case-specific clinical and practical considerations 
leading up to its determinations make for significant variability that must be duly 
considered. It is not the final decision of intractability that is left unclear but those 
decisions that immediately precede it. Those decisions where treatment choices 
were discarded, assumed to be unacceptable or intolerable to the patient and/or 
the family are the factors that finally set the stage for a final decision, which is in 
fact almost entirely the product of framing.  
It is also those decisions that highlight the funnelling process that attention must 
turn to. Sandman and Munthe’s strategic decision-making process does aid in 
ensuring that professional and clinical standards are maintained. Guiding this 
process must be a small MDT that will best ensure that a holistic review of the 
case takes place and the other goals and roles of the MDT are met.  
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In the end the decision that sits at the sharp end of the funnel is one that must be 
led by a best interest decision delineated by the family, the patient, the MDT and 
the physician in charge with whom the final decision rests. An irresistible 
question that then arises is, what of the patient’s consent? Has the authorization 
for this intervention been entirely circumnavigated by the adoption of the small 
MDT? I will discuss the issue of consent in the next chapter. 
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THE ETHICAL JUSTIFICATION FOR  




In the last chapter, it was demonstrated that the process of funnelling and framing 
would lead inextricably to the conclusion that continuous deep palliative sedation 
(CDPS) ought to be applied. This raises the question as to the position of consent 
within this apparent cascade of events. I am reminded of the quote by Lord 
Devlin in his summation of R v Adams where he states  
 “[i]f the first purpose of medicine, the restoration of health, can no longer 
be achieved there is still much for a doctor to do, and he is entitled to do 
all that is proper and necessary to relieve pain and suffering, even if the 
measures he takes may incidentally shorten life” (1). 
The significance of this statement is highlighted by its prominent place in 
Australia’s Treatment of Terminally-ill Patient’s Bill 2002 and in the Attorney 
General’s response to the Select Committee on Assisted Dying for the Terminally 
Ill Bill in 2005 (1-6). Devlin J’s summation also formed the basis of Lord Goff’s 
judgment in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland and guided Justice Sir Stephen Brown’s 
clarification on the legal position on the use of sedatives and opioids at the end of 
life in the matter of Annie Lindsell (7,8). It is this rich legacy and its implication 
upon current clinical practice that underpins the use of Devlin J’s statement in 
this thesis (7-9). 
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Professor of law Peter Skegg applies this quote to suggest that the application of 
treatment that may potentially result in significant morbidity and indeed mortality 
is legitimate and justified within “the proper practice of medicine” if the goals of 
care are clearly focused upon relieving pain and suffering in the terminally ill (9). 
This opinion, echoing the position of the British Medical Association, might be 
applied to the practice of CDPS for a number of reasons (7,9).  
As I have discussed in Chapter 2, the overarching goals of care under which 
CDPS is applied do acknowledge that “the restoration of health” is no longer 
possible (1). In its place, the goals of care that oversee the treatment of the patient 
now focus instead upon “reliev[ing] pain and suffering” (9-11). This meets the 
first of Lord Devlin’s requisites (9). 
The second condition relates to the conclusions drawn from Chapter 3, where I 
argued that this palliative option sits at the sharp end of the funnel and represents 
the only means available to realize the goals of care for a specific group of 
patients who continue to suffer (12). This group of patients are those who are 
terminally ill, with a prognosis of less than two weeks and who have exhausted 
all “proper and necessary” means of alleviating their suffering; these patients 
continue to suffer (9-11). 
Resistance to treatment of these patients by CDPS persist, however, led primarily 
by fears that this treatment of last resort “may incidentally shorten life” (9,13-17). 
Morita et al in 2001, Sykes and Thorns in 2003, Claessens et al in 2008 and 
Krishna et al in 2010 and 2012 have shown that this is not the case (18-24). 
Carefully monitored conservative applications of the lowest possible doses of 
sedating medications in tandem with the continued application of clinically 
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assisted nutrition and hydration (CANH) mitigates continued fears with regards to 
the objectives of the intervention, whilst enabling healthcare professionals 
(HCPs) to respond quickly, proportionally and effectively to any changes in the 
patient’s condition (10,11,13,14,16,25).   
With clarification of the goals and practice of CDPS, the justification proposed by 
Lord Devlin and Professor Skegg for the treatment of patients whose goals of 
care are the relief of suffering and in whom suffering persist, can be used to 
support both the ethical and legal permissibility of using CDPS for patients with 
intractable suffering (9). This mere sketch of a justificatory framework does not 
provide, however, clear enough principles for lawful and ethical conduct in 
carrying out this practice even when it is clarified that the intent of this procedure 
is to circumnavigate awareness of suffering without intentionally hastening death 
through the maintenance of deep levels of sedation in a manner that is consistent 
with regnant guidelines and clinical standards, monitored and overseen by a MDT 
when the prerequisites of diagnoses of intractability, terminality and futility are 
made and the application of this treatment of last resort is in keeping with 
holistically appraised determinations of being in the patient’s best interest are met 
(9). In particular, at least three aspects of the practice of CDPS may come into 
conflict with the law. The first relates to the inclusion of existential suffering as 
an indication for the application of CDPS, which I defend in Chapter 2. The 
second relates to the application of this treatment without consent, which I will 
discuss here and the final aspect is the precipitation of “social death” as a result of 
the induction of unconsciousness in these patients (26). I will discuss this last 
matter in Chapter 6. 
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For now, I will focus upon the question as to whether Lord Devlin’s point that a 
physician “is entitled to do all that is proper and necessary to relieve pain and 
suffering, even if the measures he takes may incidentally shorten life” extends to 
the possibility of CDPS being applied without consent (9). 
I will begin with a description of the current position of consent within the 
decision-making process for CDPS.  
 
4.2 THE CURRENT POSITION OF CONSENT FOR THE 
APPLICATION OF SEDATION AT THE END OF LIFE 
The issue of consent within the CDPS setting extends far beyond simply being a 
means of authorization of “bodily touching” that circumnavigates concerns of 
“criminal and civil liability” associated with any medical undertaking (9). At its 
core, consent within the CDPS setting is seen as a means of respecting the 
choices of patients and a means for patients to determine what should happen in 
their care and to their bodies and lives (9). This is the basis for the continued 
importance placed upon requirements for consent within the regnant terminal 
sedation (TS) guidelines [Appendix 1, 2 and 3] and the palliative sedation (PS) 
guidelines [Appendix 5 and 6]. The primacy of consent still sits as a central 
requisite for the application of PS for authors such as Levy and Cohen, Blondeau 
et al, Ventafridda et al, Seymour et al, Braun et al, Graeff and Dean, Davis and 
Ford, and Cherny, as well as guidelines such as the Fast Facts guidelines and the 
guidelines forwarded by the American Academy of Hospice and Palliative 
Medicine (AAHPM), the Norwegian Medical Association (NMA), the Hospice 
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and Palliative Care Federation of Massachusetts, the Veterans Health 
Administration’s (VHA) National Center for Ethics in Health Care, the Hospice 
and Palliative Nurse Association (HPNA) and the National Hospice and Palliative 
Care Organization (NHPCO) (10,11,27-45).  
It is unsurprising that Claessens et al reported that in their review of research 
literature on PS practice and guidelines that spanned care approaches in Europe, 
Asia and America, explicit consent remained a primary requirement within many 
guidelines and for many physicians (46).  
However, there is a growing body of professional opinion that holds that in most 
cases the ability of patients to give voluntary and informed consent is limited (13-
15,47). As a result, proxy decision-making has been adopted by guidelines 
proposed by Morita et al, Chiu et al, the American Medical Association Council 
on Ethical and Judicial Affairs (CEJA) report on Sedation to Unconsciousness in 
End-of-Life Care (CEJA Report 5-A-08), the American Medical Association’s 
Code of Medical Ethics report on Sedation to Unconsciousness in the End of life, 
the Royal Dutch Medical Association’s (KNMG) Committee on the National 
Guideline for Palliative Sedation report and the European Association for 
Palliative Care (EAPC) recommended framework for the use of sedation in 
palliative care (10,11,34,38). The NMA guidelines revert to a best interest 
principle as a source of alternative authorization (32).  
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4.3 THE CAPACITY FOR VALID CONSENT 
Consider the case of Yip Chak, an 83-year-old Chinese man with lung cancer 
whose disease had already metastasized to his adrenal glands, liver, brain and 
contralateral lung by the time he was diagnosed. This aggressive tumour did not 
respond to three different lines of chemotherapy with progression noted in his 
lepto-meninges, bones and lymph nodes.  
Not long after the failure of the third line of chemotherapy, Yip Chak was found 
to be suffering from severe headaches and hallucinations that left him in tears and 
distress. These symptoms persisted despite many lines of conventional and 
alternative treatment measures. The family, being aware of his critical clinical 
condition that was no longer amenable to curative measures, chose to adopt a 
change in his treatment stance, from one aimed at cure to one focused upon 
maximizing his comfort and relieving his suffering. As a result of this acceptance 
of an exhaustion of treatment options both for his underlying disease and for his 
increasingly difficult to manage symptoms, his continued suffering and very 
limited life expectancy, the multidisciplinary team (MDT) concluded that Yip 
Chak’s symptoms were intractable and that Yip Chak should be offered CDPS as 
a treatment of last resort. 
However, questions arose as to his capacity to consent for this procedure, not 
least because of his episodes of confusion, which in turn may have been 
compounded by a number of factors. This included his ongoing chest infection 
that was made worse by the continued use of steroids for treatment of his brain 
and leptomeningeal disease and as part of his whole brain radiotherapy treatment 
regime, his background of emphysema and his predisposition to infections as a 
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result of his misshapen lung due to his extensive lung disease. Furthermore, Yip 
Chak’s mental state was also compromised by his poor glycemic control due to 
his steroid use and episodes of arrhythmias as a result of his valvular and 
coronary heart disease that predisposed him to small strokes. His brain metastasis 
only compounded the situation.  
Whilst Yip Chak did have moments where he could communicate with others, 
they were brief and erratic. Medical staff and family found that they had little 
more than a chance to ask him a simple question before he would become 
confused or agitated again. He also had no memory of what he had said during his 
“communicative” moments, nor of what was told to him during these brief 
respites from his confused and agitated state. There was little in the way of 
assessing his competence, much less how much he understood of his present 
condition beyond a recognition that he was aware of his hallucinations and was 
becoming increasingly distressed by them. 
It is only in understanding the various factors that influence the key facets of 
consent can the position of consent within the CDPS setting be truly appreciated. 
Yip Chak’s complicated clinical, familial, financial and psychosocial situation 
reveals the wider considerations regarding any determination of competence and 
the influence of these many factors upon the consent process.  
It is clear from Yip Chak’s clinical and general physical condition that restoration 
of health can no longer be the prime focus of care. Yip Chak’s situation instead 
steers considerations towards an overarching goal of care that is focused on the 
relief of suffering, and the authorization of CDPS as the treatment of last resort. 
Yip Chak was unaware of his present situation and this situation was 
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compounded by the presence of his confusion and agitation. Whilst he did exhibit 
brief periods of lucidity, they were erratic and of varying frequency, raising the 
question as to how much information he may be able to receive and consider, and 
whether it could be sufficient to enable him to make an informed decision and 
communicate his wishes to his carers.  
To elaborate on these points I will use the framework offered by Singapore’s 
Mental Capacity Act of 2008 (MCA) to set standards and criteria for assessments 
of capacity, and to review these various factors that affect the consent process that 
Yip Chak would have to undergo (52). Latterly, I will review the alternate means 
available to establishing authorization for any treatment decision proposed. 
 
4.4 WHAT STANDARDS ARE TO BE MET IF CAPACITY IS  
TO BE DEEMED PRESENT? 
Singapore’s Mental Capacity Act of 2008, echoing the Law Commission on 
Mental Capacity’s definition of incapacity, states that 
“a person lacks capacity in relation to a matter if at the material time he is 
unable to make a decision for himself in relation to the matter because of 
an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or 
brain” (52,53). 
Section 5(1) of the MCA also states that a person is unable to make a decision for 
himself if he is unable 
“(a) to understand the information relevant to the decision; 
(b) to retain that information; 
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(c) to use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the 
decision; or 
(d) to communicate his decision (whether by talking, using sign language 
or any other means)” (52). 
 
4.4.1 Ability to understand the information relevant to the decision 
Appraisal of a patient’s understanding of the issues must include the scrutiny of 
the information imparted to the patient and their comprehension of this 
information. Given the importance of this facet, the effects of the various factors 
that influence the efficacy of this facet require close consideration.  
The presence of delirium, a transient organic brain disorder characterized by 
acute onset of disordered attention and cognition that is present in up to 85% of 
cases of terminally ill patients, is telling (54-57). These symptoms tend to develop 
rapidly and fluctuate in severity and duration (55). Its presence in Yip Chak’s 
case constitutes an “impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of the 
mind or brain” (52-57). Although the effects of delirium can be reversed if the 
offending factors are removed, there were numerous potential causes for the 
predisposition and perpetuation of delirium in Yip Chak’s case (52-57). An 
understanding of these treatment sequelae and ill effects of the comorbid 
conditions that affected Yip Chak’s cognitive ability is required.  
Yip Chak’s comorbid conditions were primarily attributable to his poorly 
controlled diabetes, ongoing ischemic and valvular heart disease and poor lung 
function. These compounding clinical complications were amongst the 
precipitating factors for delirium or were in fact causes of confusion in their own 
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right and required stabilization if Yip Chak was to have any chance of 
participating in the deliberations about his care options. The concomitant 
application of the sedatives used to ameliorate his agitation and shortness of 
breath, which clouded his consciousness; the steroids, applied to treat his cerebral 
oedema that predisposed to a worsening of his agitation; and the opioids, 
administered to treat his pain and his ongoing shortness of breath which appeared 
to sedate him; all restricted his ability to participate in the decision-making 
process, either on their own, in combination with one another or in tandem with 
his many comorbidities. 
Addressing these factors and their immediate effects are a priority. Part II Section 
6(4) of Singapore’s MCA is clear that these negative effects upon Yip Chak’s 
ability to consent should be countered:  
“so far as is reasonably practicable, permit and encourage the person to 
participate, or to improve his ability to participate, as fully as possible in 
any act done for him and any decision affecting him” (52).  
Yip Chak’s complex condition did not allow for this. Attempts to reduce the 
doses of steroids had little effect upon his agitation but did conversely precipitate 
a deterioration in his symptoms of dyspnea and headaches within 12 hours of its 
reduction. Trial of reducing either his opioids or sedatives also failed to clear his 
thinking and conversely precipitated an increase in his symptoms of agitation, 
dyspnea and confusion. All attempts to change the drugs being used to other 
equally effective alternatives in the hope that their side effect profiles might be 
less incapacitating were also attempted to improve Yip Chak’s condition. These 
efforts, too, were met with failure. 
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Concurrent efforts to address the presence of psychiatric symptoms that could 
impair the consent process, initially through psychological and counselling means 
so as not to complicate his clinical picture as pharmacological alterations were 
being carried out to address his physical symptoms, also failed. His symptoms 
such as anxiety, seen in about 25% of terminally ill patients, and depression, 
reported in about 50% of patients at the end of life, that can and do affect 
cognition and concentration were also addressed (13,14,57-60). It was only when 
these non-pharmacological attempts failed that they were supplemented by 
clinical interventions. These efforts failed too and a psychiatric review confirmed 
that Yip Chak remained incapable of making treatment decisions particularly as 
his periods of lucidity were inconsistent and erratic.  
Alongside these attempts to correct his clouded mental function were efforts to 
address the other stumbling block to his participation in these deliberations. 
Concerns of the family about disclosure of information to the patient and attempts 
to overcome collusion and circumnavigate “gate-keeping” were also addressed. 
This in turn raised two considerations. As Beauchamp and Childress assert, there 
is a need to consider if patients such as Yip Chak would have wished to know of 
their condition, much less participate in their care determinations (61). Whilst Yip 
Chak has a right to participate in a decision-making process, there is no 
mandatory duty to do so and he may have simply been exercising his prerogative 
(61). The evidence accrued from the family and by the fact that he had until this 
point been content to allow his family to decide on the course of treatment despite 
having numerous opportunities to ask for further information himself should he 
have desired it, might be seen to suggest that he had no wish to participate in the 
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deliberative process and was quite content to delegate these responsibilities to his 
family.  
Yip Chak’s wish to remain positive throughout his illness may have motivated the 
medical team and family to continue to gate-keep information, if only to “protect” 
the patient’s overall belief in the curative powers of “positive thinking”. 
Providing Yip Chak with information that would affect his outlook, particularly 
in his condition, where it would be revealed that little else can be done to 
ameliorate his symptoms, would have been counterproductive to the family’s 
efforts to promote positive thinking and hope. This is frequently a reason amongst 
many local families to collude with healthcare professionals not to brief patients 
on their “true” condition. In Yip Chak’s case, this underpinned the family’s wish 
to act beneficently and protect him from the “truth” of his condition 
(47,48,62,63). 
However, there is also the counter argument. Some healthcare professionals 
raised concerns that he may in fact have changed his mind on not exercising his 
right to participate in his care decisions in light of his worsening condition. These 
team members argued that there may also be matters that he would wish to 
address if he was made aware of his true condition. Some members of the team 
felt that the option of asking him if he would wish to discuss his condition ought 
to be forwarded. The medical social worker’s review of Yip Chak’s case that 
revealed that there were now doubts as to whether his family, now emotionally 
and physically exhausted at having him in an agitated state, were acting in his 
best interest or out of fear that he might change his “will”, raised more concerns. 
There was a suggestion that the family may in fact have been keen for the 
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injudicious application of CDPS if only to alleviate their own concerns and 
distress.  
Although these factors represent significant considerations, they were in reality, 
limited by Yip Chak’s ability to retain information provided.  
 
4.4.2 Ability to retain that information 
Retention of information is a prime concern particularly amongst patients being 
considered for CDPS. Here variability in consciousness, concentration and the 
coadunation of all those factors discussed in the earlier section compound 
concerns about the ability of a patient to retain information. This situation is 
complicated by the knowledge that even healthier patients who do not suffer from 
any limitations to their mental abilities struggle with information retention. Bryne 
et al found that only two to five days after information was provided to post-
operative patients and consent attained, as many as 27% of patients were not sure 
of the nature of the intervention proposed and a further 44% were not aware of 
the basic facts about the process (64,65). Questions are naturally raised then as to 
whether CDPS patients in general and Yip Chak in particular would actually be 
capable of retaining clinical information about their conditions in a meaningful 
manner so as to be able to actively participate in the consent process.  
In Yip Chak’s case, this was unlikely. His fleeting episodes of being 
communicative were too erratic, his recollections of previous conversations were 
impaired and his “cognitive continuity” diminished. He was not able to retain 
information from one period of lucid communication to another, raising questions 
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as to whether he could retain any information for a sufficient length of time to 
cogitate upon it. His steroids, his pain and his shortness of breath, which 
aggravated his general anxiety would have compounded this situation by limiting 
his ability to concentrate and thereby compromising his ability to retain 
information. Similarly his brain metastasis and his ongoing headaches further 
compounded his ability to be receptive of new information.  
Overall, too, the actual ability of patients to retain any information in the face of 
intractable symptomology and progressive deterioration as a result of both the 
underlying disease and the ongoing symptomology and comorbidities has also 
raised questions as to the viability of the consent process amongst these patients 
(13,14,49). This is particularly so when many of these patients, are subject to a 
wide range of side effects as a result of the various treatments options applied to 
control their ongoing symptoms and as a result of the disease effects. This would 
suggest further compromise to the ability of such patients to appropriately weigh 
up the information provided in order to make an informed decision. 
 
4.4.3 Ability to use or weigh that information as part of the  
process of making the decision 
The worry as to the ability of patients to weigh up information provided is 
particularly vivid in the face of a coadunation of cognitive impairment and 
coercive factors, both internal and external, raising the question as to whether 
truly “free” consent exists (13,14,60,64,65).  
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In Yip Chak’s situation given his limited information, his relatively small window 
for communication and a lack of recollection between each lucid moment, it is 
unlikely that he would be able to fully balance the risks and benefits of the 
situation (13,14,60,64,65). As I have argued elsewhere, the presence of severe 
symptoms and general debility do compel patients to make decisions that may not 
consider any factor beyond the immediate relief of their suffering (13,14,49). In a 
discussion in the earlier stages of his illness and when Yip Chak was still 
competent but suffering from headaches, he was provided with a number of 
treatment options for his headaches; his response was instructive. He chose the 
treatment that would have most rapidly extinguish his suffering even though there 
were significant side effects to it and there were other less risky albeit slower 
means of treating his symptoms. Later on, when he was suffering from liver 
capsular pain as a result of his liver metastasis, Yip Chak opted for rapid relief of 
suffering over safe alternatives. This type of responses are regularly seen amongst 
many palliative care patients who are suffering – their suffering may prevent 
them from appropriately considering their alternatives. In many cases, in my 
experience, the pivotal consideration of these patients with intractable and 
frequently prolonged symptoms is the relief of suffering. It is for this reason that I 
argue that suffering ought to be considered a coercive influence upon the 
decision-making process (13,14,49).  
These coercive factors upon the patient’s ability to weigh up information properly 
also come in the form of familial pressure (14,48). I have previously described 
how a young lady with a haematological malignancy decided to forego 
potentially life-prolonging treatment as a result of familial pressure and financial 
constraints (14,48). Awareness of the presence of these factors are key to HCPs’ 
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ability to determine if patients can “appropriately” weigh up the information that 
is provided to them. 
There is also a doubt as to whether Yip Chak could “use or weigh that 
information as part of the process of making the decision” due to his limited 
information on his condition as a result of ongoing collusion and gate-keeping 
amongst his family members (52). Additionally, given the erratic nature of his 
ability to communicate, there is concern as to whether he could make his decision 
known. 
 
4.4.4 Ability to communicate his decision (whether by talking,  
using sign language or any other means) 
The presence of physical impairment and cognitive problems as well as the 
coercive factors highlighted raise questions as to whether patients being 
considered for CDPS would be able to communicate their wishes appropriately. 
Data collected from dying palliative care patients reveals that 15% of patients 
were unconscious, a further 10% were drowsy, 14% were confused and 22% of 
cases were agitated during the last two weeks of life, which coincides with the 
time frame for the application of CDPS (25). Overall, 61% of patients within the 
patient population from which CDPS patients must come are physically incapable 
of communicating (25). The remaining 39% of patients in turn appear subject to 
other considerations. 
The presence of psychological and existential causes for limitations in the 
capabilities of patients to communicate cannot be discounted. The Oxford 
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Textbook of Palliative Care states that up 25% of palliative care patients at this 
stage of life suffer from clinical depression and diagnosable psychological 
deficits, which will affect their capacity to participate in the decision-making 
processes (57). Whilst not completely impinging upon the ability to participate in 
clinical decisions, their decisional capacity is liable to fluctuate or remain weak as 
will their ability to communicate their wishes.  
As discussed, Part II Section 6(4) of Singapore’s MCA requires that  
“so far as is reasonably practicable, permit and encourage the person to 
participate, or to improve his ability to participate, as fully as possible in 
any act done for him and any decision affecting him” (52).  
This envisages “the use of ‘simple language, visual aids and any other means’ 
appropriate to the circumstances of the person being evaluated” (64). 
Psychologists, psychiatrists and counsellors as part of the MDT can act to support 
the patient in tandem with the implementations of pharmaceutical interventions to 
reverse the effects of psychological and physical compromises. In Yip Chak case, 
clinical measures were also attempted, in a controlled and carefully monitored 
way, to nullify or attenuate detrimental psychological and physical effects upon 
decisional capacity.  
Practically, efforts must be made to engage these patients in a manner and level 
of communication that would be best suited to the abilities of these patients. 
Without these measures, nearly 86% of patients may be expected to fail to meet 
prevailing competence requirements, much less communicate their decisions in a 
meaningful manner (23,24). In recognition of this fact and the requirements set 
out by the MCA, the MDT must consider  
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“(a) the person’s past and present wishes and feelings (and, in particular, 
any relevant written statement made by him when he had capacity); 
(b) the beliefs and values that would be likely to influence his decision if 
he had capacity; and 
(c) the other factors that he would be likely to consider if he were able to 
do so” (52). 
This will help to ensure that the options offered to the patient and the preferences 
communicated are in keeping with the patient’s own views and consistent with 
their previously voiced positions. 
In keeping with Part II Section 6(8) of Singapore’s MCA, the MDT is also tasked 
with taking into account the views of  
“(a) anyone named by the person as someone to be consulted on the matter 
in question or on matters of that kind; 
(b) anyone engaged in caring for the person or interested in his welfare; 
(c) any donee of a lasting power of attorney granted by the person; and 
(d) any deputy appointed for the person by the court” (52). 
This then serves to reassure all parties that efforts are being expended to meet the 
informational needs to suit the patient’s specific requirements and also to equip 
the various parties involved with the background information and means to 
appropriately interpret the patient’s responses.  
Continued efforts to involve the patient in conversation and decision-making can 
be therapeutic in itself (67-69). Kitwood, for instance, suggests that continued 
involvement with the decision-making process can be maintained simply by 
allowing for the interpretation of gestures and facial expressions (67-69). Here the 
concurrent presence of various family members and carers who know the patient 
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well provide an opportunity for these interpretations to be validated and 
confirmed to ensure their authenticity as much as practically possible.  
The question that inevitably arises is, how much weight ought to be placed on the 
patient’s gesticulations and utterances, and sometimes the interpretations of the 
patient’s movements and utterances by others, within these determinations? In 
situations where the patient may only participate in some aspects of the decision-
making process, the physician led by the MDT must engage other parties to 
appropriately assess the patient’s wishes and ascertain best interest. To do so, 
employment of Sandman and Munthe’s “strategic decision-making process at the 
end of life model” discussed in the previous chapter is required (70).  
The adoption of a “strategic decision-making [process] mainly on behalf of the 
professional” form of shared decision-making is to ensure that in these 
circumstance where the patient is not able to fully participate in the decision-
making process, the best interests of the patient are protected (70). However, the 
prime reason for its adoption at this juncture of the consent process is to ensure 
that in the near absence of high-level dynamics in these interactions with the 
patient, information and communication that involve the patient are focused upon 
facilitating their involvement in the decision-making process (70). It also prevents 
the interest of the family or other parties subverting this process, as it may have 
done in Yip Chak’s case (according to the medical social worker’s report).  
The “Professionally Driven Best Interest Compromise Model” is “openly 
strategic” in that decisions on how much weight is to be placed on the input of the 
patient as a result of the information that is provided is defined by the MDT who 
have discerned the optimal medical course for alleviating the patient’s suffering 
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and what information can realistically be attained from the patient given their 
particular condition (70). All parties are also aware that the MDT is acting 
strategically around a predetermined goal of protecting the patient’s holistically 
determined best interests (70,71). There is acceptance that the inputs of the 
patient may help mould the manner that the MDT responds to his or her needs but 
overriding this is the requirement that this response must comply with the 
minimum standards of care set out by prevailing guidelines and clinical standards 
as well as be in keeping with the best interest determinations set out by the MDT 
in conjunction with the various parties involved (13,14,47-49).  
The purpose of this stepwise review of each element of the consent process has 
been to highlight that within the context of CDPS applications, the prevailing 
consent process as it stands appears compromised at multiple levels.  
At present there are two options – the traditionally applied surrogate decision-
making process, where the role is traditionally played by the family within the 
local setting, or the best interests principle (BIP) that has been adopted by 
Singapore’s 2008 Mental Capacity Act (52). I will begin by considering proxy or 
surrogate decision-making. 
 
4.5 THE POSSIBILITY OF PROXY OR SURROGATE  
DECISION-MAKING 
Surrogate or proxy decision-making has often been seen as a means of ensuring 
that the patient’s opinions, values and beliefs continue to be considered in 
determinations about their care when they themselves may be incapable of doing 
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so. Surrogate or proxy decision-making, particularly by family members, is also 
seen to meet other objectives (72,73). The American Medical Association (AMA) 
hold within Opinion 2.20 of the Council of Ethical and Judicial Affairs (CEJA) 
that surrogate decision-making can also be used to soothe any tensions between 
medical decisions and the wishes of the family (72,73). Within the local setting, it 
would appear that it is this factor that drives indulgence in family participation in 
ongoing deliberative processes (14,49). 
However, increasingly there has been data to suggest that family involvement has 
frequently derailed care approaches that a patient had decided upon when 
competent (47-51,62,63,74). More concerning is the fact that there is increasing 
data to suggest that even the determinations of a competent patient have been 
infringed (74-76). Underpinning this is a myriad of care, psychosocial and 
financial considerations that place family members in situations where competing 
interests may arise and compromise their ability to place the interests of the 
patient over their own (47-51,62,63,74). I submit that it is as a result of this data, 
clinical reports and increasing data that patients do wish to have their own voice 
in end-of-life decisions that the Mental Capacity Act of Singapore 2008 has 
attempted to steer away from dependence upon surrogate decision makers (47-
52,62,63,74-76). Competing interests aside, the role of surrogate decision maker 
itself is strenuous and frequently “emotionally draining”, particularly in societies 
where filial decision-making is still practiced and expected (74-77). Having 
emotional pressures along with financial, psychosocial and caregiver strain may 
further hinder and potentially compromise the strategic decision-making process 
(47-50,78-80).  
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Furthermore, there is evidence that would show that the concordance rates 
between patients and their family are only slightly better than the chances gained 
from “a toss of a coin” (81,82). Krishna and Ho et al suggest that locally, some 
family members actually make decisions that protect the interests of the family 
rather than the patient’s best interests (14,48,49,62,63). The validity of 
complementary decisions between the patient and the family even in concordant 
decisions are thus called into question. The continued attempts of surrogates at 
decision-making even when in many cases wishes and plans are not discussed 
with or known to surrogates would confirm the suspicion that at least in some 
cases the decision is being led largely by familial rather than the patient’s 
interests (83).  
Physicians appear to be aware of this potential for bias and do appear to act 
strategically to secure compromise in the shared decision-making process, 
ensuring that the best interests of the patient and the institutionally sanctioned 
idea of “lowest acceptable limit of what could be offered to the patient” are not 
compromised in any decision taken (70). Active framing in deliberations may 
explain why physicians report only infrequently wishing to overrule the wishes of 
the family (70,75).  
The culmination of these points led largely by clinical experience and local data 
highlight the weaknesses and inadequacies of the consent and surrogate decision-
making process that are well recognized in CDPS and perhaps end-of-life 
decisions as a whole (14). In its place the CDPS framework sets out to employ a 
best interest determination approach led by the MDT rather than solely by the 
physician in charge when considering the application of CDPS. In view of what 
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has been considered in relation to Yip Chak’s position, authority ought to shift to 
the MDT in keeping with a palliative care approach to determine the best course 
of action (14,48,49).  
Guiding the practice of the MDT and justifying its actions is the Singapore 
Mental Capacity Act 2008 (52,84,85). This process in turn is based upon a 
number of assumptions, which include the fact that  
• the patients are terminally ill as determined by a MDT and a set of 
independent clinicians following holistic evaluation of their situation (see 
section 1.2.2.3 page 29) 
• these patients are being managed by a palliative care team or have consulted a 
palliative care specialist as an independent second opinion if CDPS is being 
considered (see section 3.6.3 page 171) 
• all patients must be formally assessed for capacity by one independent and the 
team psychiatrist at two separate occasions as a result of concerns about their 
capacity to make informed decisions and in light of the gravity of this 
decision (see page 216) 
• this process must not be influenced by the age, clinical condition or diagnosis 
of the patient even if there are known lesions, previous damage or previous or 
ongoing abnormalities within the brain and/or central nervous system (see 
Singapore Mental Capacity Act) 
• all patients would have had confusion screens and treatment to reverse all 
potentially reversible causes of confusion and delirium 
• previously stated views of the patient of their experiences with lesser levels of 
sedation and their goals, wishes and hopes must be considered by the MDT 
and an independent review undertaken by a palliative care physician, social 
worker and psychiatrist (see section 3.6.3 page 171) 
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Figure 4.1 Conceptualizing capacity within the end of life 
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• all these patients have and continue to be supported by a MDT where their 
multidimensional needs and care are constantly reviewed to ensure 
complications of prolonged sedation and continued feeding are prevented (see 
section 3.7.3 page 181) 
• CDPS being considered a treatment that prevents serious deterioration in the 
patient’s condition and not as a means of hastening death (see section 3.7.4 
page 184) 
• any donee with lasting power of attorney or a court appointed deputy cannot 
make decisions regarding CDPS on their own, given that CDPS is considered 
treatment that will prevent a serious deterioration in the patient’s condition 
(see Singapore Advanced Medical Directive) 
• whilst an advanced medical directive (AMD) would be valid, CDPS is not 
considered extraordinary life sustaining treatment and therefore will not be 
affected by the valid AMD (see Singapore Advanced Medical Directive) (71). 
These factors underpin the manner that physicians act to determine capacity for 
participation decision-making for CDPS. Patients deemed to have capacity 
following a formal capacity assessment become active participants within the 
decision-making process, whilst those deemed not to be competent are “permitted 
and encouraged to participate as fully as possible in any act done for him or any 
decision affecting him” (66). Facilitation to maximize capacity and participation 
within the Best Interest Principle (BIP) deliberative process take the form of  
“relaxing the person through a patient-centred approach, conducting the 
assessment at a time when patient is most alert, allowing support from 
close relatives, familiarization with the location where the decision will be 
carried out and offering privacy to the assessed person” (66).  
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Underpinning this model of authorization are the principles of necessity, best 
interests and further, appropriateness and proportionality.  
 
4.6 APPLYING CDPS WITHOUT CONSENT: NECESSITY 
The Principle of Necessity has previously been the guiding rationale for the 
application of treatment without consent in extreme or life saving situations. This 
principle has largely been incorporated within the best interest model with the 
advent of consent legislature in the form of the Mental Capacity Act (52,71,84-
87). Under the very specific conditions that may be considered “palliative 
emergencies”, the Principle of Necessity comes into force emphasizing the 
urgency to act to relieve the patient’s suffering in a timely and appropriate 
manner particularly when consent may not be possible (52,74-77).  
Underpinning this is the belief that in patients for whom CDPS is being 
considered, continuing intractable suffering at the end of life must be seen as an 
emergency, much like a life threatening event might be viewed within the 
accident and emergency setting. Both situations demand urgent attention under 
the aegis of their respective goals of care. Within the CDPS setting, the goals of 
care are no longer restorative or curative, as they are in the accident and 
emergency setting, but focused on the relief of suffering. As a result, within the 
confines of these evolved goals of care, the cessation of suffering is a priority and 
thus demands the same considerations as emergency life saving treatments do in 
an accident and emergency setting. It is in these “palliative care emergencies”
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the Principle of Necessity provides the “force majeure” to compel immediate 
action. 
The necessity to act ought not to be hindered or delayed, particularly within the 
circumstances where CDPS is being considered and where limitations to the 
consent process are known and evidenced (81). In these end-of-life 
circumstances, as shown in Yip Chak’s case, there must be due acknowledgment 
that limitations to a patient’s autonomy grow as part of the natural progression of 
the conditions. Self-authorization, the capstone of care determinations, gives way 
to more practical determinants such as protection of dignity and the maximizing 
of comfort. The Principles of Necessity and Beneficence supported by the 
Principle of Best Interests determine the course of care and the maximization of a 
patient’s liberty. 
The English and Welsh Mental Capacity Act 2007 define the Principle of 
Necessity as “the legal basis by which people who [do] not have capacity to make 
decisions about their medical treatment [are] given treatment” whilst in the 
United States Medicare defines “medical necessity” as “services or items 
reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury or to 
improve the functioning of a malformed body member” (85,86). This sketch of 
some of the prevailing conceptions of the Principle of Necessity highlights the 
rationale for authors such as Bickenbach, Brudner and Moore to conclude that the 
central issue with regards to the Principle of Necessity is a lack of a universally 
accepted definition (88-94).  
Traditionally, the Principle of Necessity is seen to encapsulate the ideas of the 
“choice of evils” where the only options open to a physician involve breaching 
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the interests and rights of the patient in order to protect the interests of the patient 
and provide meaningful, appropriate, evidenced and clinically accepted benefit to 
them in situations where consent is not possible (88-94). This thesis maintains 
that it is the oft unarticulated facet of  “force majeure” that is the critical element 
of this principle particularly within the confines of the MCA (Fig 4.2). I will 
discuss each of these elements in due course.  
 
Figure 4.2 Conceptualizing the Principle of Necessity 
Turning first to the necessity for CDPS, it is important to state that the Principle 
of Necessity ought not to be seen as a means of justification for an action or even 
as exculpatory rationale but as a means of acting to sacrifice a lesser interest to 
save a greater one (88). Bickenbach argues that in keeping with the goals of care 
and in keeping with the demands of the circumstances, autonomy is sacrificed for 
beneficence (88).  
There is precedence for such actions (95,96). In Re: F (1990) the extent that 
medical necessity can be pursued was revealed when a mentally incapacitated 
















her best interests (95). The necessity to act was guided primarily by the fact that 
despite being 36 years old, patient F had a verbal capacity of a two-year-old, the 
“general mental capacity of a child of four or five” and was beginning to have 
voluntary sexual intercourse with a fellow patient, P, at the mental hospital where 
she had been since age 14 (95). Lord Brandon of Oakbrook in summing up his 
decision for sterilization stated that this decision was taken as there were 
significant problems with alternative contraceptive measures and  
“[b]ecause of her mental disability, however, she could not cope at all 
with pregnancy, labour or delivery, the meaning of which she would not 
understand. Nor could she care for a baby if she ever had one. In these 
circumstances it would, from a psychiatric point of view, be disastrous for 
her to conceive a child” (95). 
Borak and Veileux report further that translocations of the Principle of Necessity 
to pain control and the amelioration of suffering is not unknown (97). At its core 
is the second facet of necessity, protection of the interests and rights of the patient 
(88-94). Necessity in these circumstances is seen to trump the need for informed 
consent (91). Borak and Veileux also report that such is the concern about the 
viability of consent in moments of extremis that “partial” disclosure in the 
consent process is allowed as they argue that in the face of severe pain, for 
instance, information is unlikely to be retained and thus consent is unlikely to be 
valid (97). The authors add that lengthy and detailed consent is unlikely to be 
possible in such circumstances (97). These authors also assert that other 
prevailing means of acquiring consent are inherently biased or indeed 
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compromised by a general lack of clear definition and standards to determinations 
of competence (97). 
As a result Borak and Veileux, like Hansson and Skegg respectively, maintain 
that applying treatment even without consent is authorized by the standards set by 
the Best Interest Principle (BIP) so long as there is a documented second opinion 
confirming the necessity to act (9,96,98). Validation for treating suffering and 
pain in this manner is endorsed by professional bodies and organizations such as 
the International Association for the Study of Pain and the Worldwide Palliative 
Care Alliance, which advocate that the appropriate and timely amelioration of 
pain as a basic human right (99-101). These bodies support the right to 
amelioration of suffering and validate the Principle of Necessity, particularly 
when the goals of care are so clearly articulated, validating the appropriateness 
and the evidenced-based position of this intervention (88,94). 
However, a lack of a multidimensional, multiprofessional review within present 
applications of the Principle of Necessity proves telling and may underpin its 
encapsulation within the Best Interest Principle where any invocation of this 
principle must be accompanied by a holistic review (Fig 4.2) (97).  
 
4.7 THE BEST INTEREST PRINCIPLE 
Professor JJ Chin in his article on Singapore’s Mental Capacity Act (MCA) states 
that 
“Sections 7 and 8 of MCA 2008 reaffirms that both the UK and Singapore 
common law positions, that where an adult lacks capacity to make 
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decisions on his or her own behalf, health interventions will be lawful 
where there is both a necessity to act and any action is in the best interests 
of the incapacitated adult” (66). 
The MCA’s BIP attempts to articulate a more balanced combination of 
beneficence and autonomy than the Principle of Necessity taken on its own (52). 
Whilst protecting “the person against harmful decisions or actions by self, or by 
others” and “respecting the freedom and dignity of a person despite his 
incapacity”, the BIP set out by the MCA sets about to meet these goals through 
means that are “least restrictive of the person’s right and freedom of action” 
(52,66). Chin adds that this action, which is carried out to prevent serious 
deterioration in the patient’s condition, must be accompanied and guided by a 
holistic review of the patient’s condition that would “include reasonably 
ascertainable past and present wishes and feelings, beliefs and values of the 
person, and other factors of significance [section 6(7)(a)-(c)]” (66). 
Harris adds that justification for BIP-inspired action lies in the fact that it is 
“not that the patient consented, nor that she would have, nor that it is safe 
to presume that she would have, nor that she will consent when she 
regains consciousness or when on ceasing to be a child she becomes 
competent, but because it is the right thing to do, and it is right precisely 
because it is in her or his best interests” (102). 
Applying the Best Interest Principle must be based upon established clinical 
evidence that the patient is in fact incompetent or encumbered in such a way as to 
be unable to protect their interests and that there has arisen a situation that 
necessitates an agent to act on behalf of the patient to protect his or her interests. 
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Justification for proceeding with a BIP-based action is delineated by Harris’ 
statement that  
“if we seek the reason why it is the right thing to do, the answer is that to 
fail or to omit to do it would injure the patient. It is the infliction of THAT 
injury by act or omission, that would constitute the violation or assault” 
(102).  
In addition, the idea of best interests encompasses the “value of the life for 
the person who must live it”, set within a situation where the person is 
unable to ensure their own protection, well-being, survival and 
development, and is at a point where these interests are threatened (103-
105). The BIP requires an agent to act “in the best course of action” to 
protect the interests of the patient to the “maximum extent possible” (103-
105).  
Preserving patients against harm and securing their well-being and interests are 
considered objective criteria of the best interests of the patient. However, the UK 
Mental Capacity Act 2005, the UNHCR Guidelines on Formal Determination of 
the Best Interests of the Child 2006 and the Singapore Mental Capacity Act 2008 
also include subjective criteria that give expression to patient preferences so far as 
they are known (52,53,104,105). Combining these elements with determinations 
of intractability, the goals of care, the holistic evaluation of the case, the decision-
making processes, “force majeure” and the practical considerations with regards 
to suffering and prevailing clinical practices related to sedation at the end of life 
discussed in Chapters 1, 2 and 3 means that the BIP within the CDPS framework 
entails that  
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1. each person has an inalienable right to relief of suffering through the 
application of appropriate, legitimate, evidenced-based treatment options 
that are deemed locally clinically and professionally acceptable within a 
particular clinical setting (see section 1.5.3 page 64) 
2. any action must remain focused upon acting in their best interests as 
determined by a MDT and a set of independent clinicians following the 
holistic evaluation of their situation (see section 3.7.1 page 177) 
3. the undertaking to act in the patient’s best interest must not be motivated by 
“a desire to bring about the person’s death” (see section 4.6 page 218, 
section 4.8 page 227).  
4. any intervention that emanates from the BIP must be instigated by a clear 
necessity to act such as the presence of a “clear and present” threat to the 
interests of the patient; here evaluations of necessity must also be in 
keeping with a holistic evaluation by the MDT and a set of independent 
physicians, social workers and psychiatrists (see section 4.8 page 227) 
5. the intervention proposed must be the least burdensome, risky and 
restrictive options possible; the intervention must be shown to be 
appropriate and proportional to the considerations of the particular case and 
the necessity of the situation; evaluations of the appropriateness, 
proportionality and necessity of the situation must be in keeping with the 
multiprofessional and multidimensional evaluations of the MDT and 
validated by a set of independent physicians, social workers and 
psychiatrists (see section 3.7.4 page 184, section 4.8 page 227) 
6. during the deliberations on the best course of action and the extent that 
protection will be conferred, there must be no discrimination on the grounds 
of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinions, national, 
ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or status (see Singapore 
Mental Capacity Act)  
7. all efforts to include the patient in the deliberative process should be made 
(see section 4.4.4 page 208, Singapore Mental Capacity Act) 
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8. the patient must be assured the right to express their views and that their 
beliefs, values, wishes and feeling will be considered and given “due weight” 
within the deliberative process (see section 4.4.4 page 208) 
9. there must be consultations with “relevant others” such as the patient’s 
family, carers and loved ones who have powers to intervene or have 
interests in the patient’s affairs and personal welfare 
10. wherever possible, a multi-professional review must take place; wherever 
this is not possible, documented second opinions and input from other 
practitioners and carers involved in the patient’s management must be 
obtained to confirm the diagnosis of intractable suffering; these are subject 
to a number of conditions: 
(a) all discussions within the MDT and with carers, other professionals 
and wherever possible the patient must be clearly documented  
(b) what, why and how particular considerations were provided with 
specific weight within these deliberations and how they were 
balanced must also be justified within the patient’s clinical notes and 
potentially within the MDT’s records 
(c) the rationale for the decision itself and the reasons why alternative 
options were discounted must be carefully delineated and similarly 
justified and documented (52,104-106). 
(d) in the event a minority decision is taken or where no consensus can be 
attained within the MDT deliberations, the decision taken by the 
physician who is legally responsible for the patient’s care must be 
carefully documented, as should the dissenting views; the rationale 
and the means that this decision is arrived at must be clearly 
documented and explained. (see section 4.6 page 218) 
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4.8 APPROPRIATENESS OF TREATMENT 
Items 4 and 5 in the items listed above refer to two further principles; these are 
appropriateness and proportionality in the determination of treatment application 
in the best interests of patients for the relief of suffering. I will consider the issue 
of appropriateness here. 
In Ost and Mullock’s review of the Dutch Termination of Life on Request and 
Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act of 2002, they state that a key criterion 
to justifying this intervention of last resort is its appropriateness (107). In 
elucidating its character, Ost and Mullock describe an intervention to terminate 
the patient’s life as being appropriate if it fulfils the following: 
“the patient’s request was ‘voluntary and carefully considered’; she was 
informed of her situation and prospects by the doctor; her suffering was 
‘unbearable’ and there was ‘no prospect of improvement’ in her condition 
(the due care criteria have been interpreted as requiring a medical 
condition which may be physical or psychological in nature); both doctor 
and patient were convinced that the suffering could not be alleviated 
through any other reasonable means; the doctor acted with ‘due care and 
attention’; s/he consulted an independent physician who has given a 
written opinion as to the criteria being satisfied” (107). 
Appropriateness appears to be subject to meeting simple criteria to ensure that 
treatment offered to a patient is timely and congruent with what the patient and 
their doctor have agreed to undertake and in line with clinical, psychosocial, 
spiritual and cultural considerations (108). However, in a series of articles, Fuchs 
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has argued that an intervention is appropriate if it is worth doing (109). Fuchs 
argues that in fact appropriateness revolves around “the primacy of patient 
welfare” and represents a commitment to provide “appropriate health care” that is 
based on “wise and cost-effective management of limited clinical resources” 
(109).  
“Appropriate health care”, Fuchs argues, must also be viewed in a more general 
health care setting (109). That the average US cancer patient has three times more 
MRI scans than a Canadian patient, with no improvement in their “health 
outcomes”, is instructive (109). According to Fuchs, this point highlights the 
continued reliance upon hard facts and clearly divisible data to generalize care 
decisions and validate both the wisdom and the costs of an intervention, which 
may be flawed (109).  
Neither of the goals that Fuchs mentions earlier would actually be met within the 
CDPS setting by sole reliance upon statistical evidence or generalizable data 
(109). In the CDPS setting, generalizable data is insufficient for the purposes of a 
holistic review. It does not capture information about patient and family 
satisfaction, their spiritual and psychological health, their financial strains and 
carer burdens nor the severity of their ailments. As a result, judging the 
appropriateness of an intervention entirely upon clinical percentages and clinical 
outcome measures cannot be the sole arbiters of appropriateness. Like its sister 
indicators, holistic and case specific considerations are key. 
Fuchs’ observations show that appropriateness is calibrated by the practical 
context in which interventions are proposed and administered (109). Fuchs adds  
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“the heterogeneity of patient populations and uncertainty about the 
response of individual patients to an intervention means that it is often 
difficult or impossible to determine in advance which ones will prove to 
help particular patients and which will turn out to have been unnecessary” 
(109). 
In America, for instance, it would appear that “aggressive” investigations and 
interventions are deemed “appropriate” and has led to and been duly fed by the 
manner that the health care system is funded and managed (109). The same type 
of management may not be viewed as appropriate within the Singapore setting, 
for example (110,111).  
Appropriateness is also dependent upon what can realistically be provided by the 
MDT within a specific setting, so long as it meets accepted clinical, professional, 
legal and psychosocial standards. Appropriateness of an intervention such as 
CDPS depends upon a number of factors that include,  
“adequacy of disease and symptom diagnosis, on estimation of the 
patient’s stage in the trajectory of the disease, on calculation of the 
benefits to burdens risks calculus of both investigations and treatments, on 
the patient’s goals and values, on the family or significant others’ goals 
and values where appropriate, and, to a lesser extent, on the cost of 
investigations and treatments” (112).  
The competency and experience of the physician; training and expertise in end-
of-life care; the relationship that they share with the patient and their family; their 
communication skills and their ability to appropriately understand, weigh and 
balance the various sometimes competing factors and obligations; and the 
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cultural, religious, ethical, psychosocial and clinical factors involved within a 
specific situation help define the appropriateness of both the timing and manner 
of their interventions. Appropriateness is also dependent upon the ability to 
harness the resources available to the professionals appropriately, their 
relationships with other professionals involved in the patient’s care and their 
ability to act within a MDT is critical to this judgment. Appropriateness is thus a 
factor of the nature and extent of involvement of various parties in the care 
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4.9 FACTORS THAT IMPACT UPON THE APPROPRIATENESS OF 
CDPS INTERVENTION 
The appropriateness of an application of CDPS depends upon an appraisal that 
the application of CDPS as a matter of last resort is in keeping the limitations that 
would be expected within the particular clinical context (Fig 4.3). Whilst it would 
be considered inappropriate to commence CDPS without “appropriate palliative 
care, access to ambulant hospice teams and networks, inter-professional co-
ordinated teamwork, adequate pain relief, development and implementation of 
quality standards, research and training, and bringing palliative medicine to the 
awareness of the public”, there must be clear balance between expectations in an 
ideal setting and the limitations that the actual care situations create and what can 
realistically be provided by a MDT team (14,49,84).  
One factor that also comes under consideration of appropriateness is the issue of 
treating existential suffering with CDPS. It is the position of this thesis that 
existential suffering deserves the same consideration and aggressive care 
alternatives as physical suffering does. Based on clinical data forwarded by 
Schuman-Oliviere et al and Cassell and Rich presented in Chapter 1, this thesis 
maintains that reliance upon a “Cartesian mind-body dualism” or a clear 
demarcation between physical suffering and existential suffering is antiquated 
(113-118). Instead as per all the major textbooks in palliative care, this thesis 
maintains that appropriate response to suffering must be holistic and reflective of 
the view that all forms of suffering are inherently interrelated and require 
multidimensional and multiprofessional care of the person rather than be focused 
upon treating the apparent etiology of the suffering (27-30).  
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This issue, too, serves to highlight the variability of judgements of 
appropriateness across time and context. Any application of CDPS must also be 
found to be appropriate to the cultural, social, religious and legal practices of the 
society that it is practiced. These same cultural, religious and societal 
considerations have ensured that the practice of routine cessation of hydration and 
nutrition at the end of life is not adopted locally, for example. This in turn has 
aided in the acceptance of palliative measures at the end of life.  
An appropriate process and hence an appropriate intervention is one that is 
underpinned by informed, appropriately weighed, multidimensional and tempered 
review of all the salient factors, rather than one that is led by clinical 
considerations tempered by a few select ethical musings and sociocultural 
determinations. Fuchs noted that wisdom within these deliberations underlines the 
ability to appropriately balance all these factors whilst also considering and 
weighing the emotional factors that are involved such as compassion and 
empathy that may affect this balancing process on “both sides of the bedside” 
(109,118). 
 
4.9.1 Can CDPS be applied if the patient has previously  
declined such treatment? 
CDPS cannot be applied if the patient has consistently stated his objection to this 
intervention. However, if the situation that has arisen is not consistent with what 
the patient may have envisaged whilst in a competent state, the best interest 
process can be instituted to review and potentially override this position. If the 
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evaluation of the patient’s circumstances finds in favour of overriding the 
patients’ previously stated wishes, then as with all advance directives, there must 
be reasonable justification that the situation had now changed beyond what the 
patient had envisaged or that the goals that the patient had focused upon cannot 
be realized or that his secondary goals are now compromised.  
 
4.9.2 Can CDPS be applied to a patient found to be incompetent  
but who persistently declines this treatment? 
This question arises in light of the continued involvement of incompetent patients 
within the deliberative process. Chin reiterates that competence is not an all or 
nothing finding and  
“the MCA recognizes that capacity can be task-specific and is therefore 
assessed according to the ability of a person to make a decision about a 
matter at a particular time, rather than an ability to make decisions in 
general [section 4(1), MCA]” (66).  
The MCA, therefore, does recognize that there are patients that do not attain a 
level of competence to decide upon care decisions but who are able to consent on 
lesser matters and continue to participate within the deliberative process. The 
question that arises here is what ought to happen to a patient whose right to 
refusal is in doubt? This would include patients who have previously consented 
when competent but who now decline CDPS, or those who have not voiced any 
preferences when competent but now decline CDPS.   
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The response to this situation must be a complete review of the patient and the 
processes that had led up to this point either by a separate MDT where possible or 
by the original MDT, overseen by an independent palliative care specialist and/or 
a psychiatrist. After further holistic review of the patient and his personal 
situation, and after repeated efforts to both explain the reasons for this treatment 
and comprehend the patient’s reasons, his competence is reassessed. If the patient 
is deemed incompetent and if no reason can be provided for refusal of CDPS, 
then treatment ought to be carried out in his best interest. Such an approach is 
required particularly given local data that would suggest that in cases involving 
incompetent patients, healthcare professionals tended to comply with the wishes 
of the family even at the cost of overturning the wishes of the previously 
competent patient (75).  
In those situations where the patient provides reasons for declining CDPS, and 
can foresee the circumstances that they are in, then the patient should be 
reassessed by two independent psychiatrists on two separate occasions. If 
competence can be confirmed, only then should the MDT be justified in 
proceeding to the extent the patient allows.  
If, however, the patient still remains incompetent, the MDT must consider once 
again if proceeding with the treatment is justified by the BIP, informed by 
proportionality, necessity and appropriateness. This thorough and holistic review 
must continue despite any disquiet amongst the various parties. This stepwise 
review ought to be carried out considering if treatment can justifiably be applied 
against the patient’s present wishes or if it is reasonable to postpone the treatment 
further until consent can be gained. Underpinning this process of re-examining 
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the patient’s ability to provide meaningful informed consent are a review of the 
goals of care, the holistic evaluation of the case, the decision making processes, 
“force majeure” and the practical considerations related to the specific case as 
discussed in Chapters 1, 2 and 3. This process takes into account the following 
considerations: 
1. There is acceptance that there has been a change in the goals of care, and 
symptom control and the relief of suffering are the overarching objectives 
replacing any duty to cure or restore health (see section 2.5 page 127).  
2. The patient’s continued suffering are now seen as an “emergency” invoking a 
holistic review as to the appropriateness, necessity and proportionality of 
response in keeping with the patient’s BIP (see section 4.4.4 page 217, section 
4.7 page 222). 
3. Treatment is considered to alleviate suffering and not to hasten death (see 
section 4.4.4 page 217). 
4. The patient is incompetent of making a decision and all reversible causes and 
means of nullifying its effects have been exhausted (see section 4.4 page 200). 
5. The MDT, the family and other parties, taking into account the patient’s 
wishes, have reviewed the best interests of the patient holistically (see section 
4.7 page 222). 
6. This determination need “not always extend biological life for the longest 
time” and “advocates careful attention to comfort, care and pain control and 
must be better than the minimally accepted standards of care” (102).  
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7. At the crux of this argument is whether more time can be designated to 
reviewing the patient’s competence and if this will compromise the patient’s 
care. The answer to the latter part of the consideration is likely to be 
affirmative because under the aegis of the goals of care and under the present 
circumstances, the patient’s condition has been deemed to require immediate 
attention; it would be unreasonable to postpone treatment. However this must 
be balanced by the presence of an equally compelling rationale to delay 
treatment (see section 3.7.4 page 184). This wider review must also consider 
that despite the best efforts of the MDT to reverse the patient’s limitations to 
consent, the patient remains incapable of consenting and furthermore, a 
second competence evaluation carried out by at least two experienced 
psychiatrists on at least two separate occasions, each coinciding with the 
moments of the day when the patient was likely to be most alert and capable 
of consent, has also failed, thus reiterating the fact that further3delay can no 
longer be justified (see Fig 4.4 page 237). 
There may be those that would suggest a trial of intermittent sedation followed by 
a reassessment both of the patient’s wishes and competence. However, such a 
measure must been tried and found wanting before CDPS was considered. It is 
submitted that an application intermittent sedation would represent an injudicious 
delay in application of treatment as would allowing an incompetent patient to 
overrule a decision that they were deemed incapable of making. 
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In this chapter I have argued that faith in the process of informed consent 
amongst patients being provided with CDPS is misplaced in most cases. Through 
the careful deconstruction of the consent process to highlight the impact of the 
various factors within the consent process, I have highlighted the impracticalities 
of continued reliance upon the consent process as it presently stands. Application 
to surrogate or proxy decision-making processes are equally fraught with lack of 
congruence between the views of the surrogate and those of the patient.  
In its place, I have argued that in most cases where patients will be incompetent 
to consent to CDPS applications, the Principle of Necessity and the BIP can be 
employed to appraise the need for the use of CDPS as a treatment option of last 
resort for the relief of suffering, shepherded by the maxims of appropriateness 
and proportionality. 
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THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
The Principle of Proportionality is a central maxim within the practice of 
continuous deep palliative sedation (CDPS), particularly given its role in 
tampering and guiding the application of this intervention when treatment is 
applied without consent (1,2). Fundamental to its place is the wish to ensure that 
any clinical response proposed is commensurate with the multidimensional 
appraisal of the conditions of the case.  
Underpinning this are two primary considerations. The first is the belief that there 
is a direct relationship between the doses of drugs applied in employing CDPS 
and the risk of hastening death; an increase in dose is taken to be associated with 
an increased potential for hastening death. The second is that the induction of 
unconsciousness is an all or nothing process that once attained will negate any 
awareness of suffering.  
However, these interpretations of proportionality of practice have been called into 
question in light of new clinical evidence (4-6). In particular, this data casts 
doubts upon the apparent homogeneity in the effects of unconsciousness in 
negating the awareness of suffering (4-6). The data, I shall argue, calls for a 
fundamental change in the manner that proportionality is viewed within the 
practice of CDPS. In order to proceed I will review the prevailing understanding 
of the Principle of Proportionality as articulated by Quill et al given its pivotal 
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position within prevailing clinical guidelines on palliative sedation (PS) and 
terminal sedation (TS) (1,2,7).  
 
5.2 CONSIDERING QUILL’S CONCEPTION OF THE PRINCIPLE 
OF PROPORTIONALITY  
Quill’s concept of proportionality continues to influence end-of-life practice in 
the United States of America and Europe and although I have previously touched 
upon Quill et al’s conception of the Principle of Proportionality in Chapter 2, I 
will examine its impact upon the practice of sedation at the end of life here in 
greater depth (1,2,8,9).  
Quill presents an account of the Principle of Proportionality in a 1997 essay 
entitled “Palliative Options of Last Resort”, co-authored with Bernard Lo and 
Dan Brock and published in the Health Law and Ethics section of the Journal of 
the American Medical Association (JAMA) (7). In it, Quill, Lo and Brock review 
the ethical and clinical acceptability of physician assisted suicide (PAS), 
voluntary active euthanasia (VAE), voluntary stopping eating and drinking 
(VSED) and terminal sedation (TS) “in the face of ethical and legal controversy” 
that surrounds these interventions of last resort (7). Considered within this essay 
are the doctrine of double effect, patient voluntariness, proportionality between 
risks and benefits and the physician’s potential conflict of duties (7).  
Of interest here is the manner that these authors view proportionality (7). The 
authors propose a rather novel means of viewing proportionality within these 
specific confines. The authors begin by extracting the Principle of Proportionality 
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from the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) and casting it in a central and 
independent role that displaces the DDE. They state that, “[a]lthough 
proportionality is an important element of the doctrine of double effect, 
proportionality can be applied independently of this doctrine” (7). 
Quill and co-authors Brock and Lo then go on to explicate their interpretation by 
stating that 
“[t]he concept of proportionality requires that the risk of causing harm 
must bear a direct relationship to the danger and immediacy of the 
patient's clinical situation and the expected benefit of the intervention. The 
greater the patient's suffering, the greater risk the physician can take of 
potentially contributing to the patient's death, so long as the patient 
understands and accepts that risk” (7). 
Thus, according to the authors, the risks of applying opioids or sedatives to a 
terminally ill patient replete with the possibility of hastening death must be 
commensurate with the perceived benefits that such an intervention will bring to 
the patient’s condition. Underpinning this determination is a holistic appraisal of 
the exigencies of the situation and the urgency to act to alleviate this threat.  
A pathological fracture of the femur for instance can be a very painful experience 
and one that would generally be regarded as an emergency situation. Thus, if 
there were two identical terminally ill patients with pathological fractures of their 
femur, both these patients would as a rule be expected to require immediate 
analgesia. However, the manner that these cases are responded to is also 
determined by a particularized review of the situation. For instance, what if the 
second patient has an indwelling epidural in situ that prevents his appreciation of 
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the pain of this fracture whilst the first patient doesn’t? In the first case, 
immediate response is required as the patient is found to be in distress whilst in 
the second case the response may be more measured and subject to reviews of his 
overall condition and symptoms.  
Whilst in both cases the goals of care may have been the maximizing of comfort, 
in the second case provision of analgesia in anticipation of pain replete with its 
potential ill effects would not be seen as being proportional. On the other hand in 
the case of the first patient, analgesic associated risks are warranted given the 
patient’s distress.  
Similarly, any appraisal of proportionality of response must also consider that the 
means employed represent the safest and most efficacious options available for 
the specific situation.  
It would seem from the example above that Quill, Lo and Brock’s conception of 
the Principle of Proportionality pivots upon four prime determinants. These 
include the voluntariness of the patient to participate in the treatment and the 
necessity of the situation where the risks of the procedure must be commensurate 
with the gravity of the clinical situation. Additionally the procedure itself must 
also be in keeping with a holistic appraisal of the situation and be governed by the 
overall goals of care. This conception of proportionality is depicted in Figure 5.1. 
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Figure 5.1 Quill, Lo and Brock’s conception of proportionality 
In truth, whilst attributed to these three authors, the Principle Of Proportionality 
as it stands owes much to Quill’s earlier work, honed over many years 
(7,8,10,11). Underpinning this repositioning of the Principle of Proportionality is 
Quill’s rejection of the viability of the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) within 
the end-of-life setting (7,8,10). Quill together with Lo and Brock describe the 
DDE as an almost ubiquitous framework applied as a means of  
“distinguishing between the effects that a person intends (both the ends 
sought and the means taken to the end) and consequences that are foreseen 
but unintended. As long as the physician’s intentions are good, it is 
permissible to perform actions with foreseeable consequences that it 
would be wrong to intend” (7). 
The authors report that the DDE, tasked with determining the “moral 
acceptability” of an action if “death comes unintentionally as the consequence of 
an otherwise well intentioned intervention, even if foreseen with a high 










sought by its invocation (7). The authors state that whilst it is often argued that 
TS differs from VAE and PAS solely in respect of the intentions behind them, 
Quill, Lo and Brock argue that in reality the intentions that underpin these 
applications are complicated (7). This is especially so when routine cessation of 
artificial hydration and nutrition within the practice of TS is believed to “make 
death certain” (7). Quill and co-author Kimsma echo this point, believing that 
“withholding fluids and nutrition is not needed to relieve pain, but is typically 
taken to hasten the patient's wished-for death” (7,11). In this instance, the 
apparent inability of the DDE to adequately delineate the acceptability of this 
apparently controversial element and safeguard practices such as TS against 
abuse is seen as a fatal flaw (7).  
Quill and his co-authors also set about dismantling the DDE at its roots. Quill and 
Kimsma argue that the DDE is “derived from Catholic tradition, and relies on a 
rigid distinction between consequences that are intended and those that are 
unintended” and is a “religious concept that is inadequate to cover complex end 
of life decisions” (11).  
Quill and co-authors Dresser and Brock echo this sentiment stating that neither 
the application of the DDE nor the belief that “death should never be intentionally 
hastened when unrelievable suffering is extreme and death is desired by the 
patient” is universally acceptable to all groups (12). Similarly, Quill and Kimsma 
declare that the DDE, “obfuscated by abstract and imprecise terminology” and 
reliant upon explication of intentions, makes elucidation of the moral and legal 
permissibility of an intervention difficult (8,11) 
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Furthermore, the DDE’s dependence upon the discernment of intention as a 
means of circumventing “moral culpability is felt to be psychologically and 
morally problematic” (11). Quill and Kimsma state that the  
“notion that a clearly foreseen consequence that is not intended could be 
free of moral culpability is felt to be psychologically and morally 
problematic. The physician's potential, active, conscious role easing death 
in the face of unbearable suffering is not morally rejected out of hand” 
(11). 
Quill, Dresser and Brock add that  
“people are held responsible for all reasonably foreseeable consequences 
of their actions, not just the intended consequences. Physicians are not 
exempt from this expectation. This understanding of moral responsibility 
encourages people to exercise due care in their actions and holds them 
responsible for that which is under their control” (12).  
Quill highlights the difficulties of discerning intentions by reviewing his own 
intentions in aiding in the suicide of Diane (13). Although exonerated for 
manslaughter by the grand jury, Quill concluded that his own intentions in this 
case were “complex, ambiguous and often contradictory” (13). As a result Quill 
concludes that continued reliance on elucidating intention to clarify justifiability 
of actions is untenable particularly when the deliberative and administrative 
process behind the application of TS involves many parties (10,11,13). Similarly, 
Quill believes that this process may also be ultimately harmful to patient care as 
he states 
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“[i]f we do not acknowledge the inescapable multiplicity of intentions in 
most double effect situations, physicians may retreat from aggressive 
palliative treatment out of fear of crossing the alleged bright line between 
allowing patients to die and causing their deaths” (13). 
In an editorial for the Journal of Palliative Medicine in 1998, Quill also 
introduces the notion that the focus of attention of the DDE is in fact misguided 
and that there were more important issues to consider (15). As a result Quill states 
that the DDE  
“is not absolutely necessary, however, to respond to these challenging 
clinical problems, and is less fundamental than the following domains: 
1. Is the patient's suffering proportionately severe to warrant the risks of 
the intervention?  
2. Has the patient been fully informed about all likely outcomes of the 
intervention, both intended and foreseen, and is he or she aware of all 
reasonable alternatives? (If the patient is not capable of consent, then 
the family or surrogate decision maker must consent on the patient's 
behalf using the principle of substituted judgment.)  
3. Is the intervention the least harmful one available, given the patient's 
clinical circumstances and personal values?” (15) 
These pivotal domains then introduce what Quill and Kimsma consider to be 
more appropriate for the task at hand (11).  
Quill then turns his attention to the concept of the Dutch “secular, legal concept 
of force majeure” (11). Quill characterizes the “force majeure” by the presence of 
unrelievable suffering in a terminally ill, imminently dying patient, which in turn 
dictates a need for “extraordinary” responses to the threat of continued suffering 
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(11). The presence of these “situations of necessity” is felt to better aid in the 
discernment of the legitimacy of any application of palliative sedation (PS) 
(10,14). It also serves as a precursor for the Principle of Proportionality (15). 
 
Figure 5.2 Quill’s conception of proportionality 
The Principle of Proportionality as Quill conceives it is thus subject to a number 
of factors (Fig 5.2) (7,8,16-24). Prime amongst these are the overarching goals of 
care that drive the determination, the specific contextual aspects of the particular 
case, the voluntariness of the patient in the undertaking and the necessity of the 
situation (7,8,16-24). These four points are supplemented by three further facets 
to consider. These include balancing the case specific definition of “good” and 
“bad” outcomes, the temporal elements related to this determination and the 

























Balancing the “good” and the “bad” effects of a specific case is complex. The 
“good” effect that an application of CDPS aspires to achieve is the relief of 
suffering (24). The “bad” effects, on the other hand, are the undesirable but 
foreseen side effects of death and respiratory depression (24). Quill holds that it is 
these fatal side effects that attention must remain focused upon, given that to 
focus upon the perpetuation of suffering as the “bad” outcome would invite 
controversy (24). This is because it leaves the door open to potential abuse. If the 
“bad” outcome is focused upon the prevention of further suffering, it may leave it 
possible for some HCPs to opt to dispense with proportional and monitored care 
and apply large unmonitored doses of sedatives and/or opioids to meet these 
objectives. Such actions would not be supported by either medical guidelines or 
prevailing legal statutes (7,23,25). As a result, maintaining that the “bad” 
outcome of any intervention remains death creates safeguards that protect this 
“small percentage of dying patients [who] will still experience suffering that can 
become intolerable and unacceptable” (8,16,17,24,26).  
The ensuing safeguards set out to balance “flexibility and accountability as well 
as privacy and oversight” require that the following are carried out 
“•  standard palliative care alternatives [have been] tried and found 
ineffective or unacceptable 
•  rigorous informed consent [gathered] (only the patient him- or herself 
could consent to PAD (physician assisted death) or voluntarily stopping 
eating and drinking; family members could potentially consent using 
substituted judgment for the other options) 
•  diagnostic and prognostic clarity [is established] 
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•  independent second opinion by someone with expertise in palliative 
care [is sought]  
•  and documentation and review [is present]” (24). 
A further proviso that Quill et al add later is the requirement to discern that the 
“patient’s suffering was proportionately severe enough to warrant taking the risk” 
(20). 
Additionally Quill adds that the treatment itself must be “proportionate to the 
severity of the symptom” as well as commensurate with a multidimensional 
evaluation of the situation (7,24). 
Aside from safeguards that stem from balancing the “good” outcomes with the 
“bad”, a further facet of proportionality is timeliness (21). Attention revolves 
around hasty applications and injudicious delays in employing TS (8). Temporal 
considerations in treatment application are a key part in determinations of 
proportionality (21). Hasty, poorly considered responses are taken by Quill et al 
to reflect a lack of holistic appreciation of the situation and raises concerns about 
the consent process (23). Quill highlights the importance of a holistic appreciation 
of the situation and argues that a hasty application of sedation at the end of life 
would suggest  
“1) a lack of familiarity with appropriate measures to relieve suffering, 2) 
pressures for cost containment, or 3) the strain on health care providers or 
families of providing complex and emotionally demanding forms of 
terminal care” (23). 
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Similarly a poorly deliberated application of this intervention of last resort will 
also raise questions as to the “voluntariness” of this process, underpinning the 
importance of consent within Quill’s framework (23).  
Quill and colleagues also stress that the proportionality of a response to suffering 
must be flexible and move beyond the perceived confines of organizational 
constraints (18). This translates to the understanding that a physician must not 
only consider treatment options that have not been tried at this juncture of an 
illness but also more aggressive treatment options that may have been discounted 
at an earlier juncture. For instance, radiotherapy that may have been dismissed at 
the earlier juncture may now be reconsidered. Care provisions should also not be 
restricted due to the placement of the patient. If the patient is willing and transfer 
is possible, transfer to alternate facilities where further treatment options can be 
explored ought to be undertaken. Therefore, if it is feasible, patients cared for at a 
hospice or even at home ought not to be prevented from considering treatment 
options or second opinions that may be readily available in a specialist centre for 
instance, if transfer is possible.  
 
5.3 CRITIQUE OF QUILL’S POSITION 
Whilst Quill’s conception of proportionality may appear balanced, in truth it 
seems to be underpinned by a wish to ensconce PAS and VAE within the 
armamentarium of valid palliative care options of last resort (22,27). Quill would 
appear to see the options of PAS and/or euthanasia as valid options of care “when 
suffering becomes intolerable in spite of excellent palliative care” (22,27). This 
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position seems to hark back to Quill’s actions in assisting in the death of Diane, a 
patient with acute myelomonocytic leukemia, through the supply of large doses of 
barbiturates that she later self-administered (28). In his 1991 article in the New 
England Journal of Medicine’s Sounding Board section entitled “Death and 
Dignity, a case of individualized decision-making” Quill sets out the rationale for 
his actions as a “proportional response” to the threat of “increasing discomfort, 
dependence and hard choices” (28).  
The rationale for Quill’s efforts at relegating the DDE from its pivotal position 
appears clearer. The Principle of Proportionality would appear to be a means of 
legitimizing the application of VAE and PAS and circumventing the opposition 
that the DDE would have provided.  
The evidence for these associations seems to be compelling. The Principle of 
Proportionality is constructed upon the same principles that underlie those used as 
a framework for the “Proposed Clinical Criteria for Physician Assisted Suicide” 
set out in 1992 by Quill together with Cassell and Meier, the safeguards for the 
application VAE and PAS set out with Lo and Brock in 1997, and finally, the 
framework presented in the article entitled “Physicians Should ‘Assist in Suicide’ 
When It Is Appropriate” in 2012 (7,24,29). Within this framework, PAS and VAE 
are portrayed as legitimate treatments of last resort (22,27). There are three main 
reasons employed to validate this position. They are the failure of palliative care, 




Figure 5.3 Quill’s application of proportionality to justify VAE and PAS 
On the issue of the failings of palliative care, Quill states that  
“[i]t is only when suffering becomes intolerable in spite of excellent 
palliative care that the possibility of physician-assisted death should be 
seriously considered” (22,27).  
This would include situations  
“when a patient is bleeding uncontrollably from an eroding lesion or a 
refractory coagulation disorder, cannot swallow secretions because of 
widespread oropharyngeal cancer, or has refractory diarrhea from the 
acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS)” (7). 
Similarly, Quill with Lo and Brock argue that such failings also occur when 
limitations are set upon the patient’s rights and choices (7). For example TS is 
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said to limit the patient’s choice of a place of care at the end of life and this 
obviates a measure of control that a patient ought to possess in determining their 
care and how they are remembered (7). This sense of control serves not only to 
introduce the second reason for Quill’s position on PAS and VAE but also to 
show that these three reasons are in fact closely interrelated (7).  
The issue of control is a significant consideration in the minds of Quill, Lo and 
Brock (10). The authors are clear that patients should have a measure of self-
determination not only about their place of care but the manner and timing of 
their demise (7). For these authors, this sense of control ought to involve the right 
to decline treatments that would “needlessly prolong the dying phase” (7). Quill 
argues further that such a position is valid as there is a shift in the goals of care 
from one focused on restoration to one aimed at “allow[ing] hopelessly ill persons 
to die with as much comfort, control and dignity as possible” (29). For Quill and 
co-author, Kimsma, the Dutch ruling that maintained, “no physician should be 
expected to continue to prolong life to the bitter end” provided legal validation to 
this position (11). 
Quill’s third point is by far the most controversial and revolves around Quill’s 
view of the physician’s duty to patient and family (28). Quill argues that in 
response to the threat of “increasing discomfort, dependence and hard choices”, 
the physician must abide by his duty to care for the patient (28). This duty, it 
would appear, outweighs concerns of local legislative prohibitions (28). Quill 
believes that a “physician's moral obligation to his patient as a caregiver 
outweighs his duty to obey the law as a citizen” (28). This position is 
underpinned by the duty of non-abandonment, which Quill sees as a “physician’s 
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obligation to his or her patient and family to see the dying process through and to 
be as responsive as possible[, and this obligation] outweigh[s] other obligations 
and restrictions in these troubling circumstances” (30). 
Quill further justifies this stance by stressing the duty of the physician to respect 
the choice of the patient and states that  
“those who give considerable weight to patients’ rights to determine their 
own care believe that the patient’s informed consent to an action that may 
cause death is more fundamental than whether the physician intends to 
hasten death. From this perspective, the crucial moral considerations in 
evaluating any act that could cause death are the patient’s right to self-
determination and bodily integrity, the provision of informed consent, the 
absence of less harmful alternatives, and the severity of the patient’s 
suffering” (12).  
For Quill, it would appear that this immutable right trumps all other obligations 
and duties.  
Quill also invokes the right to “compassionate care” within the holistic review of 
a case (25,31). He describes the remit of compassionate care as extending to all 
patients who are “suffering intolerably, feeling humiliated, and disintegrating 
with no escape other than death, given current prohibitions” (25). Quill appeals to 
the “covenant” between the patient and the physician that requires of a physician 
“to care about, advocate for and ultimately not desert such patients” (28,32). Quill 
states that  
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“if a patient’s pain and suffering cannot be sufficiently relieved with state-
of-the-art palliative care, then the physician has an obligation to do 
everything within his or her power to relieve that suffering, even to the 
point of hastening death if there are no realistic alternatives acceptable to 
the patient” (30). 
These three interrelated factors are not the only concerns with respect to Quill’s 
Principle of Proportionality. Briefly, other concerns include a failure to fully 
encapsulate the palliative care ethos and care approach into this work process. 
Here, I am not concerned with the intentions behind Quill’s use of the Principle 
of Proportionality as its application in the CDPS framework is clear; I am only 
concerned with the issue of the application of the Principle of Proportionality to 
the MDT setting. Quill does not consider the fact that palliative care adopts a 
MDT based review to end-of-life appraisals and deliberative processes but 
continues instead to practice a single-handed physician-led practice. This 
omission also affects the manner that appraisals of the “good” and “bad” effects 
of the case are made. There is no holistic multi-professional review of the 
patient’s situation and determinations of care appear led entirely by clinical 
determinations and concerns for the “rights” of the patient. This does not entirely 
capture modern end-of-life palliative care practice where a multitude of other 
considerations play a role. 
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5.4 THE POSITION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY 
IN THE CDPS FRAMEWORK 
Given the concerns raised, it would seem logical to question the rationale for 
persisting with the Principle of Proportionality within the CDPS framework. To 
be clear, this thesis maintains that when applied within appropriate legal, clinical, 
professional, social and cultural boundaries and under the aegis of a palliative 
care approach, the Principle of Proportionality still remains a better alternative to 
the DDE as a means of legitimizing the practice of CDPS. Like Quill et al, 
McIntyre maintains that it is the Principle of Proportionality that represents the 
defining facet of the DDE, enhancing its position within the deliberations of 
physicians faced with difficult end of life determinations (7,8,23,24,33). There 
are also a number of other considerations that further impede routine application 
of the DDE in this setting. These concerns are taken up in the next section.  
 
5.4.1 Concerns with regards to the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) 
Concerns with regards to the DDE can be categorized into two groups: ethical 
and practical concerns. Aside from placing emphasis on the unrealistic 
elucidation of intentions within the multidimensional, multi-professional setting 
adopted here and the evolving conditions of the clinical situation, ethical concerns 
surrounding the DDE also include presupposing that balancing of the good and 
bad outcomes have appropriately been met and are in keeping with accepted 
clinical guidelines, social expectations and legal requirements, as well as the 
MDT’s holistic determination of the patient’s best interests; in fact there is no 
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stipulation for such requirements (33-35). This latter concern not only revolves 
around fears that such determinations remain largely clinically driven and 
arbitrated upon by a solitary clinician, but also that such determinations are 
susceptible to being inappropriately influenced by specific social, familial and 
cultural influences (33-35). This failure to engender a holistic appreciation of the 
situation also extends to concerns that the DDE still labours upon the assumption 
that it is death that is summum malum, a position that Quill and Kimsma suggest 
is not uniformly accepted by all parties irrespective of their religious beliefs (11). 
Underpinning this concern is the fact that the DDE is a religious framework that 
is built upon protecting the sanctity of life which Quill et al suggest is ill 
equipped to confront the complexities of end of life care determinations (11).  
The presence of a MDT approach to care further complicates matters with little 
evidence to validate the assumption that the individuals appraising the 
acceptability of the situation are neutral and have consistent and discernible 
intentions. These assumptions not only neglect the impact of professionalism 
upon the actions of health care providers but their legal and professional duties to 
protect the patient’s best interests in the face of evolving holistic case-specific 
considerations particularly when Quill argues that intentions within end of life 
decision-making can be “complex, ambiguous and often arbitrary” (13).  
A further ethical consideration brought to light by Quill et al is the suggestion that 
the DDE promotes the idea that its invocation “absolves” health care 
professionals of responsibility for their actions and the consequences of their 
actions particularly when some actions are based upon inaccurate information 
such as the suggestion that CDPS necessarily hastens death (33,34).  
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Practical considerations include the failure to encapsulate the requirement for 
holistic reviews in balancing the “good” outcomes and the potential “bad” 
consequences and the provision of guidance on how to balance the sometimes 
competing considerations particularly in light of evolving goals of care (33,34). 
Practical concerns with regards to the DDE also include worries as to whether 
there is appropriate elucidation of intentions of all the various parties involved 
and if these considerations extend beyond simply the acts of the various parties 
but also their unsuccessful acts both in this case and in the past (33). This is 
particularly salient where under the aegis of a palliative care, it is a 
multiprofessional MDT-led approach that aids in appraising, deliberating and 
overseeing care.  
Together these concerns emphasize the position apportioned to the Principle of 
Proportionality within the practice of CDPS which sets out to ensure that all care 
within this specific setting is in keeping with the prevailing laws of the land, 
clinical guidelines and institutionally sanctioned minimum standards of care and 
affirms that whatever the wishes of the patient and the determinations of the 
physician may be, their actions are still subject to prevailing regulations (33). The 
various duties that Quill invokes cannot supplant legal and professional standards 
(21). Furthermore, it is the requirement of this framework that all treatments 
applied must also be in keeping with the prevailing sociocultural beliefs and 
values of the society. Taken together with the legal and clinical limitations, this 
proviso ensures that VAE and PAS cannot be adopted as treatments of last resort 
so long as they are not sanctioned by the regnant social, cultural, professional and 
legal standards of the specific society. These same conditions also affect the 
potential application of CDPS for the treatment of existential suffering. 
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Procedural compliance with established guidelines and work processes is also an 
important factor in proportionality determinations. 
However, whilst these adaptations go some way to allaying the fears of 
misapplications of the Principle of Proportionality, it must now contend with a 
new problem. This new concern relates to the manner that a proportional dose 
response is viewed. 
 
5.4.2 Reconsidering proportionality in the face of new data 
The application of sedatives and other pharmacological interventions in CDPS is 
based on the belief that pain and suffering are “consciousness dependent 
phenomen[a]” (36,37). The argument follows that an induction of 
unconsciousness will circumnavigate a patient’s perception of prevailing noxious 
experiences (36,37). Determining the success of this intervention ought to be the 
safe relief of the patient’s suffering. Safety and success of this process is 
monitored by observational parameters that assess the patient’s depth of sedation 
and its consistency, and that monitor safety and efficacy of these interventions in 
tandem with the conservative employment of opioids and/or sedatives within 
CDPS applications (1,2).  
In reality little observations are made of sedation levels, given the belief that 
unconsciousness is an all or nothing phenomena and one that once attained will 
remain constant. As a result most of the attention in monitoring patients are 
focused upon ensuring that the primary side effects of CDPS do not occur and life 
is not threatened. Clinical observations, therefore, focus upon monitoring physical 
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parameters of distress such as random movements of body extremities, facial 
frowning/grimacing, asynchronous breathing patterns, as well as clinical 
parameters looking out for increases in blood pressure, heart rate and respiratory 
rate will ensure that the primary objective of inducing safe sedation are met 
whilst also safeguarding against any signs of unwanted side effects of 
cardiorespiratory compromise (7,38,39). These observations are sometimes 
complemented with sedation scores, which help to monitor the depth of sedation, 
and oxygen monitoring to provide additional warning of any impending danger of 
respiratory depression (40). The “stability” of these parameters during the 
monitoring process of an individual case is seen to reassure healthcare 
professionals (HCPs) that an adequate level of unconsciousness is attained 
without compromise to the patient’s safety (39,41).  
This focus on safety is underpinned the need to prevent the risk of hastening of 
death, the “bad” outcome to be guarded against in a care intervention. 
Furthermore, given the realities of end-of-life care, it is the only element that is 
truly within the control of the HCP. Based on the belief that the patient is safely 
sedated and thus unaware of their suffering it is then left to the HCP to ensure the 
safety of this process through close monitoring of the patient for any signs of side 
effects. This process of surveillance is supplemented by minimizing the doses of 
“aggressive pharmacological measures” in order to reduce the potential for ill 
effects (24,42). This practice draws upon the dictum that “the level of sedation 
should be the lowest necessary to provide adequate relief of suffering” set out by 
the EAPC guidelines, and the KNMG guidelines that call “for level of 
unconsciousness depends on causeconsciousness to be lowered to the extent that 
is necessary and sufficient to relieve symptoms in the degree desired” (1,2). In 
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reality, as Cherny, the main author of the EAPC guidelines points out, this 
practice translates to the application of the lowest possible doses of medications 
(1,43). 
Underpinning this practice, in turn, is the assumption that the lower the dose 
applied, the less likely the possibility of side effects are (7,24,42,43). Thus doses 
of sedation and/or opioids are applied only so far as to be “sufficient to relieve 
symptoms in the degree desired” (2,38,43). Clinically this has translated to the 
application of just sufficient medication to induce sedation to unconsciousness, 
which is then maintained on the premise that this level of sedation will meet the 
requirements of negating the patient’s awareness of suffering.  
The practice of proportional sedation advocated by the KNMG and the EAPC 
guidelines are based on a number of assumptions. These include the premise that 
1. unconsciousness is an all or nothing phenomena  
2. once induced unconsciousness will negate a patient’s awareness of pain and 
suffering 
3. inducing unconsciousness is a treatment with potential life-abbreviating 
characteristics that can be reduced by lowering the dose of sedative used 
4. to reduce these risks further, close monitoring of the clinical parameters and 
the physical parameters of distress of a patient’s condition will warn HCPs of 
potential side effects (37,44-71).  
All four of these assumptions are now under increasing threat in light of new data 
on consciousness and I will consider each of these issues in due course. 
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5.4.2.1 Unconsciousness is an all or nothing state  
 “Unconsciousness does not always consist of a general suppression of the 
entire activity of the central nervous system. Depending on the actual 
cause(s), many functions, such as protective reflexes and various 
cognitive processes, can remain intact” (51).  
This statement by Flohr, validated by a number of studies, dismisses the first 
assumption behind the practice of proportional sedation (51).  
Importantly, Flohr now shifts attention to the implication of this finding (51). 
According to Flohr, not only is unconsciousness not homogenous but, depending 
on the causes underpinning it, various brain functions are preserved (51). This 
raises issues about the levels of unconsciousness that are attained in 
pharmacological inductions of unconsciousness and more importantly the exact 
effects that these various levels of unconsciousness have upon a patient’s 














































Alert and awake Beta 100 ✔     ✔ 
Light/ moderate 
sedation 
Alpha 80      ✔ 
Deep sedation Alpha/
Thetha 
70  ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔ 
General 
anaesthesia  
Thetha 60      ✔ 
Deep hypnotic Delta <40   ✔   ✔ 
Table 5.1 Levels of sedation in various states of consciousness and health 
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Table 5.1 highlights the various levels of sedation documented in different health 
states (52-58).  
A further concern is the potential for variations between the different levels of 
sedation and the significance of this. Kulkarni et al for example revealed that 
persistent vegetative state (PVS) patients exhibited significant alterations between 
various levels of sedation (58). Translated to the CDPS setting where 
unconsciousness is drug induced, further concerns arise due to the variability of 
drug metabolism that will lead to changes in plasma levels of the drug, which in 
turn affect the ability of the drugs to maintain a constant level of unconsciousness 
(54,55). To highlight this point, I will focus on the effects of midazolam in 
attaining an adequate level of unconsciousness.  
Spina and Ensom comment that “high intersubject variability in midazolam 
plasma concentrations makes it difficult to correlate a targeted plasma level with 
a particular degree of sedation” (61). Compounding this is also the fact that mood 
disorders, age, concomitant disease and drug treatment, adiposity and 
hypoalbuminemia, all affect the pharmacokinetics of midazolam and thus its 
‘desired effects (62,63). Unsurprisingly the efficacy of midazolam in inducing 
sedation to unconsciousness is under scrutiny both in its ability to induce an 
adequate level of sedation and in its ability to maintain it.  
I will address the matter of the levels of sedation first. To my knowledge there 
have been no studies using sophisticated means such as PET scans and fMRI 
studies that formally appraise the levels of sedation of patients who receive 
sedation at the end of life. However, there are a handful of studies that infer the 
efficacy of this intervention (49,52,60). There appears to be some data that 
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suggests that midazolam does reduce cortical and thalamic activity, the seat of 
consciousness, albeit not to a significant level that would fully stifle neuronal 
activity at these sites and thus induce the levels of sedation desired (5,6). The 
suggestion here is that midazolam cannot induce a state of pharmacological coma 
where there is no awareness of suffering but does appear to sedate patients to a 
level of “deep sedation” where there may be some awareness of suffering (53,64) 
(Table 5.1). This raises questions regarding the applicability of midazolam as the 
primary drug in the application of CDPS. The practice of CDPS as a whole is also 
under a cloud given that both Ogilvie et al and Koelsch et al suggest that 
propofol, the alternative to midazolam in CDPS, when applied either on its own 
or in combination with midazolam fares little better in inducing deeper levels of 
sedation (55,65). The implications of these findings are that there are patients in 
suboptimal states of lowered consciousness insufficient to fully relieve awareness 
of their suffering (53).  
Barbato identifies a further complication to this treatment – fluctuations in the 
levels of sedation using Bispectral Index (BIS) monitoring (53). Indeed, in his 
study of sedated dying patients, he found  
“[f]requent fluctuations in BIS were noted in most subjects throughout the 
period of monitoring. These periods of increased awareness were found to 
occur both in association with pain and in the absence of pain” (57).  
This in effect renders sedated patients prone to periods of awareness or 
“breakthrough consciousness” (5,6,36,37,52-58). Here these periods of 
“breakthrough consciousness” may result in full awareness or even states of 
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subtherapeutic levels of unconsciousness where there may be some level of 
wakefulness (53).  
Given the range of BIS fluctuations that have been observed, I propose a simple 
means of identifying levels of sedation that will better crystallize the arguments 
forwarded here (Fig 5.4). Given the fluctuations in levels of BIS scores and EEG 
waveforms observed in patients in light and deep sedation, the primary category 
of sedation is classified as MCS-like (minimally conscious state) level of 
sedation, reminiscent of the range of fluctuations in BIS witnessed in MCS 
patients (53). Importantly, similar levels of sedation are seen in Barbato’s study 
of sedated dying patients (53). Given the fluctuations in BIS seen in PVS patients, 
the PVS-like level of sedation encapsulates the fluctuations in BIS scores 
between the deep hypnotic level, general anaesthetic levels and coma levels of 
sedation (Fig 5.4 and Table 5.1) (53).  
 
Figure 5.4 Levels of sedation 
To be clear here, I am not suggesting that a vegetative or minimally conscious 
state is created but simply that variability in consciousness creates levels of 
reduced consciousness that fluctuate in the same manner as seen in PVS and 
MCS (59). Importantly, too, there is still overlap between those in the deeper ends 
of MCS-like levels of sedation and those in the more superficial PVS-like levels 
• Fully alert and conscious!
• MCS-like level of sedation!
• PVS-like level of sedation!
• COMA!
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of sedation around the range of deep sedation BIS scores (Table 5.1 and Fig 5.4). 
This scale will be better able to confront fluctuating consciousness observed in a 
pharmacologically induced state of unconsciousness (61,62).  
 
5.4.2.2 Once induced, unconsciousness will negate a patient’s  
awareness of pain and suffering 
The presence of evidence of variations in the state of unconsciousness refutes the 
second assumption that underpins the application of proportional sedation. 
Clearly with such fluctuations in levels of sedation, perception of pain and 
suffering are likely (66). Sheen and Oates reveal that patients who undergo 
“medically induced unconsciousness” for mechanical ventilation in intensive care 
settings reported being aware of existing in a state of “utter helplessness” (66). 
The authors reveal that sedated patients reported being aware of “pain, a loss of 
control, a sense of threat to personal safety, depersonalization and a sense of 
loneliness” (66). This reaffirms the suspicions of fluctuations in the efficacy of 
treatments and highlights two more worrying features. The first is that such 
fluctuations can occur even in a closely monitored environment and that it occurs 
unrecognized by the HCPs monitoring them (66). 
Similar occurrences can be anticipated amongst patients undergoing CDPS. 
Morita et al’s report that about 49% of patients undergoing TS/PS re-emerge from 
their sedated states and 7.1% of patients were still communicative four hours after 
sedation was applied (60). Additionally, Morita et al’s data of 102 sedated 
patients revealed that the overall efficacy of PS was 83% (60,67,68). In Morita et 
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al’s study more than 63% of cases were induced with midazolam alone and a 
further 17% of cases had phenobarbital and midazolam (60).  
In their review of the practice of PS, Claessens et al reporting on Menten et al’s 
and Chater et al’s respective studies reveal the efficacy of this process to be about 
92–94% (69,70). In Menten et al’s study, midazolam was used exclusively whist 
in Chater et al’s midazolam was used as the primary drug of choice in most cases 
(70,71). Caraceni et al reveal an efficacy rate of about 83% where midazolam was 
the primary sedative in 46% of cases in his study sample (72).  
A potential compounding factor to this consideration is the issue of tolerance to 
the effects of midazolam. De Graeff and Dean report that tolerance to midazolam 
and thus increasing inefficacy in inducing sedation was most likely amongst 
young patients who have had prolonged exposure to midazolam or other drugs in 
its class (67,73). Variability in the efficacy of midazolam is further complicated 
by the effects of the underlying disease or its sequelae on the patient’s renal and 
liver function and plasma protein and albumin levels as well as a result of 
interactions with other medications that may be applied (61,62,67,73).  
Given the variability of drug efficacies, the questions that re-emerge are how 
deep a level of unconsciousness will midazolam induce and will it be sufficient to 
meet the requirements of CDPS? The suspicions based on research from Spina et 
al and Roberts et al respectively is that the best that may be hoped for from an 
infusion of midazolam is a level akin to MCS-like level of sedation (61,62). 
Concern then focuses on the fact that Laureys et al and Schneckers et al report 
that patients in a minimally conscious state do still perceive pain, there is a 
suggestion that midazolam-sedated patients may also be still aware of their 
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suffering (36,37,52). This raises questions about how better care may be 
provided. It is entirely possible, though, that closer to death, drug accumulation 
may result in a more sustained level of unconsciousness and even a PVS-like 
level of sedation. However, reliance upon these unpredictable changes is 
unsatisfactory. Instead, for those with a little longer to live where such 
accumulation may not be so pronounced, could reliance upon midazolam’s 
anxiolytic and amnesic effects be sufficient to “paper over the cracks”? (61,62). 
The suggestion here is that the amnesic effects of midazolam be utilized to 
prevent the patient from recalling their awareness of suffering in the sedated state. 
However, even this effect may be variable.  
This leaves us with an important question: could increasing the dose of 
midazolam utilized, disregarding Cherny’s call for minimal use of sedation, 
improve the situation? (43).  
Judge et al and Barrientos-Vega et al respectively suggest that this is possible 
(5,74). However, such a move must be balanced against the belief that an increase 
in the dose of midazolam would see an increase in the risks of ill effects (1,2). 
Could the concomitant application of propofol, the second line treatment for PS 
in the EAPC guidelines, provide an improvement? (1,2). Data on propofol when 
applied on its own would suggest otherwise (75,76). Present data would also 
suggest that there is no real difference in either efficacy or safety when 
midazolam was added to propofol or when compared to propofol on its own 
(75,76). The incidence of neuropsychiatric side effects between the two agents is 
also similar (77). Sandiumenge Camps et al found that in fact propofol was less 
278 
efficacious than midazolam in the initial few days of sedation and prone to 
treatment failures (78).  
Paspatis et al and Kerker et al respectively suggest that combination therapy of 
midazolam and propofol would at least ensure the consistency of sedation levels 
and would have a comparable safety profile to midazolam alone (79,80). Whilst 
consistency in sedation levels is important, it is only part of the triumvirate of 
pivotal considerations here, the others being the depth of sedation and the safety 
of this procedure (Fig 5.5).  
 
Figure 5.5 The triumvirate of factors affecting the efficacy of CDPS 
Combination treatment may not act synergistically to increase the depth of 
sedation and thus may, for example, maintain a patient in a state akin to a MCS 
and thus liable to experience suffering (80). Paspatis et al report that sedation 
scores with midazolam and propofol either individually or in combination were 
similar suggesting no beneficial additive effect of this combination in terms of the 









5.4.2.3 The potential life-abbreviating characteristics of end-of-life sedation  
can be reduced by lowering the dose of sedative used 
From the data presented on the variations in levels of sedation experienced, this 
practice of using minimal doses comes at a cost. At the root of this premise is the 
issue of managing risks, which represents the third element of the triumvirate of 
factors that define the efficacy of CDPS (Fig 5.5). Thus if midazolam appears to 
compromise the overall efficacy of CDPS, what other options are there? I will 
review the applicability of each potential sedative that can be used for the 
purposes of CDPS. 
Midazolam – with its well-studied pharmacodynamics and pharmacokinetic 
profiles that boast of a rapid onset of action, its potential to be administered 
through intravenous and subcutaneous routes, good bioavailability, a level of 
sedation that is dose dependent, a short half-life, and also because it can be 
readily reversed with flumazenil – meets these goals and thus continues to be the 
first line for CDPS in many centres (26,42,73,81,82). The alternatives to it, in 
reality, pose problems of their own and do not necessarily improve outcomes 
(73,74).  
Barrientos-Vega et al suggest that propofol may be no more effective as 
midazolam, whilst Elsayem et al report that practically propofol is difficult to 
store and requires close monitoring (73,74). These practical considerations make 
propofol almost impossible to employ in many units outside an intensive care unit 
(73,74).  
Meanwhile, another alternative, levomepromazine that the EAPC and the KNMG 
guidelines suggest, is not readily available locally (1,2). Haloperidol, which is 
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regularly used here, carries with it a health warning from the Singapore Ministry 
of Health due to its propensity to cause potentially fatal arrhythmias when used 
intravenously (83,84). Similarly, a relative lack of experience with the use of 
phenobarbital with its potential for tachyphylaxis and interactions with other 
medications makes its application difficult, particularly given the polypharmacy 
and the inherent metabolic changes seen amongst the dying (85-88). Importantly, 
Morita et al reported that phenobarbital either on its own or in addition to 
midazolam was relatively slow to induce sedation (60). This then leaves 
midazolam decidedly the legitimate and “safe” drug of choice for the purposes of 
CDPS.  
Thus, given these considerations, attention must turn to monitoring techniques 
that will allow for better surveillance of side effects and ensure that the objectives 
of this process are met.  
 
5.4.2.4 Monitoring will ensure that the risks to the patient are reduced 
It is clear that present monitoring of physical parameters of distress and clinical 
parameters are both inadequate and unreliable (89). Li et al argue that reliance 
upon the belief that “in deeply sedated patients, certain cardiovascular measures, 
pupil reactivity, and cortical arousal responses were unique to noxious 
stimulation”, even when other pain related behaviours were absent, may be 
misplaced (39). Li et al reveal that these parameters are compromised by the 
attendant use of opioids and sedatives (39). Even consistent parameters such as 
changes in heart rate and pupil size are subject to the attenuating effects of 
opioids (39). Barbato noted that “breakthrough consciousness” occurred even 
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when patients appeared “at rest and seemingly at peace”, raising doubts as to the 
efficacy of observational scales for monitoring sedation (53). Hirata et al 
commented that midazolam also makes diagnosing brain death difficult given the 
effects it has upon clinical parameters (90). These factors make monitoring 
difficult and inaccurate, and would help explain why failures in sedation 
frequently go unrecognized by HCPs (36,41,50,91).  
Given these concerns, and Barbato’s finding of erratic and sometimes 
spontaneous fluctuations in levels of unconsciousness amongst sedated dying 
patients, new monitoring protocols are required (53). The application of sedation 
scores to help monitor the depth of sedation and oxygen monitoring to provide 
additional warning of any impending danger of respiratory depression are 
insufficient, given their inconsistent use and their inability to address the concerns 
regarding fluctuations in levels of unconsciousness (5,6,36,37,52,53,89). 
Barbato’s findings also makes the requirements of the KNMG guidelines to 
monitor a patient’s parameters once a day and the EAPC guidelines requirement 
that monitoring be carried out up to three times a day, inadequate (1,2). 
Furthermore, both these guidelines do not use sedation scales or consistently 
monitor oxygen saturations (1,2). 
Clearly, more consistent and accurate means of monitoring are called for. From 
Barbato’s report, this ought to include the applications of a Bispectral Index (BIS) 
monitor (53). Whilst cumbersome, Barbato has applied this method of monitoring 
on palliative care patients with “few minor problems” (53). Importantly, Barbato 
did not report that the use of the BIS monitor, which comprises “a single small 
flexible sensor applied to the forehead and temporal region”, impedes personal 
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contact or “medicalizes” the dying process (53). Such monitoring will also alert 
HCPs of the presence of “break through consciousness”. Taken together, 
continuous oxygen saturation and BIS monitoring appear to be the central 
parameters that must be included in the new monitoring protocols for the 
application of CDPS to ensure efficacy and safety of the procedure. This level of 
monitoring may be said to simply reflect the gravity of the situation. 
Upon wider review, it is clear that the main considerations that underpin the 
interpretation of proportionality in the use of CDPS require “adjusting”. In 
summary:  
1. unconsciousness is not an all or nothing phenomena but a constantly waxing 
and waning state that does see periods of “breakthrough” consciousness 
2. in more superficial levels of unconsciousness, pain and suffering may still be 
perceived 
3. minimization of sedative use may inhibit the realization of the goals of care 
4. the parameters used to allow for the minimization of drugs do not 
appropriately capture the desired endpoints nor adequately forewarn of 
potential risks. 
As a result there are a number of issues that need to be considered:  
1. an endpoint aimed at superficial unconsciousness requires readjustment in 
keeping with the risks of continued suffering 
2. monitored parameters need to be refined to meet these new endpoints. 
Proportionality in response to this new data must consider interventions aimed at 
treating the “possibility of unobservable pain” as being in keeping with the goals 
of care (8). Allied to this must come adaptations to the manner that 
proportionality is appraised. Here I will review the manner proportionality should 
be reinterpreted in clinical practice in light of this new considerations. 
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5.4.3 A practical reinterpretation of the Proportionality Principle 
The idea of proportional response lies rooted to the conception of attending to the 
needs of the patient in a manner commensurate with the demands of the situation, 
the risks involved in striving to meet the goals of care and those of failing to do 
so. This new data questions the ability of prevailing practices of meeting this 
goal. 
Clinically, dual monitoring of oxygen saturation and BIS to ensure that sedation 
to the level required is attained is clearly only part of the solution. A deeper, more 
consistent level of sedation is also clearly required. This desired level of sedation 
ought to be at least to the level of general anaesthesia in order to adequately 
negate awareness of suffering (Fig 5.6). Practically, allowing for the inevitable 
variations in sedation, this would translate to a PVS-like level of sedation 
(Fig 5.4).  
 
Figure 5.6  Deepening levels of sedation 
However, attaining such a level of sedation is not without its risks. Chief amongst 
these potential hazards are respiratory depression and compromise of the sedated 
patient’s ability to maintain the integrity of their airways. Indeed, such a level of 
deep sedation would usually see patients requiring intubation or at least 
protection of their airways, which is neither easy nor practical within the end-of-
life setting. 
Alert!
•  Beta wave pattern on EEG!
•  BIS score 100!
Light / Mod Sedation!
•  Alpha wave on EEG!
•  BIS score 80!
Deep Sedation!
•  Alpha and thetha on EEG!
•  BIS score 70!
General Anesthesia !
•  Thetha on EEG!
•  BIS score 60!
Deep Hypnotic !
•  Delta  on EEG!
•  BIS score <40!
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This then raises the concern that without due care to protect patients from these 
side effects, questions will be raised as to whether the risks taken to prevent 
“breakthrough consciousness” are commensurate with the perceived benefits. It is 
apparent that close monitoring and clear guidelines on monitoring techniques and 
practice, replete with how to respond to these potential side effects, are prime in 
ensuring that the trained HCPs charged with the patient’s care make the 
appropriate adjustments and provide the required care needed when side effects 
arise. Failure to do so would in effect question the objective of this intervention. 
As a result, continued monitoring is pivotal to a proportional response. To begin 
with there has to be cognizance that there are two potentially conflicting effects at 
play. On the one hand is the possibility of tolerance to the effects of midazolam. 
As tolerance for midazolam occurs, its ability to sedate begins to wane and the 
possibility of “breakthrough consciousness” increases. On the other hand, despite 
the continued application of hydration, the patient is liable to suffer from a 
multitude of changes that may affect their ability to excrete midazolam, 
potentiating its sedative effects and potentially tipping patients into deep sedation 
that may in fact lead to respiratory depression and potential compromise of their 
airways. Monitoring to ensure that these side effects do not inadvertently hasten 
the demise of the patient and distancing this practice from euthanasia is 
imperative. 
CDPS guidelines maintain that patients should be reviewed closely and on an 
hourly basis by an experienced HCP whilst oxygen saturation monitors and BIS 
monitors are constantly applied. The application of oxygen monitors 
circumnavigate dependence on the now questionable clinical parameters and 
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focuses directly upon an endpoint that appears to be the focus of much of the 
fears related to this practice. However, the implications of this need for such close 
professional monitoring as well as the application of the BIS monitor creates 
significant care concerns.  
BIS monitoring is costly and can potentially interfere with basic care provisions 
and intimate family interactions. Furthermore it would mean that CDPS would 
not be able to be carried out at home given the heavy medical presence required 
both as a result of the use of sedation scales to monitor the depth of sedation and 
the need to continually monitor oxygen saturations. Additionally the presence of 
these hourly clinical reviews will impede the regular end-of-life care goals of 
making the dying process as unintrusive as possible. 
Justification, however, may not be so difficult given the fact that care provisions 
associated with the application of CDPS must necessarily be intensive and 
commensurate with the risks upon the patient in changeable conditions. Boluses 
of midazolam and oxygen may be required if symptoms remain uncontrolled or if 
the levels of sedative ebb to the point where breakthrough consciousness and 
symptoms become manifest. Data would suggest that the frequency of 
breakthrough consciousness even when monitored using present clinical 
parameters maybe as high as 8-13% of cases (67-70,92). Morita et al’s findings 
suggest that a further 17% of cases are suboptimally sedated some four hours 
after the application of deep sedation (68). Porzio et al revealed that in one third 
of cases, “standard” doses of 1mg/hr of midazolam failed to control symptoms 
and required a doubling of doses and thus the presence of close monitoring (88). 
These failures of sedation highlight the importance of monitoring and the need for 
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a continuous professional presence during the application of CDPS so as to 
enable rapid and appropriate response to these changeable conditions. This is 
especially pertinent given that these numbers may reflect only a small proportion 
of patients who clearly manifest continuing distress and do not in fact account for 
the number of patients who may experience “breakthrough consciousness” 
unbeknownst to HCPs.  
The presence of HCPs monitoring patients is also key, given that without the 
presence of trained personnel to take appropriate corrective measures should 
negative effects arise, the rationale for any monitoring becomes altogether 
superfluous. Decisions to administer flumazenil to reverse the potential 
respiratory depression caused by midazolam accumulation or indeed naloxone in 
the event of opioid-induced respiratory depression require careful consideration. 
Here delineating what may be an effect of the natural dying process and what 
might be a side effect requires clinical experience and expertise. The role of 
monitoring may help provide HCPs with tangible evidence for their actions and 
allows for clear oversight of the actions of HCPs.  
Meanwhile, close monitoring is also required given the fallibility of present 
diagnostic techniques. Consider the fact that even with significantly more 
efficient imaging and monitoring capabilities, patients in a minimally conscious 
state are still frequently mistaken for being in a persistent vegetative state 
(47,48,50,59). The implications of such misclassification amongst patients in a 
MCS-like level of sedation from those in a PVS-like level of sedation cannot be 
overstated (53,59). Claessens et al revealed that the average survival on PS is 
around five days and Barbato showed that periods of “breakthrough 
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consciousness” often take a cyclical pattern of 20 minutes to an hour (53,59). The 
potential for repeated periods of awareness of suffering over this spell is thus a 
great concern.  
These precautionary measures also serve a further purpose. They negate the 
potential for abuse by providing a constant record of proceedings that provide yet 
a further means of oversight and accountability. This continued attention will also 
negate the perception of abandonment that CDPS may give rise to amongst 
families and carers of these sedated patients.  
Given the undoubted limitations of monitoring and the toll that it takes, there are 
wider considerations that arise. To begin, a significant implication of these 
provisos would see the prevention in the application of CDPS at home, given the 
compromise to safety (93). It would also suggest that contrary to previous 
arguments in favour of balanced holistic review where psychosocial, spiritual, 
cultural and indeed personal requirements are given equal consideration to 
clinical considerations, it is clinical considerations that once more take 
precedence and primarily for the benefit of the physician and the interests of the 
institution against wider scrutiny, rather than the interests of the particular patient.  
A further implication would see these stringent policies alienating a large 
proportion of patients who cannot receive such monitoring or meet the rigid 
prerequisites for CDPS either through familial choices or practical considerations 
(93).  
Clearly a holistic, case-specific appraisal of harm and benefit must be carried out 
by the MDT in tandem with the patient, the family and carers. Those endpoints 
that we are so eager to hold on to may obscure far more detrimental concerns just 
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as much as they may prevent worrisome practices. Only a case-specific review 
under the oversight of prevailing clinical and legal processes is called for. 
However, given the expectations set out by clinical guidelines and professional 
standards, and the gravity of the potential repercussions of setting aside 
monitoring measures, such an action must only be allowed following consultation 
with the ethics committee (Fig 5.7). 
 
Figure 5.7 Safety considerations 
Similarly, for those patients who meet the individual requirements for CDPS but 
who are not able to find a specialist second opinion nor have access to these 
forms of monitoring, a particularized review of the case by the ethics committee 
should be undertaken, potentially with legal advice. Quite clearly CDPS as it is 
aimed to be practiced needs to be given the same consideration as treatments such 
as intubation and mechanical ventilation. Failure to follow proper guidelines will 
undoubtedly plunge both the practice and the HCPs into controversy that will 
inevitably affect the care of others (Fig 5.7). 
 
Safety !
Risk of death vs  
failure to achieve 
adequate sedation!
Depth of sedation vs  
safety concerns!
Consistency of sedation 
levels vs minimizing  
the dose applied!
Constant presence  
of HCP vs failure to  
pick up side effects, 
treatment failures and 
new developments!
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5.5 THE FINAL TREATMENT OF LAST RESORT 
After due consideration of these factors, the question that must be asked is what is 
to happen to those patients in whom CDPS fails? 
Quite clearly pro-euthanasia groups would argue that if the best that a treatment 
of last resort can provide is suboptimal treatment of a patient in a state of 
suffering that cannot be monitored nor ameliorated, maintaining life in such 
conditions ought not to be acceptable. 
A clear response to this beyond the obvious statement that treatments such as 
physician assisted suicide and euthanasia are illegal in many nations is that quite 
simply these forms of interventions cross one clear line that even the goal of 
ameliorating suffering does not cross, that of causing bodily damage. The 
application of CDPS is based upon the premise of ameliorating suffering rather 
than causing injury. Here, if there is doubt that an intervention will cause injury to 
the patient, which I will suggest is producing a state of irreversible cellular 
damage, then the procedure ought not to be applied if it runs against professional 
standards and legal statutes. 
There are of course two significant objections to this position. The first is that 
adherence to a definition of injury that revolves around causing cellular damage is 
problematic in that it ignores a holistic view of the patient and the temporal 
effects of this intervention. In short, it raises questions as to how chemotherapy 
may be applied without breaching this stance, for example – chemotherapy does 
cause cellular damage to the individual and in some cases even irreversible 
damage to healthy cells in the endeavour to eliminate the malignancy. The same 
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may also be said of cranial irradiation for brain metastasis. The response to such 
questions is that whilst chemotherapy and cranial irradiation are applied even 
with the risks to healthy cells, these applications are in keeping with the MDT-
determined best interests of the patient and their particular goals of care. 
Importantly such intervention are in keeping with the prevailing social, cultural, 
legal and clinical standards of care.  
By these terms, if there was evidence that the application of sedation could be 
shown to cause clinical damage to the patient that is not reversible when the 
offending intervention is ceased, then the treatment itself is not held within this 
thesis to be an acceptable treatment option. Should either sedation to a level of 
PVS or MCS be found to result in irreversible damage upon discontinuation, as 
unlikely as it may be, these treatments would be deemed unacceptable treatment 
options. This application still hinges upon the wider concept of proportionality as 
highlighted by Quill (Fig 5.2).  
However, one issue that requires closer scrutiny is the concern surrounding the 
effects of CDPS upon a patient’s personhood. Here the question being asked is if 
there is any merit to the concern that applying deep levels of unconsciousness to 
prevent suffering can be likened to sacrificing consciousness and thus 
personhood, which in turn invites comparisons with the sacrificing of life to attain 




In this chapter I have shown that whilst the Principle of Proportionality may have 
been constructed under very specific pretences, it still occupies a credible place 
within the considerations of CDPS and under the aegis of a palliative care 
approach. However, I have also questioned the manner that it has been applied 
and shown it to be robust when equal attention is given to all its various elements 
and when the goals of care are clearly stipulated.  
However, in light of new evidence as to the efficacy of sedative dosing in 
bringing about the desired levels of unconsciousness required to relieve 
awareness of suffering, the manner that it has been applied and the premises that 
it has been subject to have increasingly been viewed with suspicion. I show that 
in light of new data, the very manner that proportionality is adjudged requires 
adjustment and tempering. Realigning the manner that the efficacy of CDPS is 
measured, and the manner that its present endpoints are viewed requires 
evaluation.  
However, balancing these new requirements with the undoubted limitations that 
this analysis creates requires closer attention to the clinical needs of the particular 
case and specifically its safety requirements. Whilst reaffirming the holistic 
traditions of this concept, there arises a more clinically-led flavour to proceedings 
that threaten to plunge this practice into a mire of paternalistic concerns.  
Response to this must be measured and balanced as it becomes clear that the very 
foundations of palliative medicine are scrutinized. Here concerns of the slippery 
slope towards euthanasia are overcome by clarifying the limitations of the extent 
292 
of care, whilst concerns about the effects of this deep sedation upon personhood 
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IS THE APPLICATION OF  
CONTINUOUS DEEP PALLIATIVE SEDATION EQUIVALENT TO 
EUTHANASIA OR PHYSICIAN ASSISTED SUICIDE? 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the first chapter, I argued that there are significant differences between the 
practices of palliative sedation (PS), terminal sedation (TS) and continuous deep 
palliative sedation (CDPS) in rendering a patient unconscious to relieve their 
intractable symptoms. In subsequent chapters, I have scrutinized the overarching 
goals of care of this procedure, questioned the ability of present practices to 
realize these goals and forwarded alternative means of addressing potential 
failures in this treatment of intractable suffering. I have, during the course of this 
thesis, also highlighted three areas of particular concern with the application of 
CDPS: (i) the acceptability of extending the use of CDPS to include the treatment 
of existential suffering, (ii) the legitimacy of applying this treatment when the 
viability of informed consent is in doubt, and (iii) the implications for the 
personhood of terminally ill patients under deep sedation until death. Having 
addressed the first two concerns in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 respectively, I turn 
my attention to the final issue highlighted – the effects of applying CDPS on a 
patient’s personhood. 
Materstvedt and Bosshard, Juth et al and Rich respectively hold that personhood 
is characterized by a patient’s ability to exhibit self awareness, participate in 
social interaction and display a “capacity for human life” (1-4). This view defines 
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personhood “as a set of functions or abilities” (5-7). The loss of these functions or 
abilities has been seen to deny an individual their personhood and with this, a loss 
of their membership in a moral community, individual rights and privileges, and 
even a link to the Divine (8,9). The significance of personhood cannot be 
understated. It has even been said that a human life without personhood is a life 
without value (8,9).  
An act that would sacrifice personhood is, therefore, viewed with concern. Within 
the context of the practice of palliative sedation (PS), Juth et al suggest that the 
practice of eliminating a patient’s consciousness would be just such an act (1). 
The authors argue that an act that sacrifices consciousness, ostensibly until death, 
in order to relieve suffering is not morally dissimilar to aiding patients to end 
their biological existence in order to achieve “lasting” relief from their symptoms 
(1) (Fig 6.1). For Juth et al, Rich and Materstvedt and Bosshard, it is this wilful 
sacrifice of personhood that provokes comparisons between PS and the 
applications of euthanasia and physician assisted suicide (PAS) (2,3) (Fig 6.1).  
 
Figure 6.1 The slippery-slope argument of personhood and CDPS  
Quill and Greenlaw define euthanasia as “painlessly killing or permitting the 
death of individuals who are ill or injured beyond hope of recovery” and describe 
physician assisted death (PAD) as “the practice of a physician providing the 
means for a patient to end his own life, usually with a prescription for barbiturates 




loss of capacity 
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(4). In this chapter, the term PAD will be used interchangeably with the term 
physician assisted suicide (PAS) and no longer revolves solely around the 
prescription of barbiturates but any form of sedatives that may act to painlessly 
abbreviate life. In both the practices of euthanasia and PAD, the end result is the 
same: the patient as a matter of choice has his or her life abbreviated.  
To establish a tenable position for Juth et al’s suggestion and Rich’s position – 
that an act that sacrifices consciousness is ethically equivalent to an act that ends 
biological existence – the critical elements that must be shown are that a state of 
unconsciousness is ethically analogous to social death and that social death is 
ethically equivalent to biological death (1,2).  
Materstvedt had suggested, as part of his adaptation of Harris’ “potentiality” 
theory that so long as there was a potential for reversing sedation and the patient 
regaining their consciousness, the patient remained a person as a result of her 
retained “capacity” to “value her own existence” (3). In practice, the issue of 
reversibility of TS, PS and CDPS is set aside, given that these treatments in fact 
cannot be reversed without reigniting the awareness of suffering of the patient 
and breaching the goals of care and the duty of the physician. For all intents and 
purposes, TS, PS and CDPS are irreversible and applied continuously until the 
patient’s demise. 
 
6.2 CONCEIVING PERSONHOOD 
Whilst there is little doubt that many of the traditionally understood criteria for 
personhood are compromised as a result of applications of CDPS, the questions 
that must be asked are: is it right to hold that personhood is lost as a result of a 
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loss of consciousness; and if so, is it correct to ethically equate this loss of 
personhood to biological death? (7).  
 
Figure 6.2 The cascading argument 
Rich, Juth et al, and Farah and Haberlien employ a cascading argument to support 
their positions concerning the link between induced unconsciousness and a 
deliberate end to life (1,2,8). The argument sees a series of assumptions being 
made, each playing a critical role in the statement that follows within the cascade 
(Fig 6.2) (1,2,8). An unbroken stream of logic within this cascade is critical, with 
any lapse in the argument leading to a collapse of the cascade. Given the pivotal 
position of personhood within this cascade, this chapter will attempt to address 
the issue of personhood and how it is conceived from a local perspective in an 
effort to address this cascading argument.  
From clinical experience and local data, the response by local palliative care 
patients, carers and families does appear to be a mix of the three dominant 
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too dissimilar to Kitwood’s conception of personhood and Buron’s Personhood 
Model for Dementia (15-18). However, before delving into an amalgamated 
conception of personhood that I forward, it might be prudent to consider each of 
these conceptions separately to clarify their positions (17,18). 
Within the example of Singapore, local beliefs – which appear to be a 
coadunation of Christian, Muslim, Hindu and Buddhist beliefs in association with 
prevailing relational and social views of personhood – see personhood as an 
evolution of Kitwood’s definition of personhood (15). From my local studies in 
Singapore, personhood maybe understood as a “standing or status bestowed 
upon one by the Divine and upheld by others in the context of relationship 
and social being” (17,18). This innate element of personhood, with its grounding 
in transcendental connections and imbued with religious doctrine, is taken to be 
present and unchanging in all humans from conception until death. This data also 
clearly shows that innate personhood is neither the sole nor the dominant guiding 
model of personhood evoked within the local context (17,18). This element of 
personhood is also not strictly demarcated and is seen to pervade other 
conceptions of personhood. The porousness of these conceptions will be a key 
issue to be discussed later. 
One aspect particularly influenced by sociocultural beliefs is individual 
personhood. The individual aspects of personhood builds upon the presence of 
sentience and grows to involve the emotional, psychological, spiritual and 
intellectual, as well as the rationality, personality, moral agency, beliefs, values 
and actions of the individual, manifested most clearly in the person’s interactions 
with others (12-18). This aspect of personhood, within the local setting at least, 
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appears to revolve around the relationship between the person and the family and 
thus introduces another key element to personhood (17,18,20-26). Within the 
local setting at least, the relational element of personhood is dominated by one’s 
relationship with one’s family (17,18,20-26).  
The concept of family within the perspective of relational personhood moves 
beyond genetic associations and can be defined as “all those who are emotionally 
or psychologically close to one another” (27). Ho forwards this definition based 
on observations of the influences of various parties within the medical decision-
making process (27). Ho’s definition rather legitimately extends the concept of 
family to “include biological and adopted families as well as other domestic and 
intimate relationships” that would involve the larger family unit, clan and society 
as a whole (12,13,23). However, within the present care setting, I suggest that this 
concept is limited to those that have “powers to intervene or have direct 
influence in the patient’s affairs and personal welfare or share a personal 
relational link with the person which the patient themselves considered 
important”. The significance of this requirement and the Relational Significance 
Test which I will propose in due course will become clear in light of the complex 
psychosocial and cultural considerations that continue to influence care 
determinations.  
For now, it is sufficient to note that the innate, individual and relational elements 
of personhood – or “rings” of personhood – may best be described through the 
Ring Theory of Personhood which I will discuss later (17,18). The presence of 
interactions between the various rings allows for the postulation that an amalgam 
of these present frameworks is possible. For instance, the influence of the 
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relational element upon the individual element of personhood is described by 
Kitwood and Bredin, who affirm the importance of the relational element to the 
development of the individual part of personhood 
“[e]arly in life personhood is actually being created in relationship; small 
fragments of truly personal experience gradually coalesce, and a self, with 
a sense of psychological continuity, is formed. It is a process of 
development that absolutely needs the Other” (28). 
Similarly, interrelationship of the innate and the relational elements of 
personhood are highlighted by Lyn Morgan’s review of feminist writings on the 
issue of the “ethical emotional value of the foetus” and “the changing notion of 
incipient (foetal and infant) personhood” (29). Morgan reveals that relational 
links between the mother and the foetus that commence as soon as the pregnancy 
is known, confers the foetus with relational and innate personhood long before it 
has developed a heart beat, much less a functioning nervous system (29). 
The amalgam of these interrelated frameworks is evident in local practice and the 
manner that oncology patients perceive personhood. Yet to explicate this 
overarching framework, review of their fundamental constituents is called for. 
Each of these perspectives command support from various writers. I will not 
discuss the innate element of personhood beyond the brief and general review of 
regnant views on the subject. In order to review the individual element of 
personhood, I will review the works of Rich to scrutinize the concept of 
personhood that revolves solely upon consciousness and “psychological 
continuity” (2). Daniel Tsai whose conceptions on the relational nature of 
personhood within the medical context will guide discussions upon relational 
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personhood (13). Finally, I will study the work of Bill Buron and his explication 
of the changes in the various elements of personhood during illness (16). To do so, 
I will review the work of Tom Kitwood whose study of the subject of personhood 
amongst dementia patients has become the touchstone for present day research on 
the subject and importantly represents the starting point for Buron’s position 
(15,16,30).  
On the basis of constituent elements of these several frameworks, I shall forward 
my account of personhood, which I refer to as the Ring Theory of Personhood. 
This framework, which has been evidenced within the local palliative and 
oncological settings, best captures local opinion and attitudes toward the subject 
of personhood amongst the terminally ill patient population (17,18).  
The Ring Theory of Personhood represents an evolution of Buron’s Personhood 
Model of Dementia Patients, which as a result of its focus upon dementia patients 
only is deemed unrepresentative of the palliative care population (16-18). The 
Ring Theory of Personhood redresses these limitations and better captures the 
variability of cultural, psychosocial and clinical conditions within individual case 
contexts seen within the diverse adult palliative care population. It also serves to 
illustrate that the concept of personhood of palliative care patients are 
multidimensional and cannot be pigeon-holed into a specific conception of 
personhood without a holistic review of their beliefs, values, psychosocial and 
clinical considerations (17,18). Importantly, the Ring Theory of Personhood is 
also best suited to addressing the concerns regarding personhood of CDPS 
patients (17,18). 
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In order to set the stage for the Ring Theory of Personhood, I will begin with a 
review of the various elements of personhood, starting with Rich’s view of a 
concept of personhood that relies on the presence of consciousness.  
 
6.3 RICH’S POSITION ON PERSONHOOD 
In Ben Rich’s treatise “Postmodern Personhood: A Matter of Consciousness” the 
axiomatic capacity for “human personal life rather than merely biological life” 
and “the capacity for human life” are posited as the essential components to 
personhood (2). Inspired by Locke’s position, Rich maintains that  
“we consider human beings to be persons because of their capacity for 
self-consciousness and development of a concept of right and wrong, 
rather than because they possess a body of a particular form or genetic 
composition” (2). 
According to Rich, “the capacity for human personal life” forms the requisite 
platform for this evolved formulation (2). Rich adds that it is “not the same body, 
but the same continuing consciousness, which constitutes the criterion for the 
identity of persons” (2). 
Rich’s formulation sets up two criteria that define personhood: the first is the 
capacity for self-evaluation and the second is continuing self-consciousness that 
supports the maintenance of identity over time and the capacity for human 
personal life (2). Rich believes that without acknowledging these two elements, 
“most of the discussion of the subject of personhood would become completely 
unintelligible, as well as much of moral philosophy” (2). Psychological continuity 
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is the presence of a “consistent” stream of consciousness that would ensure the 
“same continuing of consciousness” and thus the “sameness of a rational being” 
(2). The capacity for personal life proposed by Rich in turn is inspired by 
Fletcher’s criteria for personhood (2). Fletcher’s criteria includes “minimal 
intelligence, self awareness, self control, sense of time, sense of futurity, sense of 
past, concern for others, communication, control of existence, curiosity, change 
and changeability, balance of rationality and feeling, idiosyncrasy and neocortical 
function” (31,32). 
Rich argues that within his framework, an anencephalic baby who lacks both 
these requisites and PVS patients who have lost both these faculties are denied 
their personhood (2). Rich maintains that even though  
“they bear the physiology of the human being, but they permanently lack 
the most essential feature of the human being, which is its undisputed 
capacity for living the life of a person, or rational self-consciousness” (2). 
However Rich does appear to refrain from suggesting that personhood is an “all 
or nothing” phenomena that is based entirely upon the presence of psychological 
continuity (2). Rich allows for the possibility of personhood even in the face of 
infractions in the stream of self consciousness, so long as “[s]ome tenuous link 
with their formerly competent selves” remains (2). An example of this would be 
seen in early dementia ostensibly as “the capacity for human life” remains (2). 
Whilst Rich does not discuss the issue of sedation at the end of life, without self 
awareness and severance of continuity of consciousness, ostensibly until death, 
CDPS patients would on Rich’s account have lost personhood (2). In such 
circumstances even the raft of non-corporeal and corporeal factors set out to 
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overcome the consciousness-driven idea of personhood would prove deficient in 
arguing for continued attribution of personhood to these patients (2). Cultural, 
social, religious, personal and professional variations, as well as a variety of 
internal factors such as psychological stress, must eventually manifest their 
effects through the consciousness of the patient (2,33). These arguments are thus 
a “nonstarter” as a form of defence for continued personhood in Rich’s estimation 
when consciousness is lost permanently (2). It follows that as a result of Rich’s 
position, the issue of rights, moral action and responsibility that are party to 
personhood would in effect evaporate for CDPS patients, leaving them akin to 
biologically active husks. 
 
6.3.1 Critique of Rich 
Rich’s position is atomistic and does not appear to consider personhood to be 
anything beyond a sentient existence clothed in cultural, psychosocial and 
relational considerations when the patient is conscious and capable of exhibiting 
“psychological continuity” (2). For Rich, personhood is only possible when “it” is 
able to consider “it self as it self” in continuity over time and space in a manner 
that bears some psychological relationship with the person “it” is over time (2). 
Rich appears to build his position upon a Lockean definition of personhood which 
states,  
“the term person belongs to intelligent agents capable of law, happiness 
and misery”  
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and specifically  
“a thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection. And can 
consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing in different times and 
places which it does only by that consciousness that is inseparable from 
thinking, and essential to it” (2).  
An anencephalic or patients in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) cannot be 
imbued with the rights and privileges of personhood (2).  
Rich is confident of his position and states  
“[n]o one, to my knowledge, has seriously attempted to argue that we 
could or should ascribe the status of person to a being or entity that has 
never had, could never acquire, or has irretrievably lost the capacity for 
conscious experience” (2). 
Yet this position ignores other cultural, societal, religious and feminist led 
definitions of personhood (12,13,28-30). 
Rich also does not explain what exactly constitutes “tenuous link with their 
formerly competent selves” and only applies this consideration to PVS (3). 
Questions as to its impact upon the status of anencephalic babies pose yet more 
questions particularly given the fact that Rich’s position appears irreconcilable 
with observed behaviour and practices of family of these children that would 
suggest that these children are still loved and cared for and afforded all the same 
considerations that one would see in other pediatric deaths.  
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Many religious views revolve around the “ensoulment” of the non-sentient foetus 
and the relationship it shares with Transcendence, which in turn confers it with 
innate personhood long before sentience is manifested (14). The belief that we are 
created in God’s image necessitates particular respect for the person irrespective 
of their gestation, much less age, abilities, gender or preferences (19). From this 
perspective, all human life from the moment of conception are imbued with 
innate personhood. Support for the view that personhood begins at conception 
comes from feminist philosophers such as Lynn Morgan who argue that links 
between foetus and mother begin as early as conception and provides relational 
personhood to the foetus (29). From these perspectives, a baby born with 
anencephaly would, contrary to Rich’s position, still be considered to have 
elements of relational and innate personhood (29).  
Kitwood and Buron from their respective studies of patients with dementia show 
that in fact the concept of personhood is held to be multifaceted and 
consciousness is but one part of a “standing or status bestowed upon one human 
being by others, in the context of relationship and social being” (15,16,28,30). 
These authors see cultural, relational and psychosocial factors as important 
criteria of personhood (15,16,28,30). For Kitwood and Buron, personhood is not 
confined to either the communicative, intelligence or cognitive abilities of the 
patient but draws upon the interrelatedness of individuals, not simply within a 
family web but within wider society (15,16,28,30). This wider view of 
personhood echoes how patients in a CDPS state or even patients with varying 
levels of consciousness as a result of delirium, for instance, are viewed (21).  
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Rich’s position also ignores the manner that patients with fluctuating 
consciousness are addressed and considers them to be lacking personhood so long 
as they do not even hold to a tenuous thread of psychological continuity or fail to 
display “the capacity of human” (2). There are two points of concern here. Whilst 
Rich does not consider such patients “dead,” denial of the respect of personhood 
may allow various care options to be withdrawn and denies their relational links 
(2). It also raises questions as to how these tenuous links are to be established.  
However, what is clear is that any condition that transects the continuity of 
consciousness, severing any “tenuous link with their formerly competent selves” 
and negating “the capacity for human life” would extinguish personhood (2). It 
may be argued that intractable delirium and encephalopathy at the end of life are 
themselves a cause for a loss of personhood given its effect upon the patient’s 
“capacity for human life” (2,21). It could be argued that patients for whom CDPS 
is applied for the amelioration of these symptoms could be considered to 
experience a negligible effect upon their personhood given that in truth 
personhood was already under threat of disruption before CDPS was applied. By 
such an argument, the intentional extinguishing of consciousness even for the 
purposes of ameliorating suffering cannot be seen to terminate personhood. 
 
6.4 CONSIDERING THE RELATIONAL ASPECTS  
OF PERSONHOOD 
The relational aspect of personhood highlighted in Kitwood’s definition, outlined 
below, occupies a pivotal role in populations where the prominent brand of 
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relational personhood is Confucianism (12,13,15,16,28,30). Described by Tsai, 
the Confucian concept of relational personhood revolves around seeing the 
individual as a reflection of a wider familial identity, extending considerations of 
individual personhood beyond a wholly atomistic view (13). Similar formulations 
of relational personhood are also seen amongst all the major ethnic groups and 
other local familial centric frameworks, irrespective of religious tendencies or 
cultural beliefs (20-26,34-43).  
Tsai states that the Confucian idea of personhood is based on the “individual’s 
transactions with his fellow human beings”; these are made up of autonomous 
elements and the relational elements of personhood, highlighted by the presence 
of the “horizontal dimension” and the “vertical dimension” within this framework 
(13). The vertical or the autonomous element of personhood corresponds to 
personal responsibility, self-reliance and self-cultivation (13). The horizontal or 
relational aspect corresponds to the ideal of self-transformation or growth through 
one’s interactions with one’s “family, society and country and the world” (13).  
According to Tsai, it is this horizontal aspect that is prime, underlined by the fact 
that the concept of self, defined within the vertical dimension of Confusion 
personhood, is seen not as an autonomous being but as a “centre of relations” 
closely associated with the “family, community, country and the world” (13,20). 
Tsai adds that a person “cannot become fully human without fulfilling his role-
specified relation oriented responsibilities; the Confucian personhood is to be 
realized through interpersonal transactions in human society” (13,20). These roles 
define the individual’s place within the family and create the platform for 
individual and familial identities (20).  
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When the patient is no longer able to meet the obligations of their social and 
familial roles, they are imbued with the family’s identity (20). It is also within 
this setting that the related nature of the autonomous self becomes crystallized 
and highlights the bidirectional nature of this interaction within the family (20). 
The self, in wishing to evolve, must act responsibly and must do so in a manner 
that would fulfil its obligations (20). A filial son in assuming his father’s roles is 
extending his personhood, whilst his father in sharing, and indeed ceding his 
responsibilities, continues with his own role of guiding his son. It is in meeting 
these role-specific obligations that concepts such as filial piety arises and 
reaffirms the obligations of family members to one another within the family 
identity (13,20).  
This assumption of roles by the family can also be seen as a facilitating the 
continued ability for communication, the maintenance of the patient’s roles both 
within the family structure and within society. This facilitative role is also seen as 
integral in assuring that patients remain involved in their own care. The 
“buffering process” also preserves psychological stability within the family, 
which is imperative to maintaining a patient’s many roles and functions, 
particularly when considering agitated or delirious patients (28). 
 
6.4.1 Concerns with familialism aspects of personhood 
A potential worry about familialism is that the vertical components of 
individualism may be suppressed by the horizontal aspects of this framework (13). 
From the outset, Tsai alludes to the dominance of the latter over the former (13). 
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The end result may in fact be the abrogation of all conceptions of individual 
personhood in favour of a role within the family interests and identity (20). There 
is no clear delineation of the boundaries of the relational aspects of personhood 
and how these elements of personhood are preserved within familialism (20). 
Collusion and coercion in decision-making and consent processes as a result of 
familial determination have also affected the wider view of personhood (34-43).  
Empirical studies conducted in Singapore suggest that within the context of 
decision-making at the end-of-life care, greater weight is given to the familial 
interests over the wishes of the patient (25,40,42). A recent Singapore study 
revealed that in the face of differences between the previously stated objectives of 
a now unconscious patient and that of the family, the wishes of the family have 
precedence (26). The question then is whether the persisting conception of 
personhood ascribed to the patient as a result of their relational personhood 
consistent with the patient’s own beliefs and wishes or even a true reflection of 
their individuality. 
For many palliative care patients who suffer from disorders of cognition and 
consciousness at the end of life, how personhood is conceived is critical. 
Appreciating a more holistic view of personhood that maintain the integrity of 
individual characteristics whilst being sited within appropriate psychosocial and 
cultural factors is critical and brings to the fore, first Tom Kitwood’s idea of 
personhood, and then Bill Buron’s hierarchy of personhood (15,16,28,30). I will 
review both these positions. 
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6.5 KITWOOD’S AND BURON’S CONCEPT OF PERSONHOOD 
In acknowledging that as “highly social species, we are actually endowed with 
instinct-like tendencies to develop strong affectionate social bonds” without 
which “human psyche disintegrates”, Kitwood maintains a view of personhood 
that is diametrically opposite to the atomistic stance taken by Rich (2,15,28,30). 
Kitwood believes that as a result of an “interdependence of human life … no one 
can flourish in isolation” (30). Kitwood, therefore, conceptualizes personhood as 
a balance between the individuality of the patient and inherent relational aspects 
of identity (30).  
Within this view of personhood, the individual aspect of Kitwood’s concept of 
personhood is taken to include considerations of the patient’s own preferences, 
dislikes, views, values, beliefs, evaluative processes, their personal history, 
commitments and narratives (15,28,30). Significant, too, is the fact that emotional 
constitution, spiritual and psychological characteristics are given due 
consideration within this element of personhood (15,28,30).  
The roles the patient played in society, culture and family are seen to enrich the 
individuality of the patient (30). This then forms the relational aspect of 
Kitwood’s conception of personhood. This complementary domain of personhood 
also sets out to acknowledge that in fact personhood is the “standing or status that 
is accorded by others” making appreciation of the bonds within human groupings 
central to the Kitwood view of personhood (30,44). Kitwood’s framework 
envisages personhood as being associated with continuity of self and the integrity 
of a social existence (30,44).  
318 
Building on Kitwood’s framework is Buron, whose work amongst nursing home 
(NH) residents living with dementia (RLWDs) has resulted in the proffering of a 
hierarchical construct of personhood based upon the manner that personhood is 
lost as dementia is diagnosed and progresses (16). Armed with clinical data, 
Buron modelled his framework upon regnant data and prevailing literature to 
delineate three levels of personhood, which evolved as changes in mental, social 
and clinical functions occur as a result of the dementing process. Buron classified 
these levels as biological personhood, individual personhood and sociological 
personhood (16). 
Buron’s impetus for forwarding his Personhood Model for Dementia Care was a 
wish to provide a “structure for organizing existing person-centred interventions 
and strategies in dementia care” (16). The first level of Buron’s framework is 
biological personhood, which regards the inherent nature of personhood to be 
delineated by the presence of an underlying “human biological system” that 
confers “sentience and/or the ability to experience pleasure and pain” (16). Care 
for this level of personhood is characterized by the most basic of biological needs, 
which Buron states is met by the “provision of essential needs, including food, 
water, shelter, clothing, hygiene, and medication” (16).  
Buron’s second level personhood within his framework is termed individual 
personhood, which coincides with a “higher level of personhood”. Within this 
level, there are considerations regarding “the past, roles, personality, values, self-
worth, spirituality, and so on, combined and defined through years of living” as 
well as “affect, emotions, self awareness, moral agency, rationality” (16). 
Individual personhood pivots upon the ability of the patient to “establish a 
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connection between the past and present (psychological continuity)” and the 
“capacity to communicate” (16). Buron believes that with the loss of these critical 
functions and “when an individual can no longer connect life events”, focus shifts 
from individual personhood to the “biological being” and denigrates patients to a 
state where they are “not the same person as they were before or non-person” (16).  
Within sociological personhood, the person expands both individually as well as 
within social circles. It is “strictly defined by the perceptions of society and others 
and of their treatment of the individual” (16). Sociologic personhood is, as 
Kitwood suggests, “bestowed by others”, highlighted by the fact that “[s]ocial 
relationships, culture, responsibility, ‘moral agency,’ and membership in 
professional and social groups often enable society to bestow the status of 
personhood upon others” (16). This loss of social and professional links, 
specifically the hampering of communication abilities disrupts individual, 
professional, familial and social responsibilities, moral agency and culture, which 
in turn derail societal perceptions of the person in the third level of Buron’s 
ladder (16). In this framework, the attainment of “sociologic personhood”, which 
takes the longest for a person to develop and is the first to be lost as a result of 
changes in the patient’s clinical situation, is critical (16). Social isolation and a 
loss of the attributes of “sociologic personhood” that inevitably follow may be 
delayed if such matters are attended to early and upon a holistic plane.  
Comprehending these changes are critical if the psychological, physical and 
social needs of patient-centred care (PCC) processes are to be met (16). For both 
Kitwood and Buron, maintenance of personhood is critical to ensuring care 
provisions remain focused upon the prime goal of many RLWDs, which is to be 
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treated in a respectful, inclusive and positive manner (15,16). Failure to act 
appropriately creates or accelerates the spiral of depersonalization, loss of self, 
depression, social death and increased disruptive behaviour. Evidence would 
suggest, too, that maintaining personhood improves the patient’s overall quality 
of life. The importance of preservation of social connectivity reiterates the social 
nature of personhood and the interconnectedness of the various aspects of 
personhood. 
 
6.5.1 Critique of Kitwood’s concept of personhood and  
Buron’s Personhood Model 
Whilst Kitwood does consider a more holistic view of personhood than the 
previous authors, his work remains rooted in the dementia setting. Therefore, 
issues of surviving interests and changes in social, psychological and physical 
facets in progressive illnesses other than the dementia model are not considered. 
Kitwood’s and Buron’s frameworks are also limited in their consideration of the 
manner that culture, spirituality and familial involvement may evolve over time 
and the effects of these changes may play on a patient-centred care perspective. 
The assumption that appears to be underlining Kitwood’s position and Buron’s 
Personhood Model still relates to an atomistic view of personhood, wrapped in a 
patient-centric approach to care (15,16,28,30). Issues of familial or relational 
aspects of personhood appear to be secondary considerations to those of the 
patient as the individual.  
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There is little consideration of the family or of the role of the family and their 
wishes and care needs nor is there adequate consideration of the repercussions of 
these considerations upon a patient’s specific situation. There are two points to 
this issue. The first is that it demonstrates the dated approach of these models in 
not adopting a multidimensional approach to care that geriatrics, palliative care 
and neurology adopt. This would enable these models to embrace both better 
patient-centred care and flexibility to contend with the case based variances that 
are seen in end-of-life care. The second is a failure to appropriately consider 
prevailing data upon the influences of psychosocial, financial, cultural and 
familial factors in modern conceptions of personhood (20-26,29). Addressing the 
needs of the family directly impacts the manner that patients own “biological 
aspects”, as envisaged by Buron, are met (16). This is particularly the case within 
the clinical context where there is a porous and sometimes indistinct boundary 
between personal identity and interests and those of the family.  
The family also influence the manner that an individual maybe viewed by others 
and thus influence the manner that their personhood maybe endowed. The 
influence of the family upon these views is instructive. The manner that an Asian 
family views a patriarch affects how others approach caring for that patient 
(17,18). Deciphering the influences of these various elements has largely been 
ignored by Kitwood and Buron (15,16). 
Clinically, the transposition of Kitwood’s model and Buron’s Personhood Model 
of Dementia Care to a “wider audience” is also fraught by reliance upon a 
relatively predictable course of deterioration and clinical developments (15,16). It 
also focuses mainly upon a specific age group of patients (15,16). The wider 
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palliative care situation, however, is a little more complex. Predictability of 
disease trajectory, patterns of manifestation, complications and even disease 
course vary significantly. The impact and side effects of treatments, too, cannot 
be ignored.  
Changes in personhood are not the result of physical and sociocultural change but 
affective and functional change. The variability in these areas adds to the 
complexity of adapting Buron’s framework to the palliative care setting. Social 
and financial considerations too tend to be more diverse given the wide spectra of 
diagnosis, age, settings, treatment options and complications that might be seen in 
cancer patients within the end of life.  
Clinical variability and the frequent waxing and waning disease trajectory found 
throughout the spectra of palliative care cases leave a rigid unidirectional 
framework, such as Buron’s Personhood Model for Dementia appears to be, 
inflexible to the demands of case variability (16). 
 
6.6 THE RING THEORY OF PERSONHOOD 
The Ring Theory of Personhood offers to correct the failings of the Buron and 
Kitwood models by forwarding a more culturally cogent, ethically sensitive, 
clinically relevant framework of personhood that that draws from the experiences 
of this clinician and the results of a diverse collection of clinical studies carried 
out within the holistic platform of end-of-life palliative care (17,18,20-26,45-51). 
Part of the impetus for this proffering lies in the fact that whilst palliative care is 
built upon the idea of the provision of holistic, person-centred care, there are little 
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in the way of transferable frameworks that would allow for its accomplishment. 
No framework is dynamic and flexible enough to contend with the variability of 
cultural, psychosocial, clinical, religious and familial factors within a particular 
case and yet maintain a coherent form that abides with the prevailing clinical, 
legal, professional, social and cultural standards (52). 
Demo states that personhood “is subject to constant change, revision, editing, and 
updating as a function of variations in situation and situational demands”, but 
does so around a stable core of self-identity (52). This point is particularly evident 
amongst palliative care patients and their families. Elucidating a core image of 
personhood and its evolving features rather than charting “situation specific self 
images” is critical to the provision of patient centred care and the focus of 
concern for the Ring Theory of Personhood (17,18,52). Understanding and 
contending with these changes allows for a consistent and stable framework of 
personhood that will facilitate better care determinations and provisions (17,18).  
The Ring Theory of Personhood is drawn from the narratives of palliative care 
patients at the end of life, my discussions with terminally ill patients from all 
demographic groups and care settings in end-of-life care on their goals of care 
and clinical studies carried out on oncology patients (17,18). Personhood as 
conceived by palliative care patients is not solely confined to considerations of a 
legal or moral nature but includes consideration of one’s social status, familial 
roles and religious beliefs (17,18). What makes the palliative care patient who 
they are involves the innate, the individual and the relational elements of 
personhood captured within the Ring Theory of Personhood (17,18). 
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Generally, no singular belief dominates the considerations of the general 
palliative population and no particular element within the Ring Theory is given 
precedence over the others (17,18). Personhood as it is seen in this group of 
patients, concerns itself with how a patient would like to be cared for, how they 
wish to be remembered and how they would like their interests protected. 
Individual patients, however, do place different weight upon the three main 
considerations contained within the Ring Theory of Personhood (17,18). 
The Ring Theory of Personhood does not subscribe to a processual mechanism of 
change in personhood such as Buron forwards in his Personhood Model for 
Dementia Care (17,18,52). This is because within most palliative care settings the 
effects of disease, disability and comorbidities are highly variable (17,18). 
Furthermore the great number of cultural, societal, religious, personal and clinical 
factors involved prohibits any generalization of how personhood is viewed 
(17,18).  The Ring Theory of Personhood instead sets out to view cases on an 
individualized basis guided by evidenced-based practice (17,18). 
Its three rings correspond to the three elements outlined previously – the innate 
element of personhood as the innermost ring, the middle ring which is the 
individual element of personhood that revolves around the individual’s level of 
consciousness, and the outermost ring which relates to the relational elements of 
personhood (17,18).  Within the confines of this chapter, the Ring Theory 
highlights that patients do not simply conceive themselves as being defined solely 
by their consciousness or their innate properties but by an intermix of wider 
considerations that proceed beyond purely familial considerations (17,18).   
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6.6.1 The innate element of personhood 
The innate ring is constructed upon the Greco-Judeo-Christian idea of personhood 
that would see all persons as a reflection of God, imbued with human dignity and 
rights irrespective of the stage of development or degradation (19). This idea is 
echoed within Devine’s “species principle” that holds all members of “the 
‘species homo sapiens’ are persons whereas non-human animals, robots or 
extraterrestrial life cannot be persons” (53). The idea of innate personhood then 
posits the concept that all humans are conferred with personhood simply as a 
result of being human irrespective of their stage of life (17,18). It has been 
observed that this conception appears to be held by patients across all the races 
and both religious and irreligious groups (17,18). 
 
Figure 6.3 The Ring Theory of Personhood 
Innate personhood as represented by the innermost ring in Figure 6.3, upon closer 
observation is defined by two sets of elements, represented by a further set of two 
rings (Fig 6.4). The core element of innate personhood is made up of a person’s 
biological aspects, which is their genetic make-up that endows them with the 





personhood are a patient’s cultural, religious and familial descriptors that a 
patient is born into (17,18). These secondary elements, unlike the core elements 
of innate personhood, can change and are particularly susceptible to the effects of 
suffering (17,18).  The strength upon which each of these secondary elements is 
adopted by the patient affects the size of this outer ring (17,18). A new fervent, 
religious faith, for example, increases the size of this outer ring of innate 
personhood (17,18). An active adoption of cultural and familial identity that is 
increasingly resonant with the patient and increasingly portrayed by the 
individual, will affect the size of the rings. 
 
Figure 6.4 The constituents of innate personhood 
I will discuss the dynamics of these two rings of innate personhood and the 
flexibility of this framework in Chapter 7 where I consider the effects of suffering 
upon personhood.  
Whilst foetuses and the issues of their personhood lie outside the remit of this 
thesis, ostensibly, it might be concluded that this principle would grant them 
personhood from the point of conception. Similarly, patients, irrespective of their 
impaired consciousness or their terminal state, remain persons simply as a result 
of their continued resemblance to God and being part of the human species. From 
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conception of a “brain-life theory”, which would view life as a human being 
beginning at the point when the foetal brain begins to function, nor Rich’s priori 
of consciousness (2,17,18,54). Adaptations of Englehardt’s “potentiality 
principle”, which suggests that personhood begins at the point of fertilization and 
pivots on the ability of an individual to attain full brain function, are also not 
unanimously adopted by the palliative care community (17,18,53). Many patients 
hold that how a pregnancy develops is very much the “will of God” and it is 
unacceptable and “arrogant” to place any expectations on what level of function 
one is to achieve in order to be deserving of respect (17,18,55). Ascriptions of 
personhood hold to three points. The first point is that it is not the potential for 
consciousness that is central but the potential for life in any form that is central 
(17,18).  Once conceived, a person’s genetic and parental heritage, even in 
deteriorating function, at any stage of life remains unchanged, ensuring that 
personhood remains intact (17,18). 
The second is that whilst the patient will unlikely redeem their ability to express 
and function as an independent person in the dying phase, the potential remains 
(3,17,18). This, however unlikely it may be, negates the possibility of fully 
discounting the potentiality for a reversal of fortune and thus renders the 
‘potentiality principle’ useless (3). Thirdly, it ignores the third element within the 
Ring Theory, which considers the relational aspects of personhood and 
maintenance of some element of the patient’s selfhood within the family, social 
group or society as a whole by simply being a part of them (17,18). Within this 
Ring, relational bonds that form between the foetus and the mother and/or the 
father and the rest of the wider family will confer some elements of personhood 
328 
to the foetus (18). I will discuss the various aspects of the outermost ring a little 
later.  
In summary, innate personhood confers personhood so long as the patient is alive, 
solely as a result of being born with the genetic make-up consistent with what 
could be considered a homo sapien (17,18). Even newborns with genetic 
abnormalities such as trisomy 21, Kleinfelter’s syndrome or even Turner’s 
syndrome where there is an excess of or deficiency in their chromosomal make-
up, would still be conferred personhood, so long as the baby is born alive 
irrespective of any number of the physical disabilities encountered or their 
abnormalities upon appearance and functioning. Patients with mental and 
physical disorders at birth maintain a basic level of personhood deserving of 
rights and respect (17,18). Therefore, innate personhood is not lost even in 
anencephalic babies or in dying children who are abandoned or orphaned without 
any family to care for them, or those patients who may have been abandoned by 
family, and are destitute and alone without familial and social links (18). Innate 
personhood survives such isolation so long as the patient is alive. Death and the 
separation of the soul from the body are seen to end the connection with the 
Divine and thus end an individual’s personhood. 
 
6.6.2 Individual personhood 
The second ring of the Ring Theory is the individual ring and it encapsulates the 
innate ring (17,18). The individual ring depicts the second element of personhood, 
individual personhood. Individual personhood is associated with higher functions 
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of consciousness of the individual and would be akin to Buron’s own conception 
of individual personhood (16-18). Of particular importance to this aspect of 
personhood are its evolving nature, its dependence upon consciousness, its 
changeability in periods of altered consciousness and its association with the 
other elements of personhood seen upon the wider canvass of patient’s specific 
psychosocial, spiritual, cultural, familial, clinical and societal situation (17,18). 
Individual personhood, unlike innate personhood, is entirely dependent upon 
conscious function and can be lost; the individual ring can experience alterations 
in its size depending on the ability of the individual to maintain the 
consciousness-defined elements of personhood that Fletcher and Rich hold to 
(3,17,18). Individual personhood is lost entirely during periods of 
unconsciousness but can be regained as soon as consciousness is returned. The 
extent to which individual personhood is re-established, however, is dependent 
upon the ability of the person to reclaim his self-awareness, self-control, sense of 
time, sense of futurity, sense of the past, capacity to relate to others, concern for 
others, communication with other persons, control of existence, curiosity, change 
and changeability, balance of rationality and feeling, idiosyncrasy, and 
neocortical function (3,17,18). Full restoration after unconsciousness would entail 
redeeming these functions to the level that was possessed before the period of 
unconsciousness. The appreciation of the multidimensional aspects of the 
patient’s specific context is important to appropriately appraise their abilities. 
The capacity to communicate and maintain “psychological continuity”, moral 
agency and self-awareness are key in order for the individual to expand their 
potential for individuality (17,18). This ring grows as the various abilities mature 
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and become more consistent. From this ring of personhood, a patient develops 
traits of their own that are specific to their character and enable them to exert their 
independence from others, as would be the case in a maturing child. As a result of 
these maturing abilities, the child would form their own relations that are 
independent of the familial links and based on their own characteristics. This 
independence increases their individual personhood. In so doing the individual 
ring expands as personal identities replete with values, beliefs, psycho-spirituality, 
roles, personality traits and preferences, personal goals and emotional maturity 
grow. 
Consistency in the abilities to maintain the various aspects of their individual 
personhood is also important. This would involve the ability to control emotions 
and manage the effects of external factors upon their ability to maintain their 
cognitive and neurological functions. Concentration and temperance in mood and 
responses affect the size of the ring, as do physical changes and psychosocial 
factors. Control of these factors is key to a consistent individual ring.  
Individual personhood, however, also begins to experience changes in periods of 
semi-consciousness, confusion and with dementing processes too (17,18). Lapses 
of concentration, emotional distress or psychological strain may all impair 
function for a prolonged period, as can psychological states such as depression, 
anxiety and mania.  
In a dementing process, the extent and speed that personhood dissipates is 
dependent upon how many of the prime characteristics are retained and how well 
the person is able to exercise them. Dissipation of individual personhood contains 
temporal and specificity aspects to considerations. How fast the impairment in 
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consciousness has been occurring and how long it lasts affects the speed of 
contraction and the re-expansion of the ring. Maturity of the various 
characteristics and the consistency of these elements of individual personhood do 
play a part in the speed of contraction in periods of impaired consciousness. A 
consistent, mature individual ring will be retained better than one that a child may 
possess. Similarly, the patient’s ability to recover is critical. A depressed patient 
after a stroke will take longer to recover than a stroke patient that is emotionally 
well. The speed of adaptations to physical deteriorations and the patient’s general 
health also play a role. 
These factors highlight the importance of a holistic appreciation of the patient’s 
situation. A dementing patient who is slowly losing their abilities to communicate 
and mobilize may encounter a changing level of individual personhood similar to 
that experienced by a patient with severe depression or chronic illness. Reliance 
solely on the functional elements of consciousness does not fully capture the 
influences of other factors upon individual personhood.  
It is also important to understand that change in the individual ring also 
influences the adjacent rings. An outward expansion of the individual ring does 
not to encroach upon the position of the adjacent rings but does usually institute a 
corresponding and proportional growth in the outer ring too. This is because such 
growth in the individual facilitates relationships that arise by virtue of the 
individual’s own personality and characteristics, such as friendships and romantic 
liaisons, rather than the relationships that arise as a result of familial connections. 
Similarly, a failing individual personhood will cause contractions in the size of 
the relational ring. Maturing and expanding individual personhood confers an 
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interest in the manner that these patients wish to be viewed and cared for when 
they are no longer able to do so themselves or help direct the manner that care 
would be afforded. This, then, forms the basis for surviving interests. I will 
discuss this aspect of personhood a little later. 
This idea of size also reveals the rather arbitrary boundaries of each of these rings 
and reiterates their porous nature. Individual and innate personhood affect the 
next ring of the ring theory, which relates to relational personhood. The role of 
individual personhood in influencing and forming and maintaining relationships 
and social bonds is integral but not singular in its effects upon the relational ring. 
Innate personhood, simply by being born human and being cared for, creates 
inherent relational links that will manifest themselves as elements of relational 
personhood.  
Given the direct interactions between the innate ring and the relational ring, the 
Ring Theory of Personhood is conceived as two un-centred rings within a third 
ring (Fig 6.3). 
 
6.6.3 Relational personhood 
The relational ring occupies the outermost ring of the Ring Theory of Personhood 
and is closely linked to the individual ring and the innate ring (17,18). The 
concept of relational personhood grows out of increasing data within palliative 
care settings that show that patients, whilst keen to exert their independence and 
individuality, do consider their families and carers as part of the most intimate 
and important elements of their extended selves (34-43). Furthermore, inspired by 
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Joseph Fletcher’s 15 criteria for the “status of person”, Rich acknowledges that 
interactions with others – highlighted by concern for others and being able to 
communicate with and relate to others – are essential elements of personhood 
(2,17,18). Kitwood holds that the family can facilitate the continued presence of 
these characteristics, particularly within the family unit itself where the partially 
incapacitated patient’s gestures, utterances, facial expressions and body 
movements, for instance, may be interpreted and understood by those who know 
the patient well (15). 
Rather unsurprisingly, in a society that practices family centric beliefs, the 
definition for this final ring is heavily influenced by how “family” is conceived. 
Drawing on Anita Ho’s delineation of familial ties, as it best reflects the wide 
spectra of bonds and ties that are seen in care of palliative patients, those who are 
seen to influence the relational ring are those  
“people who are emotionally or psychologically close to one another. 
Such definition can include biological and adopted families as well as 
other domestic and intimate relationships” (27). 
At the centre of this definition is the need for the parties to be “emotionally or 
psychologically close to one another” ensuring the presence of a close bilateral 
relationship that would better communicate the nature and personhood of the 
patient (17,18,27). There are two prime elements to be considered here. The first 
is that there is acknowledgement of the family’s central role particularly where it 
is their influence that most frequently provides the best account of the person and, 
in turn, is instrumental in how others perceive the patient. As a result, it is the 
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family that are most frequently involved and play a part in directing the care of 
the patient.  
Secondly, there must be a mutual relationship present. As a result of this concept, 
membership is limited to those that have “powers to intervene or have direct 
influence in the patient’s affairs and personal welfare or share a personal 
relational link with the person which the patient themselves considered 
important” (27). For now at least, it is those relationships that are found within 
the confines of these criteria that are important, with one significant exception – 
the relationship between a foetus and its parents. I will explain the significance of 
those relationships found within and those outside these limits later.  
Based on communitarian ideas that see one’s identity preserved within a patient’s 
community, a person’s unique imprint is held to persist for as long as they are 
within the memories of the social groups that they are a party of. Enshrining these 
characteristics are the personal links formed with others through social, 
professional and/or familial roles. Underpinning these are four prime 
considerations. The first is the basic premise that the more personal bonds that 
are present in a patient’s life, the larger the size of the relational ring. These 
personal links are those enduring associations between the patient and another 
person where they influence each other, where thoughts are exchanged and 
feelings shared (56). Within these interactions, there are no defining roles to be 
played and each party “retains their character” in the interaction (56). It is further 
characterized by a reciprocal relationship and may potentially be a co-dependent 
interaction (57).  
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Secondly, there must be due consideration of the quality of relationships 
contained within the relational ring. The deeper or more established the 
relationships, the stronger and more abiding these relationships are, the denser the 
ring will be. This is highlighted in Figure 6.3 above where the darker green within 
the relational ring corresponds to the stronger deeper relationships, whilst the 
lighter shades of green correspond to “weaker” relationships. These weaker 
relationships would include friends and family with no significant personal, 
emotional or psychological ties. Aiding to determine the significance of these 
relationships within their roles in the relational ring is the Relational Significance 
Test, which I will explicate later.  
The significance of relationships, however, does introduce the third point, which 
relates to the nature of persistence of personhood in a community. This centres on 
the point that how a person is remembered within their social, familial and 
professional groups helps to preserve their personhood. However, to be clear, this 
preservation of memories of the person and particularly by the roles they played 
within these entities are only seen to aid in the endowment of personhood if there 
is actual direct personal emotional or psychological links between the person and 
the members of the groups (27). This reiterates the importance of the personal 
links such as those seen in a family, in endowing personhood. An employer and 
employee may have a long association but their association may not be personal 
and thus the role each played cannot be seen to endow the person with 
personhood. 
The fourth point is that patients do then have vested interests in how they are 
conceived, given that their retention in the memories of the community and 
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indeed family even upon their incapacity and eventual demise is dependent upon 
it. This creates a basis for surviving interests (17,18). I will discuss the influence 
of each of these factors in due course. 
The quality and number of personal ties that arise from familial, societal and 
professional association are integral to the size and density of the individual’s 
relational ring. The quality of relationships provides the density of the ring 
whereas the number of these personal links increases the size of the ring. The 
quality of relationships is a measure of the strength of personal psychological and 
emotional bonds between the patient and another.  
There is a need at this juncture to differentiate personal ties from ties formed as a 
result of roles that a person may have played. Having a personal friendship with 
the patient is very different from the emotional and psychological ties that may be 
formed between a person and the patient when the patient was playing the role of 
a leader, for instance. There is no doubt that these latter bonds may still engender 
close, strong emotional and psychological links; however, the fact remains that 
they do not fulfil the criteria for a personal relationship. Within the Ring Theory, 
it is the personal element that is the focus of the relational ring and the key 
element that influences the relational ring.  
Therefore, for the purposes of density, it is those strong personal relationships 
then that are of interest. These would include those relationships with significant 
emotional investment and consistency, usually seen within those relationships 
that have been nourished and tendered over years and ones that would endure 
over long periods of unilateral interactions. A much loved patriarch, may be 
assumed to have stronger relationships and a denser relational ring than a 
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significantly brain damaged child whose only relationships are those endowed by 
its mother.  
 
6.6.4 Linking the rings: Porousness 
To highlight the porousness of the rings, consider once more the anencephalic 
child and its mother; it is clear from the relationship between the mother and child 
that some relationships arise from the start of life (2,17,18,29). The anencephalic 
child’s relational personhood is conferred by his or her mother, and sees the depth 
and size of this ring as a function of the mother’s ascriptions. This close 
association between the innate ring and the relational ring explicates the rationale 
for the displaced or “off centre” position of the innate ring within the individual 
ring. It highlights the relationship between the innate and the relational as well as 
the direct influence each has on the other. The child’s relational personhood is 
also personal though the child has but will never develop the ability to form 
relationships of his or her own. It is the biological link between the child and the 
mother that entitles him or her to this most basic personal bond. Many mothers 
form bonds and relationships with their unborn babies even before a beating heart 
is present or the symptoms of pregnancy begin (29). The link is entirely unilateral 
and does grow in most cases with the growing pregnancy as a result of the direct 
connection between a mother and her unborn child. The unborn child then has 
both the innate and relational ring before they are even born. This relational ring 
may grow still further as bonds between the foetus’ father, its siblings, its 
grandparents and wider members of the family begin to take root. It is clear then 
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that there are some bonds within the relational ring that are almost innate, 
unilateral and may remain strong throughout life.  
Once born, denser rings will form when a person’s individual personhood begins 
to expand and create new bonds. Friendships and kinships strengthen and provide 
yet more density to an individual’s relational ring. As an individual matures some 
relationships such as his spousal and filial bonds become “cemented”. For a 
terminally ill patient who has developed such bonds, such bonds are consistent, 
unwavering and remain intact even when the patient himself begins to deteriorate 
and his mental faculties begin to fade. These links endure for as long as there is a 
continuing relational link with his family members and those who knew him 
personally. The strength of the bond is anticipated to resist deteriorations in the 
link over time, whilst less well “cemented” or indeed strong ties may begin to 
crumble after a brief space of time. Stronger bonds slow the degradation of the 
relational ring.  
It may be argued, though, that this is not always the case; there are mothers and 
indeed parents who do not wish to have a relationship with their children at all, or 
may not even know of or chose to acknowledge their child’s presence until much 
later in its gestation. There are also assumptions as to how far the relational link 
extends and who may endow the child with personhood. Does the father not 
endow the child with relational personhood? Does it extend to grandparents, 
prospective godparents, siblings, aunts and uncles? The answer lies in the 
Relational Significance Test, which reviews the nature of the relationship and the 
quality of the bonds formed. I will discuss the quality of the bonds first. 
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6.6.5 The nature and quality of relational links 
The quality of the bonds are critical to considerations and bears scrutiny. Within a 
family-centric society, for example, there remains a personal expectation upon the 
family members to comply with their filial roles. Consider the case of the 
terminally ill Mr Chong and the anencephalic child who are both members of 
their respective families and as a result are owed care by the family. These take 
the form of bidirectional interactions within the context of filial piety and familial 
and social expectations respectively that need not be personal but based entirely 
upon the roles played within the family. In Mr Chong’s case, family members are 
expected to carry out their filial duties and care for him. This would be true 
irrespective of whether they shared a personal relationship with one another. The 
familial link grants such a privilege and a duty upon all its members (20-22,34-
43). These obligations would be maintained until death. Family members are also 
aware that failure to fulfil these duties would reflect badly upon them on a social 
and wider familial stage (20).  
Additionally, in keeping with Confucian beliefs, for Mr Chong’s family members 
and the family members of the anencephalic child their duty of care for their 
family members is also part of their own growth and development 
(17,18,20,34,35). Therefore, family members have their own vested interests to 
meet these obligations appropriately (17,18,20,34,35). Such provisions of care are 
extended to any vulnerable member of the family (17,18,20,34,35). The 
anencephalic child would be owed care simply as a result of being a child within 
the family and the family as a whole would be remiss in their social and familial 
obligations if they fail to care for the child (17,18,20,34,35). The bonds that 
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would on the surface be influential to the size and density of the relational ring, 
may in fact be influenced by the interests of the carers.  
So, what bonds truly affect the relational ring, and would these self-motivated 
actions of the wider family still be considered sufficiently important to be 
considered part of the patient’s personhood? How would these bonds be any 
different from those of the carers paid to look after the child? Is a familial link 
sufficient to trump all other forms of bonds? What about the concerns of a 
surrogate family who had yet to complete the adoption of a seriously ill child? 
More attention needs to be paid to these points and I will return to them at a more 
opportune time in this chapter. 
“Strong” bonds may be unconventional in nature as was the case of Thava who 
was a cleaner at a local hospital. When the chief pediatrician at the hospital 
suffered a stroke, it was Thava who visited him daily for the three years that Dr 
Sam was an inpatient at a local nursing home. Here the bond was formed as a 
result of the respect Dr Sam showed Thava in simply acknowledging him on his 
ward rounds. They had barely exchanged more than simple pleasantries and yet 
Thava felt a kinship to this prominent man for the effort he made to be courteous 
to him.  
Similar situations arise from those patients who have formed bonds with their 
carers and friends; temporal continuity imbues them with enduring bonds that 
allow for these patients’ identity and sense of self to persist in their external links. 
Yet the question arises as to whether this impacts on the individual’s personhood. 
In Dr Sam’s case, the staff went out of their way to care for him, regularly 
slipping a pot of orchids into his room, for the simple pleasure of caring for this 
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poor mute. In this “relationship”, the bonds that were formed with the staff of the 
nursing home arose as a result of his role as a patient and as a result of his past 
deeds. The personal care and affection that the staff showered upon the patient 
and the duration of these actions may be said to have led to “real” bonds being 
formed and genuine concern for the “person in the bed”. Would these links 
conceived by the staff that do not possess a personal bilateral association with the 
patient affect the patient’s personhood?  
In Dr Sam’s case with the staff, and Mr Chong’s case with the grateful beneficiaries 
of his philanthropic work, these links did not affect their respective relational rings 
given that they did not contain a personal bidirectional aspect to them. These links, 
however, still played a part in ensuring that their respective positions in society and 
their roles in the lives of others remained intact. There is another element to be 
considered when others confer personhood in addition to considerations of the 
nature of the relationship: the will of the person conferring it.  
 
6.7 THE RELATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE TEST 
For Thava and the staff looking after Dr Sam, there was a will to promote Dr 
Sam’s well-being. Their influence ensured the protection of Dr Sam’s personhood. 
The greater their interest, the more they ensured that Dr Sam’s personhood was 
maintained. This will to continue to care was exhibited in Thava talking to Dr 
Sam and reading the newspapers to him and by the staff caring for him, providing 
flowers for him and ensuring that he was always well-groomed and treated with 
dignity. The impetus involved in protecting the personhood of these patients by 
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various parties is complex. Consider some of the fans of Michael Jackson whilst 
he was being resuscitated, or Tupac Shakur whilst he was on a ventilator, who 
believed that they had personal relationships with the artists themselves albeit 
through their recordings, films and books. These fans had an interest in protecting 
the personhood of the celebrities, much like Thava or the staff of Dr Sam’s 
nursing home had for Dr Sam to treat him as whole and deserving of respect. 
However, for the most part, their influence was limited to ensuring that the innate 
part of Dr Sam’s care were met. They did not have a personal relationship that the 
patient considered important when they were conscious and thus did not influence 
personhood. 
The question then arises as to whether it was appropriate to allow the great-
grandchildren who barely knew Dr Sam personally but who had come together to 
care for him out of their filial obligations to be conferred a place in determining 
the patient’s relational personhood, but not Thava or the staff of the nursing home. 
A multidimensional and individualized review of these relational links are called 
for. Such a review is called the Relational Significance Test.  
The Relational Significance Test sets out to review a specific relationship on a 
multidimensional level. This process begins with a review of the situation 
objectively, based upon the information that is generally available concerning a 
relationship, such as a relationship between parents and a child or the relationship 
between a healthcare professional and a client. Objective standards based upon 
sociocultural expectations and, where appropriate, professional standards are 
applied. This is taken to provide a general framework upon which a relationship 
is reviewed.  
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To introduce the nuances, including specific social and case-specific 
considerations, a subjective review of the case is carried out. This combination of 
an objective review followed by a subjective review ensures a standardized 
process to this evaluation that does not neglect the nuances of the case-specific 
considerations to appropriately ensure that those relationships that ought to be 
considered within a patient’s personhood are afforded their due place in these 
deliberations.  
Consider the relationship of a child and their mother. Objectively it is a 
relationship that is socioculturally, legally and professionally acknowledged. This 
relationship therefore passes the first part of the Relational Significance Test in 
having an objective basis for acceptance as a valid form of relationship. 
The second part is the subjective element of the relationship. Consideration now 
shifts to the stance of the mother toward the pregnancy. Not all pregnancies are 
desired nor do all mothers choose to acknowledge their pregnancies. Llandra, for 
instance, was afraid to form any links with her foetus after suffering two 
consecutive miscarriages. Lee, on the other hand chose not to “get close” to the 
baby as she was acting as a surrogate for a friend and her partner and knew that 
she would have to “surrender” the baby. In both cases, the mothers did not wish 
to endow the child with a relational element beyond their innate personhood for 
very different reasons. In these cases, it cannot be assumed that the child has a 
relational element to their personhood any more than June’s child, whom the 
mother plans to abort. Kerry’s child is to be aborted, too, but only because Kerry 
is suffering severe preeclampsia that threatens her life. Kerry however has 
endowed this child with a name and even bonded with her. Ayrton, Kerry’s child 
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has a relational element to his personhood over and above his inherent innate 
personhood. In each of these cases the Relational Significance Test shows the 
importance of considering the subjective factors to a relationship. 
The Relational Significance Test also helps with a more difficult yet just as 
important consideration: the position of the father’s relationship with the unborn 
baby. Objectively, there are two considerations; like the maternal relationship 
with the child, the paternal relationship is recognized by legal, professional and 
sociocultural standards, with the additional consideration of the Confucian 
element, which also reiterates the paternal link to the child. However, all 
relationships prior to the birth of the child occur through the mother and cannot 
be considered to endow the child with elements of relational personhood since 
there is no ongoing physiological connection between father and baby except 
through the mother. This argument sits rather precariously and is difficult to fully 
explicate particularly if it has been argued that the child has been said to already 
have its own personhood and thus is already considered an individual deserving 
of respect and consideration. One explication is that whilst the child is provided 
with innate and relational personhood in utero, these elements of personhood are 
framed and supported by the mother’s extension of her own relational and innate 
elements of personhood onto the child. Even when the mother does not desire to 
keep the child or chooses not to build a relationship with the unborn child, the 
physiological link remains and maintains the child’s innate personhood. The 
precise importance of this relationship within a specific case, however, requires 
application of the Relational Significance Test that lies outside the remit of this 
thesis.  
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The situation becomes a little clearer once the baby is born, where direct paternal 
relational links with the father can be formed should the father choose to. There 
must be due consideration to whether the father acknowledges the pregnancy to 
be his and wishes to participate in caring for the baby. The subjective element 
therefore will allow for the father to form a relational link with the child even 
though the child lacks consciousness, simply as a result of the biological link the 
child shares with the father and the father’s wish to care for the child. 
The situation with extended family members also requires more consideration, 
even though objectively their relationships with the child may be considered valid 
particularly under a Confucian framework. Subjectively, the links shared between 
the child and the extended family must depend upon the subjective information 
concerning each person’s link with the child. This discussion maybe transposed to 
the situation involving the unconscious patient where as a result of the 
relationship between the now unconscious parent and the children, it is the elder 
whose personhood is encapsulated by the family. In the case of Dr Sam’s great-
grandchildren, the objective question is whether they, as great-grandchildren, 
have a personal relationship with Dr Sam. The answer would be affirmative. 
Reviewing the situation subjectively, the fact that they did not really know Dr 
Sam is weighed up against the fact that they were all studying abroad and only 
saw Dr Sam during their school holidays. This did not relegate their relationship 
to be any less important than any other family member’s, especially as the great-
grandchildren still loved Dr Sam dearly and had written to him regularly and had 
their emails and texts read to him by the staff even after he was reduced to an 
uncommunicative state. On the subjective level, too, the relationship was deemed 
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sufficiently close to allow for them to be determinative of Dr Sam’s relational 
ring. 
Of the staff involved in the care of Dr Sam, the objective review would ask if it is 
possible for staff to develop relationships with their patients. The answer would 
be no but yet there is also an acceptance that they do do so, as Quill so vividly 
describes (57,58). A subjective review, however, reveals that part of the close ties 
that developed was because some of the staff had previously heard of Dr Sam and 
held him in high esteem and also because the owner of the nursing home had 
been cared for by Dr Sam many years ago. The links were thus not personal and 
based on the experiences of others with the patient. They thus fail the Relational 
Significance Test.  
Whilst relational personhood is led by Anita Ho’s definition of family, given the 
prevailing family-centric views practiced widely around the world, it does 
engender a particularist view to each relationship that is considered using the 
Relational Significance Test. This is because it is those who pass the Relational 
Significance Test that are deemed to have “powers to intervene or have direct 
influence in the patient’s affairs and personal welfare or share a personal 
relational link with the person which the patient themselves considered 
important” (27). 
With this in mind, addressing Mr Chong’s case becomes clearer. Here the 
presence of filial obligations alone do not endow strong relational links instead it 
is those important and personal relationships with the various members of his 
family that matter within these determinations. 
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6.8 IS THE APPLICATION OF CDPS AKIN TO  
EXTINGUISHING PERSONHOOD? 
An important element of clinical observation that this model explains is the 
discernible change in the manner that a patient is viewed upon the onset of 
iatrogenic sedation to unconsciousness or “natural” unconsciousness as a result of 
a disease process. Whilst the innate element of personhood remains intact, the 
individual ring is lost and the relational element becomes involute. For instance, 
as the duration of unconsciousness persists, visits and attention from 
acquaintances recede, the roles that the individual play in groups even in work 
settings are slowly revised and repealed. The lighter coloured rim of the outer 
circle does contract to leave the darker elements of the relational ring that 
correspond to those closest and dearest to the patient.  
Inducing unconsciousness, therefore, does impact personhood and as a result 
cannot be considered to be an undertaking to be met lightly. However, it does not 
prove fatal to the patient’s personhood. Despite a change in how personhood is 
perceived, it not lost completely and thus does not fall victim to the belief that 
CDPS renders a person “socially inert” and thus dead (17,18). This distances the 
application of CDPS from inducing social death. Personhood is not sacrificed for 
the sake of symptom control; therefore, no comparison can be drawn with 




In this chapter, I have confronted a new threat to the practice of CDPS and have 
addressed it by forwarding the clinically relevant framework of the Ring Theory 
of Personhood. I have argued that whilst there is a decrease in the extent of an 
individual’s personhood, in truth, it is not lost completely. With the help of the 
clinically based Ring Theory of Personhood, the cloistered views of personhood 
that would see the application of CDPS in the same light as social death are laid 
to rest.  
Additionally, the Ring Theory helps reiterate the need to continue to respect and 
treat all patients with consideration and concern irrespective of their subjective 
psychosocial and clinical conditions. It also sets out to uphold the 
acknowledgement rights and surviving interests of patients in all stages of life and 
ensures that patients are cared for in a manner that is commensurate with their 
beliefs, values and wishes at all stages of life. The Ring Theory in sitting itself 
within palliative care also ensures that considerations move beyond narrow views 
of personhood to consider familial, psychosocial and spiritual considerations in a 
balanced and holistic manner. This is highlighted in the next chapter when I 
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There is general consensus that personhood is pivotal to palliative care 
considerations particularly given its central role within quality of life (QoL) 
determinations, the preservation of dignity and the provision of “active total care” 
(1-7). Understanding the effects of suffering upon personhood and its potential 
compromise of the central objectives is essential to care determinations (6-8). The 
Ring Theory of Personhood crystallizes the impact of suffering upon this wider 
social construct of personhood. Understanding these effects is invaluable to a care 
landscape that continues to adopt differing approaches to care of physical and 
existential suffering.  
Part of this dissonance in approaches is due to a lack of consensus as to what 
forms of suffering lie within the remit of modern medical care and the limits to 
the efforts expended to address them (9,10). I have shown in Chapter 2 that 
deference to “alternative” treatment modalities that authors such as Jansen and 
Sulmasy employ can no longer be viewed as appropriate within a palliative care 
practice led by a multidisciplinary team (MDT) (9). However, resistance towards 
homogenous treatment of all forms of suffering persists (9). There are two issues. 
Firstly, there is a general unease about labelling suffering as intractable when a 
clear definition to the suffering is still lacking (9). I will return to Jansen and 
Sulmasy’s concern of a lack of a “concrete” diagnosis later on in this chapter (9).  
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The second issue revolves around a general lack of understanding of existential 
suffering and the precise limits of care that may be utilized to address this form of 
suffering (11,12). This is particularly clear within the Dutch setting where such 
determinations amongst the terminally ill could result in the iatrogenic demise of 
the patient (11,12).  
I have argued that comprehending the full effects of suffering is integral to the 
provision of appropriate and proportionate care at the end of life. I submit that if 
the effects of existential suffering upon personhood is as far reaching and as 
severe as those seen with physical suffering, then the present differential 
approach to the treatment of intractable suffering at the end of life cannot be 
viable.  
To begin, I accept the proposition that physical suffering is multidimensional and 
thus has the potential to affect all aspects of personhood. My task now is to 
investigate if the effects of existential suffering upon personhood have similar 
repercussions.  
 
7.2 CONCEIVING EXISTENTIAL SUFFERING 
There are two schools of thought with regard to existential suffering (12). I will 
refer to them as the “discrete” and the “holistic” views of suffering. The 
“discrete” perspective would see existential suffering delineated by 
“13 categories, including meaninglessness in present life, meaningless in 
past life, loss of social role functioning, feeling emotionally irrelevant, 
dependency, fear of being a burden on others, hopelessness, grief over 
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imminent separation, ‘why’ questions, guilt, unfinished business, life after 
death, and faith” (13). 
This “discrete” view is best exemplified by Jansen and Sulmasy’s conception of 
“agent narrative suffering” and Morita’s refractory psycho-existential suffering 
(9,13,14). Morita states that  
“[r]efractory psycho-existential suffering as an indication for palliative 
sedation was defined as psychological distress not accompanied by 
physical symptoms, such as feeling of meaninglessness / worthlessness, 
burden on others / dependency / inability to take care of oneself, death 
anxiety / fear / panic, wish to control the time of death by oneself, 
isolation / lack of social support, and economic burden” (14). 
Morita circumscribes the presentation of psycho-existential suffering from 
physical suffering, creating two separate and unrelated entities (14). Like Jansen 
and Sulmasy, Morita holds that the effects of existential suffering do not 
permeate to other realms of care nor are they expected to impact upon the family 
and carers of the patient (9,14).   
Bruce et al’s concept of “groundlessness” represents a more “evolved” form of 
Morita’s “discrete” view of existential suffering (14,15). Bruce et al hold that 
their “dynamic and fluid” perspective of existential suffering “compels health 
providers to acknowledge the complexity of fear and anxiety and the uniquely 
dynamic nature of these processes for each person” (15). The “groundlessness” 
that Bruce et al present results from being “shaken to the core” and is part of a 
social process, which the authors refer to as “longing for ground in a groundless 
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world” (15). The period of groundlessness is taken to symbolize existential 
suffering (15). Groundlessness  
“is a time and place of raw experience and frayed emotions. Participants 
used emotional terms in describing it, talking about fears, losses, 
questioning, worrying, discontinuity, pain, despair, frustration and anger” 
(15). 
Whilst Bruce et al conceive an evolving process to existential suffering, the 
effects remain confined to the “ultimate concerns that arise when a person is 
faced with mortality through illness, profound loss, or from deep reflection on 
what it means to be human” (15). Drawing from Yalom’s posits of 
“meaninglessness”, Bruce et al report that their concept of groundlessness “is a 
way of facing and leaning into the experience of loss, confusion, fear and 
uncertainty where loss of meaning is implicated” (15). 
Bruce et al introduce a further “dimension” to considerations by stating that the 
effects of existential suffering are not localized to solely patients but affect those 
persons who care for them (15): 
“Caregivers also experienced groundlessness. In situations when the 
patient’s suffering seemed irresolvable and no peaceful end was possible, 
an infectious or rippling suffering was evoked for some professional and 
family caregivers” (15). 
Bruce et al also see this element of existential suffering as being changeable and 
state that “caregiver suffering was heightened as the patient’s suffering endured 
despite all efforts to relieve it” (15). Bruce et al also show that there is reciprocity 
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to this suffering, and that the suffering of family members does affect the 
suffering of patients themselves highlighting a relatively new perspective of the 
discrete view of suffering.  
Unlike Bruce et al’s concepts that remains confined to “making sense and 
reconstruct[ing] one’s sense of self and life when it has been unravelled”, Tan et 
al provide a contrasting and holistic view of suffering (15,16). For these authors, 
existential suffering is a multidimensional experience “interwoven within the 
broader complexity of suffering” (13,16). Tan et al hold that  
“[p]ain and physical symptoms were experienced as existential realities 
that were inseparable from the various emotional, cognitive, and spiritual 
reactions triggered by the perception” (16). 
Tan et al add that so pervasive is this interconnectedness of suffering that 
suffering itself may be seen as an existential experience (16). For these authors 
suffering is then “defined as an unpleasant existential experience that occurs 
when the individual suffering threshold is exceeded” (16). This threshold is itself 
dependent upon a wide range of psychosocial, spiritual, physical and emotional 
considerations (16).  
I will consider the effects both these clinically evidenced views of existential 
suffering have upon personhood and palliative care objectives as a whole. 
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7.3 BRUCE ET AL’S “LONGING FOR GROUND IN  
A GROUNDLESS WORLD” THEORY 
In their article “Longing for ground in a ground(less) world: a qualitative inquiry 
of existential suffering”, published in BMC Nursing in 2011, Bruce et al study the 
existential and spiritual concerns of six palliative care patients, six family 
caregivers and ten healthcare professionals (HCPs) in Canada (15). Bruce et al  
“used grounded theory, a qualitative, systematic approach used to explore 
processes in the context of situated interaction, to explore the process of 
existential suffering. It involves the concurrent collection and analysis of 
data to formulate theories that are grounded in the worlds of the 
participants” (15). 
In this study, the authors note that the “participants’ understandings of existential 
suffering were as varied as seen in the literature”; however applying the social 
process of “longing for ground in a groundless world”, the authors are able to 
categorize the concerns of participants into three groups (15). The three groups 
are “engaging groundlessness, taking refuge in the habitual and living in the in-
between” (15). The authors conclude that groundlessness is a  
“process [that] involves moving between engaging groundlessness, in 
which people turn toward the discomfort of groundlessness and learn to 
let go; taking refuge in the habitual, in which people turn away from the 
discomfort, attempting to keep it out of consciousness by clinging to the 
familiar; and living in-between, in which people may create a balance 
within groundlessness and potentially find comfort in the instability” (15). 
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The term “groundlessness” is derived from a description of  
“‘being shaken to the core’. It also carried connotations such as ‘un’ terms 
such as feeling undone, unravelled, or unhinged to describe being 
groundless” (15).  
The authors report that patients 
“spoke of recognizing life is ending, having a profound sense of 
hopelessness, being unable to reconcile their experience with their 
spiritual faith, not understanding why God is doing this, having ones’ 
belief system shattered, experiencing extreme dissonance” (15). 
Despite the difficulties in articulating this feeling of groundlessness, the authors, 
drawing from the narratives of patients, deduce that the experience of 
groundlessness is “profoundly distressing, in that a patient’s world is shattering 
and his/her fundamental beliefs are called into question” (15). The authors are 
clear that this form of suffering revolve around a discrete set of issues and is 
manifested by “the experience of loss, confusion, fear and uncertainty where loss 
of meaning is implicated” (15). 
In “engaging groundlessness”, participants report “moving into the discomfort of 
being groundless and working with that instability” (15). Pivotal to this process is 
that “participants continuously renegotiate and reconfigure what is normal, as 
well as the sense of self, of relationships, and so forth” (15). The authors also 
report that this process continues, “as losses accumulate and one’s ability to 
actively engage groundlessness diminishes” (15). Participants spoke of “making 
new meaning of what is happening” to them during this process but admit that 
this effort at confronting the reality of their situation can be “too much” (15).  
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It is, therefore, not uncommon for patients to choose to take “refuge in the 
habitual” (15). Patients adopting this form of coping attempt to relate to things 
“as if nothing has changed” (15). Many do, however, accept that “compounding 
losses at the end of life … make[s] it harder to relate to the world through a veil 
of ideas that can no longer obscure those losses” (15). These patients may find it 
difficult to address many situations as a result of this stance. 
There are some patients who choose to adopt a more flexible position:  
“[L]iving in-between is an attempt to become comfortable with constant 
shifting within the experiences of losing ground, letting go of that loss, 
finding a new frame of reference only to realize that it, too, is a temporary 
ground that will slip away” (15). 
The authors note that patients find it difficult to talk about “existing in this state” 
(15). 
 
7.3.1 Reviewing Bruce et al’s data 
In all these states, existential suffering results in significant effects upon 
personhood. Before I review these effects based upon the Ring Theory of 
Personhood, there are a number of significant concerns with respect to this 
framework that need to be addressed. The application of the “longing for ground 
in a groundless world” process remains unproven in end-of-life care and the 
manner that Bruce et al elucidate the themes of this small study is unclear (15). 
The “concurrent collection and analysis of data to formulate theories that are 
grounded in the worlds of the participants” raises questions as to the effects of the 
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interpretations and inferences the investigators make of the individual narratives. 
The small sample size also casts doubts as to the validity of these themes. It is 
unclear if these themes were deduced from the data or were led by Balfour 
Mount’s and Yalom’s findings that the authors refer to in their paper (15). Were 
the typology of coping with suffering predefined or were the authors biased 
towards analyzing their data to meet these predetermined types of coping 
mechanisms? With the vacillations seen in patients choosing to adopt an 
“engaging groundlessness” approach to their suffering, the “denial” seen amongst 
those “taking refuge in the habitual” and the patient’s difficulty at discussing 
“living in-between”, it is questionable as to how these states could be identified 
from a single interview of so few patients (15).   
Biases also arise as a result of the participation of caregivers and HCPs in this 
study when reciprocal caregiver suffering is evident. In Strang et al’s study, there 
was a difference in the meaning and interpretation of the experience suffering 
amongst various HCPs, confirming fears of bias in reports (17). This suggests that 
not only were HCPs’ opinions better articulated than those of the ill patients but 
that their experiences are “tainted” with their own interpretations of the situation 
(17). These concerns reinforce earlier doubts that Bruce et al’s “concurrent 
collection and analysis of data to formulate theories that are grounded in the 
worlds of the participants” may be biased by the investigators own views (15). 
The relatively small sample used and the preponderance of family members and 
HCPs raises concerns that what is being described is swayed by what these 
observers deduce from the patient’s actions and narratives as well as their own 
beliefs (17). That the “self identification” of participants “as having experience 
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with existential suffering at the end of life were included in the study” also raises 
questions about the generalizability of this data (15).  
 
7.3.2 Implications of Bruce et al’s view of suffering upon personhood 
The biases and concerns in Bruce et al’s study whilst significant still reflect 
prevailing data (15). A further point of temperance is the acceptance that 
caregiver suffering has reciprocal effects upon the patient, meaning that whilst the 
caregivers may make their positions more clearly than the ill patients, their own 
experience with suffering is evidenced to impact and play a part in the suffering 
of the patient (16). Therefore, even if the data is biased by the presence of so 
many caregivers, the views can be seen to provide both a wider view of the 
patient’s suffering over time and also a different perspective to the suffering of 
patients. Providing more weight to the views of family and caregivers also allows 
for insight into what HCPs identify as existential suffering in practice and how 
they address the various forms of coping with existential suffering.  
 





I will utilize an evolved form of the Ring Theory of Personhood to consider the 
implications of Bruce et al’s views of suffering.  
 
7.3.3 Implications of Bruce et al’s conception of existential suffering on 
innate personhood  
Innate personhood is founded upon the notion that personhood is inherent from 
birth, by virtue of all persons being reflections of God, imbued with human 
dignity and rights, irrespective of their stage of development or deterioration. 
This ring is lost when the soul of the patient “departs the body” and the link with 
God is severed.  
Innate personhood is defined by two sets of elements. The core element of innate 
personhood is made up of a person’s biological aspects, which is their genetic 
make-up that endows them with the abiding status of being a human. The 
secondary elements of innate personhood are more changeable and are made up 
of the patient’s cultural, religious and familial descriptors that they were born 
into.  
 




- Familial Genetic 
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Bruce et al show that groundlessness leads to an “uncertainty and quest for firm 
footing”, which for many patients does not result in positive effects upon a 
patient’s secondary elements of innate personhood (15). The resultant effect of 
being “shaken to the core” affects a patient’s faith and relationship with God (15). 
These effects challenge beliefs and may weaken religious affiliations thereby 
diminishing the patient’s secondary elements of innate personhood.  
These effects can have wider repercussions. They may change the way patients 
think and determine their goals of care. Beliefs in a religion that sees suicide as a 
sin may be lost in these moments of “groundlessness” and new goals may now be 
focused upon securing an early demise (15). The patient’s goals of care and 
reasoning will reflect these changes in thinking. This also highlights a wider 
effect upon the individual ring, which I will address a little later. 
The other secondary elements of the innate ring are also affected by these 
changes. It is not uncommon for some family members to withdraw from the 
patient’s side when their situation deteriorates. Patient F was conscious but weak 
and tearful when some of her family began to excuse themselves from her side, 
unable to cope with her emotional liability and constant demands for reassurance. 
Amongst those who remained by her side, there were some who chose only to 
participate in “practical care” such as turning her and washing her but chose not 
to engage her on a more emotional and existential level.  As a result of her 
“isolation”, the “deeper” bonds between these family members and Patient F were 
lost. Patient F withdrew from her family sensing their own feelings of 
“groundlessness” (15). Shedding her familial links affected the secondary 
elements of her innate personhood, as it did her relational personhood.  
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In a society where causing suffering is viewed as a sin, Patient F also renounced 
her cultural heritage, upset that her suffering could cause such upset and distress, 
but also by the manner that her family acted on their cultural views and societal 
expectations. She stopped wearing her traditional clothes and refused to practice 
some of the cultural beliefs and mores.  
A three-dimensional representation of the elements of the innate ring is applied to 
better articulate the depth, affinity and importance of these elements to the 
patient. “Groundlessness” may not result in a complete loss of old values, beliefs 
and links but does cause a reduction in them. This change in affinity and 
importance sees the globe that represents the secondary elements of the innate 
ring contract. Reductions in importance of any of the secondary elements result in 
a reduction of the global size that encompasses the “inert” disc of the core of the 
innate ring (Fig 7.3). 
 
Figure 7.3 Innate personhood in 3D 
The effects of groundlessness, though, need not always be detrimental to a 
patient’s innate personhood. Bruce et al add that as a matter of “engaging 
groundlessness”, and the belief that “groundlessness is workable, that one can 
learn to let go”, this suffering may be overcome with an increase in the affinity 







rally together to support a patient (15). The globe of the secondary elements may 
then increase.  
Temporal comprehension of the effects of suffering then becomes important. At 
an early stage, the globe may be bigger as the families “rally around the patient”. 
As the situation evolves and the changes described occur, the globe may reduce in 
size before, given sufficient time and support and the ability to reconsider, the 
globe may re-expand. Understanding the effects of personhood must be a 
comprehension of the effects of suffering over time and not a “snapshot”. 
Understanding that these changes are possible helps the small MDT understand 
the thinking and rationale of the patient.  
This change in rationale is also reflected in the patient’s individual ring.  
 
7.3.4 Implications of Bruce et al’s conception of existential suffering on 
individual personhood  
The effects of suffering upon how a patient exhibits their self-awareness, self-
control, rationality, sense of time, sense of past, and sense of futurity affects the 
growth, maturity and consistency of individual personhood, and further highlights 
the dynamic nature of personhood. I argue that consistency and maturity of 
behaviour provide depth to the individual ring proffered in Chapter 6. The 
thickness of the individual ring is dependent upon the maturity and consistency of 
those characteristics associated with consciousness. Maturity is taken to mean the 
presence of more nuanced behaviours that one would expect of an adult, as 
opposed to the consistent behaviour of a child. Consistency in behaviour and 
367 
character is manifested in two forms. The first is the constancy in manifesting the 
various aspects of consciousness. When a patient’s beliefs and values change, are 
“shaken to the core”, or their mood and clinical conditions alter despite a constant 
level of consciousness, being able to maintain a consistent position and behaviour 
and temperament delineates consistency. Changes in behaviour and thought 
processes may result in vacillations in the way patients interact with others, in 
their rationality and in the temperance of their mood. This ability to tamper 
responses and to appropriately balance considerations goes hand in hand with 
maturity of character.  
Consider Jansen and Sulmasy’s case of Patient B, a man with end-stage 
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) (9). Reflecting Bruce et al’s findings upon 
Patient B’s case reveals that Patient’s B’s thoughts, decision-making processes, 
emotional responses, temperance in mood and rationality would be affected by 
his existential suffering (9). The ability of Patient B to behave in a manner that is 
both consistent with his previous thinking and previous characteristics is 
doubtful. Patient B’s individual ring reduces in size even without a change either 
in consciousness or in the number of elements of consciousness exhibited.  
The effects of existential suffering as Bruce et al conceive it will also change the 
manner that Patient B interacts with others. Bruce et al state that “[s]ometimes 
people engage the world through strongly held beliefs that provide solace, but 
that may no longer work in the current reality” (15). In “taking refuge in the 
habitual”, Bruce et al report that patients control their interactions in their coping 
with their existential suffering, which in turn affects their ability to express many 
of their conscious facilities and compromises their personhood (15).  
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A diminution of Individual personhood also affects their ability to control the 
manner that they are regarded. Whilst professional, social, cultural and legal 
standards ensure that there is a general standard to care provisions, patients are 
clear that these standards do not fully capture their individuality nor ensures that 
they are cared for in a manner that is consistent with their beliefs, values and 
aspirations. These effects also affect the relational ring of personhood.  
 
7.3.5 Implications of Bruce et al’s conception of existential suffering on 
relational personhood 
Bruce et al’s introduction of a wider concept of existential suffering that 
acknowledges the effects of suffering of the patient upon the family and that of 
the family upon the patient’s suffering, provides a more clinically-relevant 
understanding of suffering (15). The relational ring, whose size is a factor of the 
number of relationships a person has, and whose depth is defined by the strength 
and enduring nature of these relationships within the evolved form of the Ring 
Theory, display changes in size resulting from the effects of suffering on 
relationships with family and friends.   
Recall Patient F’s situation and her withdrawal from the family both as a result of 
their suffering and in response to their coping with her suffering, reveals a 
contraction in the relational ring. 
From the analysis of the effects of Bruce et al’s conception of existential 
suffering upon the various rings within the Ring Theory of Personhood, it is clear 
that despite Bruce et al’s discrete view of existential suffering, all three rings 
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contained within the Ring Theory of Personhood are affected, revealing wider 
repercussions to this experience than the authors originally acknowledge (15). It 
also highlights that much like the effects of intractable physical suffering at the 
end of life, intractable existential suffering has a similarly extensive effect upon 
the patient’s being as evidenced by the effects upon their personhood. The wider 
implications of this finding will be discussed later in this chapter.  
 
7.4 TAN ET AL’S  HOLISTIC VIEW OF SUFFERING  
UPON PERSONHOOD 
Tan et al hold that suffering in all its forms is a result of an overwhelming of a 
patient’s “suffering threshold” by various forms of distress (16). This “suffering 
threshold” is modulated by protective and risk factors that include the patient’s 
character and coping strategies, their support mechanism and stressors, their 
psychosocial and physical backgrounds, as well as their outlook and religious 
beliefs (16). Overwhelming of the threshold may arise from any form of distress 
and highlights the interconnected and holistic view of suffering that these authors 
expound in their “Existential-Experiential Model of Suffering” (16). Tan et al 
constructed the “Existential-Experiential Model of Suffering” from their thematic 
analysis of 20 semi-structured interviews of palliative care patients in Malaysia 
(16).  
From this clinically evidenced stance, the authors conclude that the experience of 
suffering is unique to the patient and changeable in character over time and 
circumstances. However, despite this capriciousness, the various forms of 
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suffering maintain a constant overlap between one another and allows them to be 
loosely categorized into existential suffering and experiential suffering. The 
authors describe existential suffering as  
“suffering from the perspective of existential realities, which include loss-
related events, named as deprivational events in the study; and gain-
related events, named as acquisitional events” (16). 
Experiential suffering on the other hand is seen as  
“suffering from the perspective of the inner experiences of the person, the 
unique, direct, first person experiences. It encompasses perceptual 
suffering that involves the experiences of suffering through the senses and 
reactional suffering that embraces all the unpleasant reactions triggered by 
perceptual suffering” (16). 
From their clinical data, the authors identify 10 forms of overlapping types of 
suffering and conclude that a more holistic view of suffering is required to 
adequately address an evolving concept of suffering (16). They also conclude that 
the present failure to address suffering as a multidimensional experience is 
contributing to suffering of many patients. The authors state  
“[p]ain and physical symptoms were experienced as existential realities 
that were inseparable from the various emotional, cognitive, and spiritual 
reactions triggered by the perception” (16). 
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7.4.1 Reviewing Tan et al’s data 
Whilst Tan et al do set out to delineate a multidimensional view of suffering, their 
formulations of suffering are “deduced from the fact that a beginning point of 
suffering might exist where a threat just began to be experienced as suffering” 
(16). Delineation of suffering based on their apparent etiological origins make 
these concepts categorical in nature and reminiscent of Jansen and Sulmasy’s 
concept of a causal relationship of suffering (9,16). This defeats the authors’ 
attempts to overturn the prevailing dichotomous view of suffering (9,16). This 
approach is also flawed in its failure to consider the potential for more than one 
cause for each form of suffering that they identify (16).  
Whilst the study was carried out in multicultural, multi-religious Malaysia, the 
participants were primarily from the minority Chinese population and did not 
reflect the multicultural beliefs present (16). There is little in the way of 
consideration of the influences of sociocultural, religious and familial factors in 
the determinations of the threshold of suffering. There are also other apparent 
oversights. A lack of explication upon the manner that each form of the 10 types 
of suffering are categorized under either existential or experiential themes casts 
further doubt on the analytic process (16). There is little explication as to why 
emotional suffering and spiritual suffering, which is defined as “suffering due to 
unmet spiritual needs”, are classified under experiential rather that than the 
classically understood existential category of suffering (16).  
There are also other conceptual concerns with Tan et al’s review. Tan et al 
suggest that experiential and not existential suffering is affected by perceptions 
(16). This position is highlighted in the apparent omission of interconnectedness 
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between the existential and the experiential arms of the Existential-Experiential 
Model of Suffering. This position sits diametrically opposite to received wisdom 
on suffering and palliative care opinion (16,18-20). Tan et al also fail to 
acknowledge the overlap between the experiential and existential forms of 
suffering, despite the data they present (16) 
 
7.4.2 Implications of Tan et al’s view of suffering upon personhood 
However, it is also in these oversights that the holistic nature of the suffering 
experience is brought to the fore. The authors do state that coded elements within 
the narrative analysis were applied more than once to describe the various forms 
of suffering (16). This highlights an overlap between the various forms and hints 
at, at least in part, the rationale behind the categorization of suffering into the 
various arms. On a larger scale, it also facilitates overlap between experiential 
and existential suffering, making the division of suffering between these two 
forms of “organizing themes” arbitrary (16). Tan et al final conclusion of a 
holistic view to suffering receives support from van Tol et al’s and Dees et al’s 
studies (11,16,21). 
With existential suffering evidenced to affect all elements of personhood when 
viewed either as a discrete entity or within a holistic framework, the implications 
upon the manner that palliative care addresses existential suffering need to be 
reconsidered.  
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7.5 IMPLICATION OF EXISTENTIAL SUFFERING UPON  
PALLIATIVE CARE PROVISION 
The findings from the applications of Bruce et al’s and Tan et al’s studies upon 
the Ring Theory of Personhood concur with the findings of Kissane, Rietjens et 
al, Schwartz and Lutfiyya, and Saunders on the growing evidence for a holistic 
view of suffering (5,7,22-24). A wider view of existential suffering and its effects 
is dawning with the advent of more clinical evidence in support of this more 
holistic view. Such understanding will be invaluable to the comprehension of 
suffering and the manner that patients address these issues, particularly how a 
patient’s views change and care decisions are affected.  
Such repercussions are not unexpected with Chochinov et al revealing that 
existential suffering is associated with psychological distress, quality of life and 
suffering, and Kissane, Rietjens et al, Schwartz and Lutfiyya, and Saunders 
showing independently that this experience changes a patient’s beliefs and values 
(5,7,8,15,16,22-25). Rietjens et al state 
“[m]any patients approaching the end of life suffer from more than 
physical symptoms alone: emotional and existential problems including 
hopelessness, death anxiety and disruption of personal identity may occur 
as well. This sometimes happens to the extent that patients attach no value 
to continuing to live or at least to consciously experiencing their life” (24) 
Such changes and experiences trigger re-evaluations in the stances of patients 
upon many aspects of their own care, as well as in their goals of care and in the 
manner that it is provided (22). Kissane states that these responses may range 
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from avoidance of medical care and non-adherence to treatments so as to affect 
the ability of these patients to make decisions, questioning their cultural or ethnic 
values and beliefs, and an increase in religious doubt (22). LeMay and Wilson 
add that the presence of intractable existential suffering increases “a patient’s risk 
for suicidal ideation and desire for death” (25). Gonen et al also report that there 
is an increase in psychiatric morbidity amongst these patients, whilst Puchalski 
reports that it may worsen physical pain, “impact coping” and decision making 
(26,27). These issues alter a patient’s focus of care and compromise the manner 
patients protect their best interests and may potentially jeopardize competence 
(22,26-30).  
Recall Patient B, who as a result of his existential suffering due to amyotrophic 
lateral sclerosis suffers from what Tan et al would refer to as “dependent 
suffering” (9,16). Patient B’s experience with the “compassionate psychiatric 
social worker” and the psychiatrist reveals that he also suffers from emotional, 
terminal, interactional, differential, cognitive and spiritual suffering (16). These 
forms of suffering straddle both experiential and existential forms of suffering 
within Tan et al’s Existential-Experiential Model of Suffering, highlighting the 
interlinking nature of these various forms of suffering (16). These findings are 
echoed in Bolmjso’s study of existential suffering amongst patients diagnosed 
with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (31). The presence of this suffering results in a 
change in the manner that Patient B would act to protect his interests. Bolmjso’s 
study reveals that many patients like Patient B experience anxiety, suicidal 
thoughts and thoughts of euthanasia (31). For Patient B, an early demise or even 
palliative sedation (PS) would be better than his present state of existence. 
Patient B therefore acts to realize his goals that would remove him from this state 
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of distress. To do so, Patient B exhibits a change in his thinking and deliberation 
so as to realize these goals. The same argument will also apply to Jaafar’s case. It 
is this shift in thinking amongst patients that validates the need for a wider, 
balanced deliberative process under the aegis of a small multidisciplinary team 
(MDT) that I forward in Chapters 2 and 3.  
What is clear from Patient B’s case and Jaafar’s case is that they developed 
existential suffering as a result of a coadunation of their individual psychological, 
social and physical state that overwhelmed their “suffering threshold” (16). These 
cases also reveal that the effects of existential suffering affect every element of 
the patient’s being and can be seen to impact upon the patient’s quality of life and 
comfort in a similar manner that intractable physical suffering does. The question 
that then arises is what rationale can be given to justify the dichotomous view 
taken on the treatment of existential suffering and physical suffering? 
Could it be the concern articulated by Jansen and Sulmasy that there exists no 
pathological diagnosis for this suffering? (9,32). If, as Vehling et al reports, 
existential suffering is a response to physical suffering and disability, and if as 
Tan et al and Vehling et al suggest, the potential risk factors and protective 
factors are known, why is there no means of a firm, reproducible, evidenced-
based means for a diagnosis of existential suffering? (16,33). 
 
7.6 A DIAGNOSIS OF INTRACTABLE EXISTENTIAL SUFFERING 
The lack of a succinct and universally accepted definition for existential suffering 
is a reflection of a failure to understand the process and to comprehend the extent 
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of its effects both temporally and holistically. A dearth of longitudinal studies in 
this field, particularly when the significant sociocultural factors need to be fully 
understood, and a lack of a flexible diagnostic framework that can address the 
subjectivity of these symptom reports merely hamper the process (34-36). 
However, there is no lack of recognition of the constellation of symptoms that 
make up existential suffering (31-46). 
It is clear from the data provided thus far that general medicine’s present 
preoccupation with the American Psychiatric Association’s (APA) fifth edition of 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Diseases to provide a 
“dimensional assessment” of existential suffering is misplaced (9,13-16,38). This 
hope merely highlights a poor understanding of the process of existential 
suffering and a continued reliance upon poorly conceived notions of existential 
suffering. Data that I have reviewed thus far will clearly substantiate the fact that 
existential suffering is not confined to psychiatric or solely emotional planes (13-
16). A wider view is required. 
The North American Nursing Diagnosis Association (NANDA) adopts just such a 
view and has recognized spiritual suffering as a nursing diagnosis since 1980 (34-
36). Expansion of this idea to encapsulate the wider ideas of existential suffering 
is already on the way (34-37). The lesson that NANDA’s position highlights is 
that a wide and multidimensional view of this issue is required. Modern medicine, 
which has compartmentalized itself along various areas of subspecialties, is not 
best placed to address a multidimensional issue such as existential suffering. 
Palliative care on the other hand, with its diverse areas of interest and its multi-
professional and multidimensional approach, offers a solution.  
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Intractable existential suffering at the end of life already lies within the remit of 
palliative care and a palliative care physician is required, under the guidelines set 
out here, to substantiate any diagnosis of intractability when continuous deep 
palliative sedation (CDPS) is being considered. Furthermore, its small 
multidisciplinary team (MDT) approach is better able to comprehend the 
experience holistically and across the patient’s family and carer circles, 
particularly given the reciprocity of this form of existential suffering.  
A further response to Jansen and Sulmasy’s concern that no concrete diagnosis 
exists for existential suffering lies in reiterating that whilst there is a lack of 
consensus in the manner that existential suffering is perceived, there is no lack of 
recognition of this pathological process and its implications upon the patient and 
their family and carers (13-16,31-46). A lack of a diagnostic framework for 
dying, for example, does not in itself prevent acknowledgement that it occurs in a 
myriad of ways. Dying is recognized as a process and treated as one. 
Comprehending existential suffering in a similar light may offer a suitable 
solution for existential suffering. Vehling et al reiterate this “processual” concept 
(33). The authors state 
“cancer patients face considerable existential challenges across all disease 
phases, despite the changing backgrounds of these concerns. Thus, the 
‘shock of diagnosis’ frequently experienced by cancer patients is often 
attributed to the confrontation with the fundamental (existential) fact of 
the finiteness of one’s life and may be followed by an existential ‘plight’ 
over months. The phases of recurrence and/or metastization, however, 
often confront patients with limited life time and growing physical 
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constraints. The increase of distress in the palliative treatment phase found 
in the present study suggests a culmination of existential concerns toward 
the end of life” (33) 
Morita et al and Tan et al report that existential suffering is subject to a great 
number of other considerations, particularly from a cultural and social point of 
view; unlike the entirely clinical presentation of the dying process, these other 
considerations merely complicate the situation and results in the need for further 
studies like that of Tan et al’s on various ethnic, religious and cultural groups 
(16,39).  
The primary obstacle to the forwarding of a comprehensive diagnostic platform 
for intractable existential suffering is a failure to understand suffering itself. The 
data above shows that existential suffering and physical suffering are interrelated 
and that they both create equally adverse effects upon the patient and their family 
and carers. To attempt to forward a framework for the diagnosis of existential 
suffering akin to that expected of intractable physical suffering at the end of life is 
to continue to promote a dual view of suffering.  
Forwarding a diagnostic platform for existential suffering is not about expanding 
or adapting the diagnostic platform for intractable physical suffering at the end of 
life since no firm diagnostic frameworks exists for intractable physical suffering. 
Thus far a diagnosis of intractable physical suffering has been a diagnosis of 
exclusion, a diagnosis made when physical suffering no longer responds to 
treatment measures and no viable alternative remains.  
Intractable existential suffering does not exhibit any specific nor reproducible 
parametric changes in the patient’s condition, but its effects are equally 
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devastating to the patient, their family and carers. It is clear that to appraise these 
effects and treat them require a holistic review. Given that this form of suffering 
is discussed within the context of end-of-life care and requires multidimensional 
assessment and treatment, it becomes clear that diagnosis and care of existential 
suffering at the end of life must fall under the aegis of palliative care.  
A multidimensional view of suffering is already a central precept of the palliative 
care ethos, as is a holistic view of suffering. A palliative care approach avoids 
discrimination in the extent of care on the basis of aetiology but instead adopts an 
inclusive view of care. This prevents it becoming mired within a specific form of 
treatment and enables it to adopt multipronged approaches to care that include 
alternative as well as traditional medical options. These approaches are in turn 
overseen by a MDT that in turn provides the balanced oversight required. These 
factors reinforce the position that the diagnosis and treatment of existential 
suffering should be a palliative care diagnosis. 
 
7.7 CONCLUSION 
It is a lack of comprehension of the process of suffering and its implications and a 
failure to appropriately site end-of-life care within a palliative care approach that 
underpins the primary reason why terminally ill patients experiencing existential 
suffering are not provided with the care that they require.  
It is as a result of this oversight that many of the existing PS and TS guidelines 
remain compromised and not suitable to their allotted roles. Reliance upon 
preconceived ideas of goals of care and the limits of medical interventions leave 
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these options decidedly hamstrung particularly when addressing complex 
presentations of suffering. It is clear from the evidence provided that this 
approach is not tenable and reinforces the fact that reliance upon holistically-
determined, case-based delineation of care that this thesis advocates is called for.  
Addressing these shortcomings ought to begin with appropriately providing a 
palliative care diagnosis to existential suffering within the complex and 
interrelated entity of suffering as a whole.  
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“CDPS, a ‘snow white like state’, till death’s kiss.” 
~Lalitha Sriharan~ 
 
Underpinning concerns with regards to the application of sedation at the end of 
life is a lack of understanding, not simply of end-of-life care in general, but of 
palliative care itself. This is highlighted by the continued dissonance in the 
manner that palliative care goals have been adopted beyond the realms of 
oncology (1,2). This situation is not helped by a failure to include a palliative care 
presence and approach to the assessment, diagnosis and care of all terminally ill 
patients, particularly those with complex needs. 
It is thus no surprise that a palliative care approach has been largely neglected in 
the considerations for treatments such as palliative Sedation (PS) and terminal 
sedation (TS) until recently (3,4). It is this oversight that has propagated the 
continued controversies that have beset the practices of TS and PS. Whilst the 
European Association for Palliative Care (EAPC) and the Royal Dutch Medical 
Association (KNMG) have set about correcting this omission, more is required to 
address the procedural and ethical concerns that remain, particularly in light of 
the stark variances in care facilities and access to palliative care that is observed 
within diverse care settings (1-4). 
Despite these efforts, concerns with regard to the practice of TS and PS are liable 
to perpetuate as healthcare professionals confront practical limitations in the form 
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of dissimilar understanding of palliative and supportive goals in caring for these 
imminently dying patients with intractable suffering, differences in general 
medical and end-of-life clinical practice, and diverse access to palliative and 
supportive care (1,2). These differences fan fears that the inevitable variances in 
care provisions will potentiate the risk of abuse of these treatments. The situation 
is compounded by an eagerness amongst healthcare providers to produce 
guidance and treatment frameworks that are “inclusive” and that will cope with 
stark differences in care facilities and access to palliative care observed within the 
various palliative care settings [Appendix 3, 5 and 6].  
The pursuant “overly” inclusive and ultimately limited guidance upon the practice 
of TS and PS has not helped to alleviate concerns (5-11) [Appendix 3, 5 and 6]. 
Confronting these prevailing concerns and anticipating potential limitations – 
limitations that have moved beyond the well-documented fears of drug induced 
hastening of death, to involvement of the processes applied within the decisions 
to employ this treatment, as well the manner and means that it is employed and 
monitored – has been the focus of this thesis (8-20).  
Under increasing clinical, professional and legal oversight, it is merely a matter of 
time before more pages of clinical, philosophy and ethics journals are expended 
on “new” areas of concern as healthcare professionals (HCPs) begin to grapple 
with the practical considerations of controversial treatments such as continuous 
deep palliative sedation (CDPS) (3-7). Already questions have shifted from fears 
of an iatrogenic cause of death to one increasingly concerned with “social death” 
and the demise of personhood (21-23). As scrutiny of this practice grows, 
practical and procedural inconsistencies will undoubtedly arise, which I have 
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highlighted earlier. Circumventing and pre-empting these inevitable questions – 
questions that will mire this treatment option in yet more dispute and further 
compromise care of vulnerable patients with intractable suffering at the end of 
life – has been the central theme of this thesis. In this thesis I have presented data 
and ethical review of a number of key issues in the hope of allying these 
concerns.  
This thesis has argued for a holistic, palliative-care-led approach to the 
employment of sedation at the end of life in order to stem the evolving concerns 
about the various elements of CDPS practice. This thesis, by confronting present 
and potential areas of concern using prevailing clinical data and guidelines, as 
well as clarifying observed clinical practices to augment the overarching ethical 
review of the primary areas of concern, has addressed and negated many of the 
primary concerns with respect to the employment of CDPS. This is achieved, 
among other ways, by clarifying the process of determining the overall goals of 
care in Chapter 2 and the closely related process of decision-making involving 
palliative medical principles and practices, as well as the affirmation of the key 
role of the multidisciplinary team (MDT) within these proceedings in Chapter 3. 
These two areas are frequently neglected within prevailing guidelines on PS and 
commentaries by various clinicians and ethicists, a significant source of potential 
controversy for the practices of TS, PS and CDPS (Appendix 1-3, 5 and 6).  
This thesis has also set out the inclusion criteria and the manner that care is 
determined. Grey areas are not papered over but are addressed by an explication 
of the manner that proportionality, necessity and appropriateness is sited and 
viewed within the holistic multidisciplinary team review of a particular case. 
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There is no obfuscation of the methods nor obscuring the manner in which a 
small group of professionals – guided by regnant clinical guidelines, prevailing 
laws and social norms, and overseen by an independent specialist palliative care 
review – will liaise with the family and patient to facilitate a balanced, 
transparent, justified and accountable process of determining the best interests of 
the patient, the overarching goals of care, and the viability for the application of 
CDPS. Such a multidimensional, multiprofessional and inclusive approach to 
overseeing this intervention is inspired by the guidance set out by the European 
Association of Palliative Care Guidelines on the application of PS (3). This 
approach attempts to correct the past failures to appropriately site the practice of 
PS under the banner of palliative medicine and under the aegis of evidenced-
based medicine that have only served to compound the misconceptions about 
treatments such as PS and TS (9-16,24). It also lays to rest fear that this is a 
paternalistic, single-clinician based decision-making process. Standards of care 
and goals of care are guided by the Best Interest Principle and complemented by 
established clinical guidelines, legal expectations and social norms.  
Yet the solutions may be as difficult as the problem to overcome. Finding a 
practical compromise to a more “demanding” monitoring protocol in the face of 
new clinical data and care limitations featured in Chapter 6 would be difficult 
without the decision-making process advocated in Chapter 3. Clearly 
compromises require a case-by-case review guided by prevailing legal, 
professional and societal expectations and a clear understanding of what can 
realistically be provided by a MDT. 
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There are, of course, issues that have not been addressed in this thesis. A key 
element for future focus is the determination of intention, particularly within the 
MDT. Such a study extends well beyond the remit of this thesis but must surely 
be an area of interest for any coming study on end-of-life practices. 
It is hoped that this thesis will pave the way towards the production of clinically 
relevant, socioculturally sensitive, ethically appropriate practices that will address 
care of extremely ill and suffering patients whilst improving education about end-
of-life care and general medical care as a whole.  
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